Calendrier du mois de décembre 2021
PSE Internal Seminar
Du 17/12/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
R2-01
TERCIEUX Olivier(PSE)
D ALBIS Hippolyte(PSE)
Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Double Coincidence of Wants without Money
Co-authors: Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University), Julien Combe (CREST), Yinghua He (Rice University), Victor Hiller (Paris 2), Robert Shimer (University of Chicago).
For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposal, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses “memory” as a medium of exchange to eliminate these timing constraints. In a dynamic matching model, we prove that Unpaired delivers a waiting time of patients close to optimal and substantially shorter than currently utilized state-of-the-art algorithms. Using a rich administrative dataset from France, we show that Unpaired achieves a match rate of 57 percent and an average waiting time of 440 days. The (infeasible) optimal algorithm is only slightly better (58 percent and 425 days); state-of-the-art algorithms deliver less than 34 percent and more than 695 days. We draw similar conclusions from the simulations of two large U.S. platforms. Lastly, we propose a range of solutions that can address the potential practical concerns of Unpaired.
Du 16/12/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
LOEWE Simon (PSE)
*
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 16/12/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.15, Campus Jourdan
MADINIER Etienne(PSE)
DEWITTE Edgar(Sciences Po)
PEPES Junior - Explaining the heterogeneous effect of Internet on elections
Behavior seminar
Du 16/12/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Salle R1-09 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
Development Economics Seminar
Du 15/12/2021 de 16:30 à 17:45
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan
CASSAN Guilhem (University of Namur)
Stopping rule and sex selective abortion: new measures and world evidence
écrit avec Jean Marie Baland et François Woitrin (University of Namur)
When parents want a specific number of children of a given gender (boys, in general), they can use two methods: the "stopping rule" and sex selective abortion. The stopping rule refers to a behaviour by which parents continue child bearing till they reach their desired number of boys. Sex selective abortion refers to the choice of aborting foetuses of a specific gender.
In societies in which gender preferences are prevalent, these methods can heavily affect fertility practices.
We propose two novel theory based measures of detection of these practices. Taking the perspective of the child rather than that of the family, these measures are easily implementable, precise, and rely on fewer assumptions than other measures in use.
We first show that, under the stopping rule, girls are, on average, exposed to a larger number of younger siblings than boys. We then propose a new method to detect the prevalence of the stopping rule in a given society.
This method allows us to identify countries in which the stopping rule prevails, some of which have been largely ignored in the literature. We also identify countries in which the stopping rule targets a desired number of girls rather than boys.
Second, we show that sex selective abortion leads to boys have on average more elder daughters than girls. We then propose a new method to detect the prevalence of sex selective abortion in a given society and implement it at the world level.
Economic History Seminar
Du 15/12/2021 de 12:00 à 13:30
Salle R2.21, Campus Jourdan
HURET Romain (EHESS/CENA)
The "drones" of society? Never-married men and women, inequality and capitalism in the United States (XXth century)
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 14/12/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan
BOCQUET Leonard (PSE)
The Network Origin of Slow Labor Reallocation
Virtual Development Economics Seminar
Du 14/12/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
On line
DONALDSON Dave (MIT & CEPR)
Imports, Exports, and Earnings Inequality: Measures of Exposure and Estimates of Incidence
écrit avec joint with Rodrigo Adao (Chicago Booth), Paul Carrillo (GWU), Arnaud Costinot (MIT) and Dina Pomeranz (Zurich)
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 14/12/2021 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-15
BAKKER Jan (Bocconi University, CEP and IFS)
Cancelled Cities, Heterogenous Firms and Trade
écrit avec A. Garcia-Marin, A. Potlogea, N. Voigtländer, Y. Yang
Texte intégral
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 14/12/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan
VAN DER WEELE Joël (University of Amsterdam)
Fair Shares and Selective Attention
écrit avec Dianna Amasino, Davide D. Pace
Fairness views often serve to justify economic privilege. To understand the formationof such views, we experimentally investigate how subjects allocate their visual atten-tion to the contributions of merit and luck in the generation of a surplus, and how theydecide on its division. We find that subjects who randomly obtained an advantagedposition pay less attention to information about true merit and retain more of thesurplus. Both the attentional and behavioral patterns persist when dictators subse-quently divide money between pairs of advantaged and disadvantaged subjects in therole of a benevolent judge. Moreover, attention has a substantial causal effect: forcingsubjects to look for one second more at merit information relative to overall outcomesreduces the effect of having an advantaged position on allocations by about 25%. Thesefindings suggest that attention-based policy interventions may be effective in reducingpolarized views on inequality.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 13/12/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
R1-09 Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
Econometrics Seminar
Du 13/12/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
KOLESAR Michal (Princeton)
On Estimating Multiple Treatment Effects with Regression
écrit avec Co-authors: Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham and Peter Hull
We study the causal interpretation of regressions on multiple dependent treatments and flexible controls. Such regressions are often used to analyze randomized control trials with multiple intervention arms, and to estimate institutional quality (e.g. teacher value-added) with observational data. We show that, unlike with a single binary treatment, these regressions do not generally estimate convex averages of causal effects-even when the treatments are conditionally randomly assigned and the controls fully address omitted variables bias. We discuss different solutions to this issue, and propose as a solution anew class of efficient estimators of weighted average treatment effects.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 13/12/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
Salle R2-21 - Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
CAMBONI Riccardo (University of Padova)
Bidding on price and quality: An experiment on the complexity of scoring rule auctions
We experimentally study procurement auctions when both quality and price matter. We compare two treatments where sellers compete on one dimension only (price or quality), with three two-dimensional treatments where sellers submit a price-quality bid, and the winner is determined by a score that combines the two offers. We find that, in the two-dimensional treatments, efficiency and buyer's utility are lower than their predicted levels. Estimates from a Quantal Response Equilibrium model suggest that increasing the dimensionality and the size of the suppliers' strategy space increases their tendency to bid suboptimally, thus undermining the theoretical superiority of more complex mechanisms.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 10/12/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
R2-01
BASTIEN Michel (PSE)
The Impact of Preschools in Lower-Income Countries: Experimental Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire
écrit avec S. Maiga & P. A. Yeo
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 10/12/2021 de 11:00 à 12:30
Salle 18, Maison des Sciences Économiques, 112 Bd de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris
VALENTIN Julie (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES)
Rationalité et conséquences de l'externalisation : une analyse à partir du cas du nettoyage
écrit avec François-Xavier Devetter (Univ Lille, CLERSE)
Depuis les années 70, la tendance à l’externalisation des services liés aux fonctions supports (entretien, restauration, sécurité, etc.) est marquée. Elle nourrit une transformation du système d’emploi en favorisant la croissance des métiers à bas salaires. Après avoir décrit cette évolution, nous aborderons trois questions : comment différents modèles organisationnels peuvent entrer en concurrence pour la production de services perçus comme identiques ? comment l’externalisation modifie la définition et le calcul du temps de travail ? et enfin comment la rationalité apparente du choix de l’externalisation s’appuie sur une conception particulièrement restrictive des coûts et de la valeur des services ?
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 09/12/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-01
CHAVEZ Emmanuel (PSE)
Who pays for a Value Added Tax Hike at an International Border? Evidence from Mexico
This research studies the effects of a value added tax (VAT) reform at Mexico's international frontiers. The reform raised the VAT rate from 11 to 16 percent at localities close to the international borders. We use the traditional ``static'' difference-in-differences methodology as well as dynamic difference-in-differences. The treatment group is composed of municipalities in the area where the VAT increased, and the control group is composed of municipalities close to the treatment group. We find that the VAT hike had a positive effect on prices of around half the size of the full pass-through conterfactual. In addition, the reform had a negative effect on workers' wages and no effect on employment. The negative effect on workers' real incomes is not smoothed out with credits. We find evidence of a negative effect on consumption at Mexico's northern border due to the reform. However, we find no evidence of an increase in shopping at the United States side of the border.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 09/12/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-14 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
PIVATO Marcus ( CY Cergy)
*
Economic History Seminar
Du 08/12/2021 de 12:00 à 13:30
Salle R2.20, Campus Jourdan
HADDAD Joanne (ULB)
Settlers and norms
The distinctive traits of early settlers at initial stages of institutional development may be crucial for cultural formation. In 1973, the cultural geographer Wilbur Zelinsky postulated this in his doctrine of ``first effective settlement''. There is however little empirical evidence supporting the role of early settlers in shaping culture over the long run. This paper tests this hypothesis by relating early settlers' culture to within state variation in gender norms in the United States. I capture settlers' culture using past female labor force participation, women's suffrage and financial rights at their place of origin. I document the distinctive characteristics of settlers' populations and provide suggestive evidence in support of the spatial (across locations) and vertical (over time) transmission of gender norms. My results show that women's labor supply is higher, in both the short and long run, in U.S. counties that historically hosted a larger settler population originating from places with favorable gender attitudes. My findings shed new light on the importance of immigrants’ characteristics and their countries/states of origin for cultural formation in hosting societies.
Du 08/12/2021 de 12:00 à 13:30
Salle R2.20, Campus Jourdan
HADDAD Joanne (ULB)
Settlers and norms
écrit avec Joanne Haddad (ULB)
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 07/12/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan
GETHIN Amory (PSE)
Government redistribution and the growth elasticity of poverty: Evidence from South Africa, 1993-2019
Development Economics Seminar
Du 07/12/2021 de 16:30 à 17:45
On line
BATISTA Catia (Nova School of Business and Economics.)
Can Information and Alternatives to Irregular Migration Reduce “Backway” Migration from the Gambia?
écrit avec joint with Tijan Bah, Flore Gubert and David McKenzie
Irregular migration from West Africa to Europe across the Sahara and Mediterranean is extremely risky for the migrants and a key policy concern. We conducted a cluster-randomized experiment with 3,641 young men from 391 settlements in The Gambia to test three different approaches designed to reduce risky, irregular migration. The first is to provide potential migrants with better information about the risks to be faced during the journey, including testimonials from those who have attempted the journey and statistics on the likelihood of experiencing negative events en route. The second intervention is to also provide a second safer migration alternative by adding information and assistance for migration to neighboring Senegal. The third approach is to provide vocational skill training in addition to the information about irregular migration. We evaluate the effect of these policies on actions towards migrating the “backway”, migration to Senegal, and overall well-being.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 07/12/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1.09 Jourdan
JOHANNESEN Niels (University of Copenhagen, EU Tax Observatory)
Bailing out the Kids: New Evidence on Informal Insurance from one Billion Bank Transfers
écrit avec Asger Lau Andersen, Adam Sheridan
We combine transaction-level data from the largest retail bank in Denmark and individuallevel data from government registers to study informal insurance within social networks.
Accounting for transfers in cash (money transfers) and in kind (cohabitation), we estimate
that family and friends jointly replace around 7 cents of the marginal dollar lost within
the bottom income decile, but much less at higher income levels. We document that
informal insurance covers other adverse events than income losses: expenditure shocks,
family ruptures and financial distress. Parents appear to be the key providers of informal
insurance with a small amount of insurance coming from siblings and virtually none from
grandparents and friends. Replacement rates vary monotonically with parent economic
resources.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 06/12/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
Online
GARRETT Dan (University of Essex)
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings
écrit avec Francesc DILME
We study relational contracting with an agent who has consumption-smoothing preferences as well as the ability to save to defer consumption (or to borrow). Our focus is the comparison of principal-optimal relational contracts in two settings. The first where the agent’s consumption and savings decisions are private, and the second here these decisions are publicly observed. In the first case, the agent smooths his consumption over time, the agent’s effort and payments eventually decrease with time, and the balances on his savings account eventually increase. In the second, the agent consumes earlier than he would like, consumption and the balance on savings fall over time, and effort and payments to the agent increase. There is convergence to efficiency in the long run. Our results suggest a possible explanation for low savings rates in certain industries where compensation often comes in the form of discretionary payments.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 06/12/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle 116) 75013 Paris
ABELE Christian (PSE)
Reputation in International Trade - Evidence from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster
écrit avec Kentaro Asai (PSE)
A country’s reputation may be an important determinant of its ability to export but the effect is notoriously difficult to isolate from underlying product attributes. We exploit the Fukushima nuclear disaster as a sudden large-scale shock to the reputation of Japanese food exports, where nonetheless not all products were affected similarly. Since exposure to radiation and import bans varied by product and prefecture, we use agricultural production data to identify unaffected products and compare their exports to exports of other countries in the same destination market. For all exports to the EU we find, a massive but short-lived drop in the value and number of products exported while prices increased. Unaffected products exhibit attenuated effects indicating that a change in the perceived riskiness of a country plays a role in explaining trade flows.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 06/12/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
Salle R2-21 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
RICK VAN DER PLOEG (University of Oxford)
Carbon pricing and portfolio diversification
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 03/12/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
R2-01
MAUE Casey (PSE)
Seasonality and the Organization of Palm Oil Processing in Ghana
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 02/12/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-14 - Campus Jourdan 75014 PARIS
TUMENNASAN Norovsambuu (Dalhousie University)
One Truth and a Thousand Lies: Defaults and Benchmarks in Mechanism Design
We study a behavioral robust implementation problem in which agents are endowed with benchmark strategies. Benchmarks may arise, for instance, as a consequence of recommendations made by the planner, or through social norms. We introduce (Interim) Behavioral Benchmark Equilibria (BBE) and prove a revelation principle: any social choice function (SCF) implementable in BBE is also fully implementable by a direct revelation mechanism in which agents' benchmark action is truthtelling. Specializing to direct mechanisms, we provide the following results. First, behavioral robust implementation is equivalent to interim rationalizability with iterative elimination of strategies that are dominated by truthtelling. When preferences are interdependent, an SCF is behavioral robust implementable if and only if it satisfies a strengthening of the contraction property, Bergemann and Morris (2009) (BM). We document the restrictions that behavioral agents impose: in a leading example of BM, the maximum possible interdependence in preferences is half the bound identified in BM. Behavioral robust implementation is therefore possible. In addition we show that in any private value environments, behavioral agents impose no further restrictions than those already imposed by robust implementation.
Behavior seminar
Du 02/12/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
MATTAUCH Linus (University of Oxford)
Healthy Climate, Healthy Bodies: Optimal Fuel Taxation and Physical Activit
Transport has significant externalities including carbon emissions and air pollution. Public health research has identified additional social gains from active travel, due to health benefits of physical exercise. Per mile, these benefits greatly exceed the external costs from car use. We introduce active travel into an optimal fuel taxation model and analytically characterise the optimal second-best fuel tax. We find that accounting for active travel benefits increases the optimal fuel tax by 49% in the US and 36% in the UK. Fuel taxes should be implemented jointly with other policies aimed at increasing the uptake of active travel.
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 01/12/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
Séminaire annulé
DE VICQ Amaury (PSE)
Caught Between Outreach and Sustainability: The Rise and Decline of Dutch Credit Unions
Economic History Seminar
Du 01/12/2021 de 12:00 à 13:30
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan
FLEISCHMANN Sandra (University of Oxford)
The Role of formal and informal Institutions in Illegitimacy development in south-western Germany