Calendrier du mois de mars 2015
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 31/03/2015 de 16:30 à 18:00
MSE (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital - room 19) 75013 Paris
DURAND Cédric (UNIVERSITY OF PARIS 13, CEPN AND CEMI/EHESS)
Le capital fictif : comment la finance s'approprie notre avenir
écrit avec Discussant: Thibault DARCILLON (University Paris 7, CES/LADYSS)
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 30/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
MANIQUET François (UNIVERSITé DE LOUVAIN)
Fairness and well-being measurement
écrit avec Co-authors : Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet
Texte intégral
Development Economics Seminar
Du 25/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
ALSAN Marcella (UNIVERSITY OF STANFORD)
The Gendered Impact of Young Children's Health on Human Capital: Evidence from Turkey
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 24/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment B, 2e étage, Salle de Réunions
MURARD Elie (PSE)
How does migration affect individual attitudes towards redistribution? Empirical evidence across European countries.
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 24/03/2015 de 16:30 à 18:00
Maison des Sciences Economiques (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital, room 19) 75013 Paris
KINDERMAN Daniel (UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, DPT POLITICAL SCIENCE/ INTERNATIONAL RELATION)
Challenging Varieties of Capitalism’s Account of Business Interests: The New Social Market Initiative and German Employers’ Quest for Liberalization, 2000–2014
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 23/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
DEKEL Eddie (ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, AND SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC)
Disclosure and Choice
écrit avec Co-author(s) : Elchanan Ben-Porath and Barton L. Lipman
An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer's expectation of the outcome. With some probability, the agent can disclose the true outcome to the observer. We show that choice is inefficient : the agent favors riskier projects even with lower expected returns. If information can be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer, the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information, excessively risk-averse when the challenger has better access, and efficient otherwise. We also characterize the agent's worst-case equilibrium payoff.
RISK Working Group
Du 19/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
THOMAS Julien (ISFA LYON 1)
Construction et validation des tables de mortalité prospectives: le contexte de l'assurance
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 18/03/2015 de 17:30 à 19:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
PASCALOU Alain (EX-DIRECTEUR TECHNIQUE DU CLUB DU FC LE MANS )
Accompagner des jeunes stagiaires pros et faire face à leur environnement
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 16/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
MOULIN Hervé (UNIVERSITY OF GALSGOW (VISITE POLYTECHNIQUE))
One dimensional mechanism design
When agents'allocations are one-dimensional and preferences are convex, the three perenial goals of mechanism design, efficiency, prior-free incentive compatibility and fairness (horizontal equity) are compatible. This has been known for decades in the cases of voting and of division of a non disposable commodity. We show that it is in fact true when the range of allocation profiles is an arbitrary convex and compact set. Examples include: load balancing with arbitrary flow graph constraints;!coordinating joint work inside a team or across teams, when individual contributions are substitutable or complementary; and any joint venture with a convex technology where each agent provides a single input or consumes a single output. The set of efficient, incentive compatible and fair mechanisms is very rich, and additional requirement such as consistency are needed to identify reasonable candidates.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 09/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
GANGULI Jayant (ESSEX)
Pricing effects of ambiguous private information.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 04/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
BOGART Dan (UC-IRVINE)
There can be no Partnership with the King’: Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment in Britain’s East India Monopoly
'There can b e no Partnership with the King': Regulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise of England's East Indian Merchant Empire Dan Bogart y January 2015 Abstract The English East India Company help ed build Britain's colonial empire, but the Company struggled for much of its early history due to a violotile regulatory environ- ment. This pap er argues that the Company's p erformance was hindered by instability and incapacity of English institutions as late as the mid eighteenth century. It gives a brief history of the torturous renegotiations over its monop oly trading privileges and the scal demands by the monarchy. It also analyzes the eects of p olitical instabil- ity, warfare, and scal capacity on the Company's investment in shipping tonnage. Regressions show the growth of shipping tonnage declined signi cantly when there were changes in government ministers, when Britain was at war in Europ e and North America, and when shipping capacity exceeded central government tax revenues. The ndings p oint to the signi cance of regulatory institutions in Britain's development and its links with p olitics and war. They also provide a unique insight into how regulations and investment change as institutions evolve.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 03/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:00
MSE (salle B2.2)
ALDAMA Pierre ()
Public debt sustainability under a regime-switching fiscal policy rule
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 02/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
LESHNO Jacob (COLUMBIA)
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition
écrit avec Co-authors :Itai Ashlagi & Yash Kanoria