Calendrier du mois de décembre 2015
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 18/12/2015 de 12:45 à 13:45
DEL VALLE Alejandro (GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY)
*
Macro Workshop
Du 17/12/2015 de 15:00 à 16:00
MSE Campus (106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris), room B. 3.1
FRANCESCO Furlanetto (NORGES BANK)
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 17/12/2015 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
LE CHAPELAIN Alexis (SCIENCE-PO)
*
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 15/12/2015 de 12:30 à 13:30
STEIN Mattea (PSE)
Reforming the Speed of Justice: Evidence from an Event Study in Senegal
écrit avec Coauthor : Florence Kondylis (World Bank)
Industrial Organization
Du 14/12/2015 de 12:00 à 13:15
() *;
La séance est annulée
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 14/12/2015 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
LESSARD Sabin ()
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 10/12/2015 de 16:30 à 17:45
Maison des Sciences Economiques, 6th floor conference room
MERTENS Karel (CORNELL)
Macro Workshop
Du 10/12/2015 de 15:00 à 16:00
MSE Campus (106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris), room B. 3.1
BARTAL Mehdi (PARIS 1 - PSE)
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 10/12/2015 de 12:45 à 13:45
RAI Birendra (University of Mannheim)
Preference Domains and Bilateral Bargaining: An Experiment
Theoretical results and experimental findings from competitive settings suggest that agents with other-regarding preferences (ORP) often behave as if they have self-regarding preferences. We say an institution (game form) is `robust' wrt ORP if the above holds. We experimentally explore whether and when such robustness arises in non-competitive environments using a series of ultimatum games where proposer's monetary payoff upon rejection varies. The data provides some insights into when and why robustness holds wrt which type of ORP.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 10/12/2015 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
ALBERTO Alesina ()
Organized crime, violence, and politics
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 09/12/2015 de 18:00 à 19:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 2
ROCABOY Yvon (UNIVERSITé DE RENNES)
Compétition entre ligues nationales de football: Existe t-elle ? Devrait-on la réguler ?
It is often supposed that the stakeholders of a national football league draw more satisfaction
from their sport if the league is balanced. This is the so-called Competitive balance
hypothesis. If there exists an international competition like the European champions league,
this hypothesis can be challenged however. The utility of national leagues’ stakeholders
could be higher, the higher the probability of winning of their representative club at the
international level. If it is correct, a league’s governing body intending to maximise the
quality of the national league by making use of redistributive schemes would face a tradeoff
between national competitive balance and international performance of the national
representative club. We propose a simple microeconomic framework to model this tradeoff.
If there exists a non-cooperative game among the national league governing bodies,
whether it is a Nash or a Stackelberg one, this game would result in inefficient redistributive
policies. We find soft empirical evidences suggesting that such a competition occurs
among the big 5 football leagues in Europe. This result supports the idea of the creation
of an international regulatory body. We derive the conditions under which the international
regulatory body should ensure that the leagues’ governing bodies implement redistributive
schemes guaranteeing the respect of the national competitive balance. We also emphasize
the risk of experiencing a drop in the quality of leagues if one
Texte intégral
Development Economics Seminar
Du 09/12/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
NAIDU Sureh (Columbia University)
Social Origins of Dictatorships: Elite Networks and Political Transitions in Haiti
écrit avec James A. Robinson and Lauren E. Young
Existing theories of coups against democracy emphasize that elite incentives to mount a
coup depend on the threat that democracy represents to them and what they stand to gain from
dictatorship. But holding interests constant, some potential plotters, by the nature of their
social networks, have much more influence over whether or not a coup succeeds. We develop
a model of elite social networks and show that coup participation of an elite is increasing in
their network centrality and results in rents during a dictatorship. We empirically explore
the model using an original dataset of Haitian elite social networks which we linked to
firm-level data on importing firms. We show that highly central families are more likely to
participate in the 1991 coup against the democratic Aristide government. We then find that
the retail prices of the staple goods imported by coup participators differentially increase
during subsequent periods of non-democracy. Finally, we find that urban children born
during periods of non-democracy are more likely to experience adverse health outcomes.
Economic History Seminar
Du 09/12/2015 de 12:30 à 14:00
SALEH Mohamed (LSE)
The Cotton Boom and Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Rural Egypt
The “staples thesis” argues that institutions in a given region could be explained by the nature of production of its prevailing staples, whereby slavery is likely to emerge in “slave-conducive” crops, such as cotton, rice, and sugarcane. This paper evaluates the thesis using a unique natural experiment from nineteenth-century rural Egypt, the cotton boom that occurred because of the American Civil War in 1861-1865. Historical evidence suggests that the cotton boom marked the emergence of the short-lived institution of large-scale agricultural slavery in Egypt’s Nile Delta, where all slaves were imported from East Africa, before the abolition of slavery in 1877. Employing the newly digitized Egyptian individual-level population census samples from 1848 and 1868, I find that cotton-favorable districts witnessed greater increases in household’s slaveholdings and the share of slave-owning households between 1848 and 1868 than less favorable districts. Those districts also witnessed greater increase in the population share of free local immigrants. I examine several potential mechanisms of these effects, namely, cross-district differences in the relative scarcity of free local labor and inter-crop differences in economies of scale and skill-intensity (results on mechanisms are not complete).
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Paris Trade Seminar
Du 08/12/2015 de 15:00 à 16:30
Maison des Sciences économiques, salle 114, 1er étage.
THOENIG M. (U of Lausanne )
Imported Violence : Post-Conflict Evidence on Asylum Seekers, Crimes and Public Policy in Switzerland
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 08/12/2015 de 12:30 à 13:30
MULLEROVA Alzbeta (UNIVERSITé PARIS OUEST)
Family Policy and Maternal Employment in the Czech Transition: A Natural Experiment
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 07/12/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
HART Oliver (HARVARD UNIVERSITY)
SHORT-TERM, LONG-TERM, AND CONTINUING CONTRACTS
écrit avec MAIJA HALONEN-AKATWIJUKA
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 07/12/2015 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
KANADE Varun (ENS)
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 04/12/2015 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
BERTELLI Olivia (PSE)
Investing in cattle as an alternative to lack of saving services? Evidence from rural Uganda
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 03/12/2015 de 12:30 à 14:00
MARTINEZ-BRAVO Monica (CEMFI)
An Empirical Investigation of the Legacies of Non-Democratic Regimes: The Case of Soeharto's Mayors in Indonesia - SALLE 8
écrit avec Priya Mukherjee and Andreas Stegmann
A large theoretical literature argues that the legacies of non-democratic regimes can affect the quality of governance in new democracies. However, the empirical evidence on the effects of these legacies is scarce. This paper exploits a natural experiment that took place in the Indonesian democratic transition: the mayors of the Soeharto regime were allowed to finish
their five year terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were
not synchronised, this event generated exogenous variation on how long the agents of the old
regime remained in their position and, hence, on the degree of control that they exerted during
the democratic transition. The results suggest that districts that had an old-regime mayor for
longer exhibit worse governance outcomes and tend to vote more for Soeharto's party. These
effects persist several years after the old-regime mayors are no longer in office and are robust
to controlling for subsequent political reforms. The results are consistent with the hypothesis
that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to find ways to capture
democracy in the medium and long run.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 02/12/2015 de 12:30 à 13:45
PALLAIS Amanda (HARVARD UNIVERSITY)
Discrimination as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from French Grocery Stores.
écrit avec William Pariente and Dylan Glover
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 01/12/2015 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
VINAS Frederic (PSE)
The real effects of universal banking on firms’ investment : Micro-evidence from 2004-2009