Calendrier du mois de mars 2020
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 31/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
LEROUTIER Marion (PSE)
Maritime Traffic, Air Pollution and Short-Term Health Outcomes: Evidence from a Large Port City
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 31/03/2020 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014, Paris - salle R2-21
GUADALUPE Maria (INSEAD)
POSTPONED
Du 31/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SCHNEIDER-STRAWCZYNSKI Sarah (PSE)
Do people change their mind ? Hosting Refugees and Far Right Support in France
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 31/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SCHNEIDER-STRAWCZYNSKI Sarah (PSE)
Do people change their mind ? Hosting Refugees and Far Right Support in France - REPORTÉ
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 30/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
RENOU Ludovic (QMUL)
ANNULE
Régulation et Environnement
Du 30/03/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
CALEL Raphaël (Georgetown University)
ANNULE
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 30/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
RENOU Ludovic (QMUL)
*
Development Economics Seminar
Du 27/03/2020 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
GENICOT Garance ((Georgetown University and CEPR))
Séance annulée et reportée
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 27/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE-Paris 1, Salle 18 (nouveau bâtiment), 106-112 Bd de l’hôpital 75013
O SULLIVAN Mary (Université de Genève)
Power & Profit: The Economics of Mechanisation in Late 18th Century Britain
PSE Internal Seminar
Du 26/03/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 26/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:45
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
LE BARBANCHON Thomas (Bocconi University)
POSTPONED
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 26/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
PSE
HAZARD Yagan (Paris School of Economics)
Online Platforms and the Labour Market: Learning (with Machines) from an Experiment in France
I study the effect of an online job search assistance program taking advantage of an experiment made by the French public employment services, which provides some exogenous variation in the use of this platform. I focus on the heterogeneity analysis of this treatment, using two main different approaches. The first one is theory-driven, and focuses on the analysis of the heterogeneity of thetreatment with respect to various different labour market tightness indicators. Two main assessments can be made based on this analysis. (i) Tightness indicators are (surprisingly) decorrelated, making it difficult to corroborate the rare significant results obtained. (ii) The set of significant results obtained suggest that the treatment effect is increasing in labour market tightness. I suggest competing ways of interpreting the treatment that are consistent with those results. I also document some evidence of a larger treatment effect for individuals with weaker employment prospects. This is in line with other empirical evidence in the literature evaluating job search assistance programs.The second approach is more data-driven, and resorts to the new machine learning (ML) techniques developed for heterogeneity analysis. I focus on tree-based techniques and forests, which have been central in the development of these new methods. I provide applications of a large part of the existing ML techniques for exploring treatment effect heterogeneity, trying to take advantage of each of them to document which are the dimensions that are likely to be important to study treatment effect heterogeneity in my setting.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 25/03/2020 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BEST Michael (Columbia University)
Séance annulée et reportée
Economic History Seminar
Du 25/03/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
SUSSMAN Nathan (Graduate Institute Geneva)
Séance annulée et reportée
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 24/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
RACHIDI Tobias(PSE)
RACHIDI Tobias(University Bonn)
Committee Search: Evaluating One or Multiple Candidates at a Time?
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 24/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MICHEL Bastien (PSE)
Custodial vs. Non-Custodial Punishments: Measuring the Impact of an Anticipated Reform - REPORTÉ
écrit avec Camille Hemet (ENS, PSE)
We study a reform of the Danish legislation after which most offenders tried for drunk-driving received a non-custodial sanction instead of a custodial one. We show that stakeholders anticipated the consequences of the reform as selection is observed in the nature of the cases tried before and after the reform. To measure its impact, we use an instrumental variable approach exploiting the fact that the closer to the reform a crime was committed, the more likely the defendant was to be tried after. Offenders who received a non-custodial sentence commit fewer crimes and have stronger ties to the labor market.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 23/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PATHAK Parag (MIT)
ANNULE
Régulation et Environnement
Du 23/03/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LAUKKANEN Marita (VATT)
ANNULE. Energy Taxes and Manufacturing Firm Performance: Evidence from Finland's Green Tax Reform
écrit avec Kimmo Ollikka
This paper seeks to evaluate the effect of energy taxes on the economic and environmental performance of manufacturing firms. We examine these issues in the context of Finland’s green energy tax reform that substantially increased the excise taxes on energy inputs, with the aim of promoting energy efficiency and reducing CO2-emissions. The preparation of the tax reform was accompanied by controversy over the predicted effects on manufacturing firm competitiveness, with the consequence that firms above a certain energy tax threshold were granted an exemption from energy taxes. While firms below the threshold pay energy taxes in full, firms above the threshold are refunded up to 85 percent of their energy taxes. Exempt and non-exempt firms, and in particular plants within these firms, can be otherwise very similar. The exemption rule allows us to compare plants that operate in the same manufacturing sectors and have otherwise similar history, but have been subject to different effective tax rates since the tax reform. Overall the results are most compatible with no important effect of the energy tax refund on employees, wages or energy use on average, and, if anything, a negative impact on gross output and energy efficiency.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 19/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:45
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
KIRCHER Philipp (European University Institute)
POSTPONED
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 19/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
CASELLA Alessandra (Columbia)
ANNULE. Mediating Conflict in the Lab
écrit avec Evan Friedman and Manuel Perez
According to the theory of mechanism design, the presence of a mediator can strictly improve the chances for peace between two contestants. What is striking is that the result follows even when the mediator is less informed than the two parties and has no enforcement power. We test the theory in a lab experiment where two subjects negotiate how to share a resource. In case of conflict, the subjects' privately known strength determines their payoff. The subjects send cheap talk messages about their strength to one another or to the mediator, before making their demands or receiving the mediator's recommendations. We find that, in line with the theory, messages are significantly more sincere when sent to the mediator. However, contrary to the theory, peaceful resolution is not more frequent, even when the mediator is a computer implementing the optimal mediation program. While the theoretical result refers to the best (i.e. most peaceful) equilibrium under mediation, multiple equilibria exist, and the best equilibrium is particularly vulnerable to small deviations from full truthfulness and from full rationality.
Behavior Working Group
Du 19/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz)
Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution (canceled)
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 18/03/2020 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
SATO Hideki (Kanazawa U. )
Séance annulée et reportée
Development Economics Seminar
Du 18/03/2020 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
SHAH Manisha (UC Berkeley)
Séance annulée et reportée
Economic History Seminar
Du 18/03/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
SAINT-RAYMOND Léa (IHMC - ENS)
« La Bourse de l’art et du bric-à-brac » : une histoire économique des ventes aux enchères publiques parisiennes (1830-1939). ANNULE ET REPORTE
En 1906, un article anonyme, intitulé « Sous le marteau du commissaire-priseur », désigna l’hôtel Drouot comme « la Bourse de l’art et du bric-à-brac ». Cette expression résume, à elle seule, la double conception de cet hôtel des ventes aux enchères publiques parisiennes, considéré à la fois comme un bazar et comme un temple de la spéculation. Néanmoins, la comparaison avec le marché financier est loin d’être évidente. Raymonde Moulin écrivait, en 1967, que « l’assimilation entre l’hôtel Drouot et la Bourse n’est pas légitime, bien que largement répandue ». Le but de cette présentation est d’apporter un nouvel éclairage sur l’histoire des ventes aux enchères publiques à partir des archives des commissaires-priseurs parisiens. Celles-ci rendent possible l’analyse des différents segments – des tableaux, dessins et sculptures, en passant par les estampes, les objets d’art, les monnaies ou encore les bonsaïs et les silex – mais elles donnent également accès à des données plus macroéconomiques, permettant de mesurer la sensibilité du marché de l’art avec le marché financier.
Du 17/03/2020 de 16:30 à 19:00
PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris,
SPITZER Yannay(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
BEINE Michel(University of Luxemburg)
FACCHINI Giovanni(University of Nottingham)
*
Texte intégral
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 17/03/2020 de 16:30 à 19:00
PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, Salle R1-09
RAVALLION Martin (Georgetown University)
BEINE Michel(University of Luxemburg)
CANCELLED: Assessing the Role of Immigration Policy for Foreign Students: the Case of Campus France
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 17/03/2020 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014, Paris - salle R2-21
GANAPATI Sharat (Georgetown)
POSTPONED
écrit avec Woan Foong Wong (University of Oregon) and Oren Ziv (Michigan State University)
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 17/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GALBIATI Roberto (Sciences-Po)
Wealth Accumulation and Institutional Capture: the Rise of the Medici and the Fall of the Florentine Republic - REPORTÉ
écrit avec Marianna Belloc, Francesco Drago, Mattia Fochesato
We study the rise of the Medici family and the fall of the Florentine Republic in the 15th
century. In this period, political offices were assigned by a system which combined elections and
selection by lot. During the 1420s, the Medici family increased its influence and de facto captured
the system of office allocation while leaving the political institutions formally unchanged. We
use data on the results of the drawings for the four main government offices of the city between
1395 and 1457 and match them with data on individual wealth at different points in time
in the 15th century. Our analysis documents the systematic capture of the process of office
allocation in favor of individuals belonging to the Medici’s network. When we move to the
analysis of the relationship between wealth and political office holders, we show that after the
Medici’s institutional soft-capture, holding a political office is strongly and directly associated
with individual wealth accumulation, especially for office holders from the Medici faction. By
contrast, we find a very limited effect between the number of terms in office and individual wealth
before the rise of the Medici to political power. By comparing results for the two periods, before
and after the institutional capture, and using complementary data sources, we provide several
pieces of evidence that explain our findings in terms of collusion and rent extraction.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 16/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
DOVAL Laura (Columbia University)
ANNULE - Optimal Mechanism for the sale of a durable good
écrit avec Vasiliki Skreta
We show that posted prices are the optimal mechanism to sell a durable good to a privately informed buyer when the seller has limited commitment in an infinite horizon setting. We provide a methodology for mechanism design with limited commitment and transferable utility. Whereas in the case of commitment, subject to the buyer's truthtelling and participation constraints, the seller's problem is a decision problem, in the case of limited commitment, the seller's problem corresponds to an intrapersonal game, where different “incarnations of the seller represent the different beliefs he may have about the buyer's valuation.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 16/03/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
FISHMAN Arthur (Bar-Ilan University)
ANNULE
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 16/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
LEVY John ()
*
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 13/03/2020 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2.01, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
CRESPIN-BOUCAUD Juliette (PSE)
Parental divorces and children's educational outcomes in Senegal
écrit avec Rozenn Hotte (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 13/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE-Paris 1, grande salle - 6e étage, 106-112 Bd de l’hôpital 75013
PRASAD Monica (U. Northwestern)
Présentation de l'ouvrage Starving The Beast, Ronald Reagan and the Tax Cut's Revolution suivie d'une table ronde
Since the Reagan Revolution of the early 1980s, Republicans have consistently championed tax cuts for individuals and businesses, regardless of whether the economy is booming or in recession or whether the federal budget is in surplus or deficit. In Starving the Beast, sociologist Monica Prasad uncovers the origins of the GOP’s relentless focus on tax cuts and shows how this is a uniquely American phenomenon.Drawing on never-before seen archival documents, Prasad traces the history of the 1981 tax cut—the famous “supply side” tax cut, which became the cornerstone for the next several decades of Republican domestic economic policy. She demonstrates that the main impetus behind this tax cut was not business group pressure, racial animus, or a belief that tax cuts would pay for themselves. Rather, the tax cut emerged because in America--unlike in the rest of the advanced industrial world—progressive policies are not embedded within a larger political economy that is favorable to business. Since the end of World War II, many European nations have combined strong social protections with policies to stimulate economic growth such as lower taxes on capital and less regulation on businesses than in the United State. Meanwhile, the United States emerged from World War II with high taxes on capital and some of the strongest regulations on business in the advanced industrial world. This adversarial political economy could not survive the economic crisis of the 1970s.Starving the Beast suggests that taking inspiration from the European model of progressive policies embedded in market-promoting political economy could serve to build an American economy that works better for all.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 12/03/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
IOVINO Luigi (Bocconi)
POSTPONED
écrit avec Mikhail Golosov University of Chicago
We consider optimal public provision of unemployment insurance when government's ability
to commit is imperfect. Unemployed persons privately observe arrivals of job opportunities
and choose probabilities of communicating this information to the government. Imperfect
commitment implies that full information revelation is generally suboptimal. We define a
notion of the social value of information and show that, due to the incentive constraints, it
is a convex function of the information revealed. In the optimum each person is provided
with an incentive to either reveal his private information fully or not reveal any of it, but the
allocation of these incentives may be stochastic. In dynamic economies unemployed persons
who enter a period with higher continuation utilities reveal their private information with lower
probabilities. The optimal contract can be decentralized by a joint system of unemployment
and disability benefits in a way that resembles how these systems are used in practice in
developed countries.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 12/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
RAUX Morgan (AMSE and PSE)
Looking for the Best and Brightest: Hiring difficulties and high-skilled foreign workers
This paper shows that firms' demand for high-skilled foreign workers partly results from their hiring difficulties. Relying on a within-firm identification strategy, I compare recruitment decisions made by a given employer for similar jobs differing in recruitment difficulties. I quantify how the time to fill a vacancy affects the employer's probability to look for recruiting a foreign worker. To identify this relationship, I have collected and assembled a new and original dataset at the job level. It matches online job postings to administrative data on H-1B visas applications in the US. I find that a standard deviation increase in job posting duration increases employers' probability to look for a foreign worker by 1.5 percentage points. This effect is mainly driven by firms sending only a few visa applications. It increases to 3 to 4 percentage points for architects, engineers and computer scientists.
Du 12/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:45
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 12/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LETROUIT Lucie (Université Gustave Eiffel)
Why can't we be friends? An evolutionary approach to the emergence of ethno-cultural hierarchies
Economic behaviors are deeply infl uenced by social norms and, in particular, ethnocultural hierarchies. That's why understanding how such hierarchies emerge and persist through individual interactions in multi-cultural societies is of crucial importance for economists. This paper proposes a three-group (one majority and two ethno-cultural minorities) evolutionary game model of the emergence of ethno-cultural hierarchies in the context of a typical western country where one social group is much larger than the others. From a methodological point of view, this model's originality stems from the multiple groups and strategies implied, which renders the use of graph theory necessary. The model's main results are the following: (1) in accordance with the empirical literature on the subject, ethno-cultural hierarchy views tend to be shared by most individuals within and across groups, (2) minority-di fferentiating ethno-cultural hierarchies, where di fferent minorities are associated with di fferent social statuses, are evolutionarily very resilient and often persist in the long run, instead of more egalitarian ones, because they play a divide-and-rule" role that prevents minorities from allying and jointly demanding more equality, (3) old minorities in a country benefi t from the arrival of a new minority in the long run, if this new minority is culturally close enough to the majority, either directly through status improvement or indirectly through the social recognition of this new minority.
Economic History Seminar
Du 11/03/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
GRANDI Elisa (Paris School of Economics)
Governance and networks: French Firms listed and traded at the Paris Bourse (1880-1939)
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 10/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
ZUBER Thomas (PSE)
Directing job search: a large scale experiment
Du 10/03/2020 de 14:30 à 16:30
PSE, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014, Paris - salle R2-21
RAMONDO Natalia (San Diego)
*
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 10/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BLANC Guillaume (University of Manchester)
Modernization Before Industrialization: Cultural Roots of the Demographic Transition in France
This research identifies the origins of the early demographic transition in France, before the French Revolution and more than a century before the rest of Europe. We provide strong empirical evidence suggesting
that secularization accounts for the bulk of the decline in fertility and document large, significant, and robust results across specifications, datasets, and estimation methods. We draw on a novel individual-level historical dataset crowdsourced from publicly available genealogies to establish a causal interpretation. This dataset allows to control for time-varying unobservables, to study the effect of secularization before and after demographic change, and to exploit the choice of migrants in the aftermath of the decline in religiosity. Finally, we discuss the roots of the rapid and early process of secularization and suggest that the strength of the Counter Reformation following the demise of Protestantism in France played an important part. Our findings demonstrate that cultural change and the transition to modernity and away from tradition can shape development.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 09/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
RAPPOPORT Daniel (Chicago Booth)
Evidence and Skepticism in verifiable disclosure games
A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: to the extent possible, a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. The degree of skepticism depends on how much evidence the sender is expected to possess. I characterize when a change in the prior distribution of evidence induces more skepticism, i.e. induces any receiver to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable to the sender following every message. I formalize an increase in the sender’s (ex-ante) amount of evidence and show that this is equivalent to inducing more skepticism. As an input to this result, I fully characterize receiver optimal equilibrium outcomes in general verifiable disclosure games. I apply these results to a dynamic disclosure problem in which the sender obtains and discloses evidence over time. I identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the evidence structure such that the receiver cannot benefit from early inspections.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 09/03/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
SCHLENKER Wolfram (Columbia University)
Coase, Hotelling and Pigou: The Incidence of a Carbon Tax and CO2 Emissions
écrit avec Geoffrey Heal
A carbon tax has been widely discussed as a way of reducing fossil fuel use and mitigating climate change, generally in a static framework. Unlike standard goods that can be produced, oil is an exhaustible resource. Parts of its price reflects scarcity rents, i.e., the fact that there is limited availability. We highlight important dynamic aspects of a global carbon tax, which will reallocate consumption through time: some of the initial reduction in consumption will be offset through higher consumption later on. Only reserves with high enough extraction cost will be priced out of the market. Using data from a large proprietary database of field-level oil data, we show that carbon prices even as high as 200 dollars per ton of CO2 will only reduce cumulative emissions from oil by 4% as the supply curve is very steep for high oil prices and few reserves drop out. The supply curve flattens out for lower price, and the effect of an increased carbon tax becomes larger. For example, a carbon price of 600 dollars would reduce cumulative emissions by 60%. On the flip side, a global cap and trade system that limits global extraction by a modest amount like 4% expropriates a large fraction of scarcity rents and would imply a high permit price of $200. The tax incidence varies over time: initially, about 75% of the carbon price will be passed on to consumers, but this share declines through time and even becomes negative as oil prices will drop in future years relative to a case of no carbon tax. The net present value of producer and consumer surplus decrease by roughly equal amounts, which are almost entirely offset by increased tax revenues.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 09/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
KRäHMER Daniel ()
*
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 06/03/2020 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2.01, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
GITTARD Mélanie (PSE)
Adaptation to climate change and effects on agricultural production and food security
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 05/03/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
PATTERSON Christina (Northwestern University)
The Matching Multiplier and the Amplification of Recessions
This paper shows that the unequal incidence of recessions in the labor market amplifies aggregate
shocks. I define the Matching Multiplier as the increase in the output multiplier stemming from the
matching of high marginal propensity to consume (MPC) workers to cyclical jobs. Using administrative
data from the United States, I document a positive covariance between worker MPCs and their elasticity
of earnings to GDP. This covariance is large enough to increase shock amplification by 40 percent
over an equal exposure benchmark. I provide additional evidence for this mechanism using local labor
market variation and a dynamic incomplete-markets model.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 05/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
PINTO Gustavo (PUC-Rio)
Extended maternity leave and children's long-term development. Evidence from France
écrit avec Luc Behaghel
Countries around the world are increasingly expanding legal maternity leaves, with the dual objective of allowing mothers to recover from childbirth while protecting their job, and enhancing child development. Although the literature on the effects of parental leave on child development suggests positive effects for short paid leaves, for the case of extended periods the evidence is scarcer and tends to suggest no (or negative) effects. In this paper, we exploit a 3-year expansion of paid leave in France in 1994 and estimate the impact of mothers' eligibility for extended leave on long-term educational achievement of children. We find zero effects on schooling achievement (measured by high school graduation or holding junior high school certificate), that are robust to different specifications and tightly estimated. Moreover, this is true for different subpopulations, since we find no detectable impact heterogeneity.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 05/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
STERN Lennart (PSE)
Funding Global Public Good Institutions via taxes on aviation emissions- a comparison of three proposed mechanisms
The EU is considering taking unilateral action to achieve higher carbon pricing for international aviation. It has been proposed that the EU could start a club mechanism whereby participating countries would have to tax the emissions of all outgoing flights as well as all flights coming in from non-participants at a fixed rate. They would then have to allocate a cer- tain proportion of the tax revenue to some agreed-upon global institution for climate change mitigation. I propose an alternative club mechanism in which participating countries could allocate their tax revenue to Global Public Good Institutions (GPGIs) of their choice from a set of GPGIs recognised as eligible in the treaty establishing the mechanism. Of the tax revenue that participants decide to not allocate, they could retain a fixed proportion. The remaining revenue would be added to the GPGIs, in proportion to the aggregate allocations made to them. I consider an example where the set of eligible GPGIs consists of 2 GPGIs for global health and 4 for climate change mitigation. I estimate the payoffs that countries would derive from money being added to the different GPGIs, taking into account the heterogeneous benefits generated by each GPGI, the rents that some GPGIs create and the redistributional effects that some GPGIs induce by changing e.g. the oil price. Using an iterated best response algorithm and assuming that initially only the EU and China participate, I predict that this new mechanism can achieve 22% more wel- fare gains than the previously proposed one, raising 50% more revenue for GPGIs. I then enrich the mechanism by allowing countries to also give to so-called “Proportional Matching Funds”, which distribute their budget to subsets of GPGIs, in proportion to the direct allocations made to these GPGIs. This enriched mechanism can achieve 67% more welfare gains than the previously proposed one, raising 100% more revenue for GPGIs.
Behavior seminar
Du 05/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
AAROE Lene (Aarhus University)
Evolved psychological biases and dissemination of political information in social network
Many political news stories reach citizens via a two-step process, transmitted to them indirectly via their social networks. Yet, why do some news stories “go viral” and become transmitted heavily in citizens’ social networks with strong impact on their political opinions while others go by almost unnoticed? In this talk, I integrate theories from cognitive and evolutionary psychology into classical political science research on the flow of political communication to argue that political news stories that resonate with deep-seated psychological biases will be transmitted more and have stronger impact on citizens’ political opinions when they transmitted in their social networks. Focusing on evolved biases for cheater detection, vivid social information, and negativity, I present experimental evidence from large-scale chain transmission studies collected in Denmark and the United States as well as observational analyses of Facebook data supporting this argument.
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 04/03/2020 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
FLIERS Philip (Queens University of Belfast)
Corporate Taxes and Debt under the Nazi Occupation
Development Economics Seminar
Du 04/03/2020 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BLATTMAN Chris (University of Chicago)
Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance
Urban criminal groups rule tens to hundreds of millions of people worldwide. In Medellin, Colombia, gangs resolve disputes, police neighborhoods, enforce contracts, and tax businesses in their territories. The literature suggests that gang rule arises not only because governments fail to project their power, but also because they delegate governing to criminals. We first document and describe criminal governance, its correlates, and its origins in Medellin, qualitatively and quantitatively. We then look observationally at the effect of long-run state presence on criminal rule. Finally, we worked with the government to develop the first ever gang-level randomized trial. Most policy solutions are coercive and repressive. We identified a nonviolent approach to intensify municipal and community governance and attempt to displace gang rule. The city identified 80 neighborhoods where their governance is weak and gangs are strong. For 18 months the city intensified outreach and services to a random 40 of these neighborhoods—a 10-fold improvement in street-level staff plus an intensification of municipal services. The intervention had the expected effects in gang neighborhoods where gangs elect not to govern. In neighborhoods where gangs seek to govern, however, the city’s effort backfired, reducing citizens’ use of the state and state legitimacy. We conclude with paths forward
Du 04/03/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00
() Marriage-related disputes arbitrated by Native Courts in colonial Senegal:prevalence and dynamic;
La séance est annulée
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 03/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
STERN Lennart (PSE)
The optimal taxation of air travel under monopolistic dynamic pricing
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 03/03/2020 de 14:30 à 16:30
PSE, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014, Paris - salle R2-21
EGGER Peter (ETH Zurich)
Decomposing the Economic Effects of Transport Infrastructure
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 03/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina (PSE)
Reading Twitter in the Newsroom: How Social Media affects Traditional-Media Reporting?
écrit avec Sophie Hatte, Etienne Madinier
Do social media affect traditional media reporting? We estimate whether and how the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by US TV channels is affected by the flow of tweets released from Israel and Palestine. For identification, we exploit exogenous variation in internet access in Israel and Palestine and electrostatic discharges during thunderstorms. We find systematic evidence that social media does change the reporting by traditional media. Twitter activity increases both the likelihood and the length of coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On average, the Palestinian side of the story is less likely to be reported. We provide some evidence that Twitter helps portray the Palestinian side of the story.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 02/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
VIGIER Adrien (Oslo Business school)
Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets?
écrit avec Jesper Rüdiger
We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers' gain from becoming informed. When quotes are observable, this effect in turn induces a strategic complementarity in information acquisition amongst market makers. We then derive the equilibrium pattern of information acquisition and examine the implications of our analysis for market liquidity and price discovery. We show that increasing the cost of information can decrease market liquidity and improve price discovery.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 02/03/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE, room 019
COTTERLAZ-CARRAZ Pierre (CEPII & Sciences Po (Department of Economics))
Information in the First Globalization: News Agencies and Trade
écrit avec Etienne Fize (Science Po & CAE)
This paper documents the effect of information frictions on trade using a historical large-scale improvement in the transmission of news: the emergence of global news agencies. The information available to potential traders became more abundant, was delivered faster and at a cheaper price between countries covered by a news agency. By exploiting differences in the timing of telegraph openings and news agency coverage across pairs of countries, we are able to disentangle the pure effect of information from the effect of a reduction in communication costs. Panel gravity estimates reveal that bilateral trade increased by 30 % more for pairs of countries covered by a news agency and connected by a telegraph than for pairs of countries simply connected by a telegraph.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 02/03/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
RHODES Andrew (TSE)
Dynamic Consumer Search
We consider a model in which firms sell differentiated products, and consumers are interested in buying repeatedly over time but need to search for price and product information. Firms and consumers turn over at an exogenous rate. We show that provided the search cost is not too large, the market exhibits pure strategy price dispersion. Specifically, older firms charge higher prices because they face a larger and `better-matched' demand. The fact that sellers gradually raise their prices over time also leads to rich consumer search and purchase dynamics. For example, consumers may initially search a lot for a product, return to the seller and buy for several periods, but then faced with successive price increases quit the firm and search again for a new product. We also provide conditions under which the ability of sellers to contact past customers and offer them personalized prices leads to higher consumer surplus.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 02/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
ZSELEVA Anna ()
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