Calendrier du mois de mars 2021
Development Economics Seminar
Du 31/03/2021 de 16:30 à 18:00
Via Zoom
AGGARWAL Shilpa (India School of Business)
Saving for Multiple Financial Needs: Evidence from Lockboxes and Mobile Money in Malawi
We test whether the provision of multiple labeled savings accounts affects savings and downstream outcomes in an experiment with 761 microentrepreneurs in urban Malawi. Treatment respondents received one or multiple savings accounts, in the form of lockboxes or mobile money. We find that while providing additional boxes increased savings by 40%, technical issues marred the efficacy of a second mobile money account. Data from novel high-frequency surveys suggests that both types of accounts had impacts on downstream outcomes, including farming decisions and credit extended to customers. We do not detect differential downstream effects by the number or modality of accounts.
Economic History Seminar
Du 31/03/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
via Zoom
KAMBAYASHI Ryo (Université Hitotsubashi)
Consequence of Hometown Regiment: Gender Imbalance and Industrial Structure in the Post-war Japan
écrit avec with Kentaro Asai (PSE)
War sometimes made a huge gender imbalance in certain cohort and in certain areas. While such gender imbalance may have moved the trajectory of economic development, the controversy is still inconclusive, because the market economy has a strong restoring force. We intend to contribute to this literature by introducing the Japanese experience during the second world war. Japan lost more than 2 million soldiers eternally between 1938 and 1945. In addition, since the Japan Imperial Army organized its main force as hometown regiment, the loss of young male is concentrated in certain cohort of certain geographical areas. By exploiting the variation of changes in gender balance cohort-by-prefecture, we examined the loss of young male may affect the post-war industrial structure. What we found so far is that the reduction of gender ratio may have led to slower industrialization, though it is only to a limited degree in terms of quantity.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 30/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
YOUNG BRUN Marie (PSE)
The political economy of carbon taxation with vertical and horizontal inequality
Virtual Development Economics Seminar
Du 30/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
I KHWAJA Asim (Harvard Kennedy School and CEPR)
*
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 30/03/2021 de 14:30 à 16:00
Using Zoom
OTTAVIANO Gianmarco (Bocconi University & CEPR)
The Backlash Against Globalization
écrit avec Italo Colantone, Piero Stanig
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 30/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
DUFLO Esther (MIT)
Street mathematicians
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 29/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
GIUNTI Sara (Uni. Milano Bicocca)
The Refugee Crisis and Right-Wing Populism: Evidence from the Italian Dispersal Policy
écrit avec joint with Francesco Campo and Mariapia Mendola
This paper examines how the 2014-2017 ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy affected voting behavior and the rise of right–wing populism in national Parliamentary elections. We collect unique administrative data and leverage exogenous variation in refugee resettlement across Italian municipalities induced by the Dispersal Policy. We find a positive and significant effect of the share of asylum seekers on support for radical-right anti-immigration parties. The effect is heterogeneous across municipality characteristics, yet robust to dispersal policy features. We provide causal evidence that the anti–immigration backlash is not rooted in adverse economic effects, while it is triggered by radical–right propaganda.
Texte intégral
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 29/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
MARGARIA Chiara (Boston University)
Exit Dilemma: The Role of Private Learning on Firm Survival
écrit avec Doruk Cetemen
We study exit decisions of duopolists from a stochastically declining market. Over time, firms privately learn about market conditions from observing the stochastic arrival of customers. Exit decisions are publicly observed; thus the model features both observational and private learning. We assume that a larger firm is more likely to have customers and hence has better information about market conditions than does a smaller rival. We provide sufficient conditions for either the smaller or the larger firm to be the first to exit the market in the unique equilibrium. Because of observational learning, exiting may be a firm's dominant action since continuing operation would bring too much of a good news to the rival, leading it to further postpone its exit. Uniqueness then follows from iterated conditional dominance.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 29/03/2021 de 12:00 à 12:30
BLOCH Francis( Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)
LUJALA Paivi(University of Oulu)
Follow the leader: Using videos to make information on resource revenue management more relevant
How can citizens be motivated to demand accountability in the management of public revenues? We use a video survey experiment to provide information, and employ role models to provide encouragement and motivation to act. The experiment focused on petroleum revenue management in Ghana and included over 2300 respondents. Providing information significantly increased satisfaction with current revenue management, though treated participants remained dissatisfied on average. We also found increased intention to demand more accountability through greater debate. The role models had an additional effect: they increased the sense that an individual can influence how petroleum revenues are used; the intention to contact media and to vote differently to ensure better accountability. These changes, however, did not persist, and a follow-up with 925 respondents 2.5 years later later showed few differences between the control and the treated groups. The experiment demonstrates that providing relevant information affects attitudes and planned behavior in the short term, and that role models give valuable encouragement for behavioral change.
PSE Internal Seminar
Du 26/03/2021 de 13:15 à 13:45
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 26/03/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
DESCHENES Sarah (PSE)
Exploring research ideas to evaluate a life skills and gender-norm intervention targeting adolescents
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 25/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
Using Zoom
PETERMAN William (Federal Reserve Board)
Macroeconomic Implications of Inequality and Income Risk
We explore the relationship between measured income and wealth inequality, income risk, and the macroeconomy in a nonlinear overlapping-generations model in which households face uncertain streams of labor income and returns on their savings. To manage those risks, households can apportion their savings to a bond, whose return is safe and identical across households, and a productive asset, whose return is uncertain and can differ persistently across households. We find that greater inequality in households' labor income and the return on their savings is generally associated with higher measured wealth inequality, a lower risk-free rate, and higher risk premiums. These findings suggest that the factors behind the observed rise in inequality over the past few decades might also have contributed to the observed fall in the risk-free rate and widening gap between the risk-free rate and the rate of return on capital. We discuss how these and other macroeconomic effects depend on the nature of income risk and portfolio choices.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 25/03/2021 de 16:00 à 17:00
Using Zoom
CHYN Eric (Dartmouth College)
The Long-Run Effects of School Racial Diversity on Political Identity
How do early-life experiences shape political identity? We examine the end of race-based busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools, an event that led to large changes in school racial composition. Using administrative data, we compare party affiliation in adulthood for students who had lived on opposite sides of newly-drawn school boundaries. Consistent with the contact hypothesis, we find that a 10-percentage point increase in the share of minorities in a white student's assigned school decreased their likelihood of registering as a Republican by 2 percentage points (12 percent). Our results suggest that schools in childhood play an important role in shaping partisanship.
Behavior Working Group
Du 25/03/2021 de 11:30 à 12:30
CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1)
Rumors diffusion in the lab
écrit avec Francis Bloch (PSE) and Sudipta Sarangi (Virginia Tech)
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 24/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
SPILIMBERGO Antonio(IMF)
SANDRI Damiano(IMF)
Mobility Under the COVID-19 Pandemic: Asymmetric Effects Across Gender and Age
écrit avec joint with Francesca Caselli and Francesco Grigoli
Lockdowns and voluntary social distancing led to significant reduction in people's mobility. Yet, there is scant evidence on the heterogeneous effects across segments of the population. Using unique mobility indicators based on anonymized and aggregate data provided by Vodafone for Italy, Portugal, and Spain, we find that lockdowns had a larger impact on the mobility of women and younger cohorts. Younger people also experienced a sharper drop in mobility in response to rising COVID-19 infections. Our findings, which are consistent across estimation methods and robust to a variety of tests, warn about a possible widening of gender and inter-generational inequality and provide important inputs for the formulation of targeted policies.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 24/03/2021 de 16:30 à 18:00
Via Zoom
DE ROUX Nicolas (Universidad de les Andes Bogota)
Forgone Investments Amid Conflict: Evidence from Agricultural Credit in Colombia
écrit avec with Luis R. Martínez, University of Chicago, Harris.
Do people forego otherwise profitable investments under civil conflict? Answering this question is crucial to our understanding of the costs of violence, but it is difficult to answer because it requires measuring willingness to invest and a source of exogenous variation in conflict intensity. We exploit a unique administrative dataset from Colombia’s largest agricultural bank and the 2016 demobilization agreement between the Colombian government and insurgent group FARC to overcome these challenges. A difference-in-difference strategy yields three main findings: First, credit to small producers increases in municipalities with historical FARC presence after the agreement. Higher loan applications drive this increase, with no change in supply-side variables. Second, a simple theoretical framework combined with rich information on characteristics of applicants and projects (including credit scores and loan outcomes) suggests that producers forego investments with a low return, but not riskier ones, amid conflict. Third, conflict is not the binding constraint on investment in areas with low access to markets. Higher investment, unchanged default rates, and increased nighttime luminosity suggest an overall positive economic impact of lower conflict intensity.
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 24/03/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
PHILIPPE Aurélie (IDHE.S / Sorbonne IHES)
Le Comité des Houillères et ses réseaux de pouvoir : la mise en place de stratégies d'influence au service des compagnies minières (1887-1939)
Economic History Seminar
Du 24/03/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Via Zoom
PASSALACQUA Arnaud (Lab'URBA/LIED )
Innovation et transports urbains : l'impossible défi ? Quelques réflexions à partir du cas parisien depuis le XIXe siècle
L'agglomération parisienne est en train de se doter d'une rocade de métro, le Grand Paris Express, présentée comme novatrice et porteuse de grandes ambitions : report modal depuis l'automobile, réduction de la ségrégation socio-spatiale, meilleure connexion des lieux-clés de son fonctionnement économique et de ses structures de recherche, rénovation du visage de Paris dans le monde, etc.
Le regard de l'histoire incite pourtant à interroger ces objectifs nombreux à l'aune de ce qu'ont pu apporter les projets antérieurs. L'histoire des transports est en effet un cimetière d'innovations, peuplé de multiples projets fantômes, inaboutis ou mis en échec. Ceux qui fonctionnent ont-ils d'ailleurs répondu aux objectifs qui ont présidé au choix de les réaliser ?
La communication proposée à ce séminaire discutera donc de ce que peut signifier l'idée d'innovation dans l'histoire des transports urbains, à partir du cas de l'agglomération parisienne. Elle croisera des considérations sur les temporalités des projets, les imaginaires sociaux associés aux systèmes de transport, le désenchantement de l'exploitation quotidienne de systèmes pensés comme des solutions de papier idéales... Ce faisant, elle interrogera la capacité des politiques publiques à organiser les mobilités urbaines dans la ville industrielle depuis le XIXe siècle.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 23/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
BOMARE Jeanne ()
Will we ever be able to track offshore wealth? How suspect real estate investments responded to automatic exchange of information
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 23/03/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
Via Zoom
GENTZKOW Matt (Stanford University)
Digital Addiction
écrit avec with Hunt Allcott and Lena Song
Digital technologies such as smartphones and social media occupy a large and growing share of leisure time. While these technologies provide obvious benefits, it is often argued that they can be addictive and harmful. We lay out a model of digital addiction and estimate its parameters using a randomized experiment involving about 2000 smartphone users. We find that smartphone social media use is habit forming, and while people correctly predict habit formation, they consume as if they are inattentive to it. Functionality that allows people to set time limits on social media apps reduces use by about 15 percent, suggesting that people have self-control problems. People slightly but consistently underestimate future use, suggesting slight naivete about temptation. Our structural model predicts that in our sample, non-rational habit formation—projection bias, temptation, and naivete—increases social media use by 12–25 minutes per day and reduces long-run consumer surplus by $50–$100 per person each year.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 23/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
via zoom
BANERJEE Abhijit (MIT)
Does Poverty Increase Labour Supply ? Evidence from Multiple Income Effects and 115,579 Bags
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Paris Migration Seminar
Du 22/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
SANTAMARIA Julieth (University of Minnesota)
When a Stranger Shall Sojourn with Thee’: The Impact of the Venezuelan Exodus on Colombian Labor Markets
This paper analyzes the effect of open-door immigration policies on local labor markets. Using the sharp and unprecedented surge of Venezuelan refugees into Colombia, I study the impact on wages and employment in a context where work permits were granted at scale. To identify which labor markets immigrants are entering, I overcome limitations in official records and generate novel evidence of refugee settlement patterns by tracking the geographical distribution of Internet search terms that Venezuelans but not Colombians use. While official records suggest migrants are concentrated in a few cities, the Internet search index shows migrants are located across the country. Using this index, high-frequency labor market data, and a difference-in-differences design, I find precise null effects on employment and wages in the formal and informal sectors. A machine learning approach that compares counterfactual cities with locations most impacted by immigration yields similar results. All in all, the results suggest that open-door policies do not harm labor markets in the host community.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 22/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
ALI Nageeb (Penn State)
Reselling Information
Information is replicable in that it can be simultaneously consumed and sold to others.
We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. We show that
even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents
from at most a single buyer: her payoffs converge to 0 as soon as a single buyer has
bought information. By contrast, if the seller can also sell valueless tokens, there
exists a “prepay equilibrium” where payment is extracted from all buyers before the
information good is released. By exploiting resale possibilities, this prepay equilibrium
gives the seller as high a payoff as she would achieve if resale were prohibited.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 22/03/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/94445869097?pwd=WVgweGJiUStZV0phaW54TGlueEhxUT09
STIPANICIC Fernando (TSE)
The Diffusion of Knowledge: Evidence from the Jet Age
écrit avec Stefan Pauly (Sciences Po)
This paper studies the impact of travel time on the diffusion of knowledge. We provide causal evidence by exploiting the beginning of the Jet Age as a quasi-natural experiment. We digitize airlines' historical flight schedules and construct a novel data set of the flight network in the United States. Between 1951 and 1966, average travel time between locations more than 2,000km away decreased 49%. We use patent citations as a measure of knowledge diffusion. For research establishments located more than 2,000km away from each other, the reduction in travel time increased citations by 8.1%. The reduction in travel time accounts for more than one third of the observed increase in citations in this distance interval. Additionally, the reduction in travel time increased the diffusion of knowledge through multi-establishment firms. Firms opened research establishments in locations that obtained a relative reduction in travel time to headquarters. Firms carried knowledge across distant establishments and increased its diffusion.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 22/03/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
HEIDHUES Paul (University of Dusseldorf)
Procrastination Markets
We develop models of markets with procrastinating consumers when competition operates — or is supposed to operate — both through the initial selection of providers and through the possibility of switching providers. As in other work, consumers fail to switch to better options after signing up with a firm, so at that stage they exert little downward pressure on the prices they pay. Unlike in other work, however, consumers — falsely expecting to do still better in the future — are not keen on starting with the best available offer, so at this stage they do not generate much price competition either. In fact, a competition paradox results: an increase in the number of firms or the intensity of marketing increases the frequency with which a consumer receives switching offers, so it facilitates procrastination and thereby potentially raises prices. By implication, continuous changes in the environment can, through a self-reinforcing entry or marketing process, lead to discontinuous changes in market outcomes. Sign-up deals serve their classically hypothesized role of returning ex-post profits to consumers extremely poorly, while in other senses they exacerbate the failure of price competition.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 19/03/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
BERNARD David (PSE)
Forecasting treatment effects from RCTs
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 18/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:45
Using Zoom
CARDOSO Ana Rute (IAE - CSIC)
Collective Bargaining in a Continental European Setting
écrit avec David Card (University of California Berkeley)
Sectoral contracts in many European countries set minimum wage floors for different occupation groups. In addition, employers often pay an extra premium (a wage cushion) to individual workers. We use administrative data from an annual census of employees in Portugal, linked to collective bargaining agreements, to study the interactions between wage floors and wage cushions and assess the impact of wage floors. We show that wages exhibit a spike at the wage floor, but that a typical worker receives a 20% premium over the floor, with wide variation across workers and firms. Flexibility of cushions allows mean wages to respond to firm-specific productivity differences even within the same sectoral agreement. New contract negotiations tend to raise all wage floors proportionally, with increases that reflect average productivity growth among covered firms. As floors rise, however, wage cushions are eroded, leading to an average pass-through rate of only about one-half. We also found no evidence of employment responses to floor increases. Finally, we use a series of counterfactual simulations to show that real wage reductions during the recent financial crisis were facilitated by reductions in real wage floors (-2.2 ppts), reductions in real cushions (-2.5 ppts), and the re-allocation of workers to lower wage floors (-4.8 ppts). Offsetting these effects was a rapid rise in share of workers at higher education levels, which in the absence of other factors would have led to rising real wages.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 18/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
online
BI Wei (European University Institute)
Adverse Selection with Dynamic Learning
Most of the current literature about adverse selection in the dynamic game form assumes that the information asymmetry exists ex ante while I build a search model (the seller samples the buyers and the buyers make the offer) to characterize the case where the information asymmetry evolves as time goes on and study the agents' behavior. I find the condition such that the market is efficient in which case all sellers could make a trade whatever their types. Furthermore, I study how the agents' behavior changes when they are bounded rational. I first consider a situation where the coarse buyer forms an expectation of the value from the trade, which is unconditional on whether the seller will accept his offer. I find that he tends to overbid if the information asymmetry exacerbates. Secondly, I consider the coarse buyer expects the seller's behavior as if it was stationary conditional on the state. I find that when the adverse selection effect is significant, he will not make a higher offer compared to the rational one.
Behavior seminar
Du 18/03/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
LEBRETON Mael (PSE)
*Generosity Biases the Learning of Cultural Conventions
Human groups can markedly differ in fairness and cooperation norms, and these differences can create intergroup misunderstandings and conflict. At the same time, humans also trade and travel across cultural divides, suggesting that they can learn and adapt to new culture-specific conventions and rules of engagement. While such adaptions avoid intergroup conflict and benefit intergroup exchange, how humans learn group-specific rules that are often implicit and distinct from already learned values and norms remains poorly understood. Here we examine this fundamental learning process underlying social rule acquisition. We created three populations with different yet unobservable rules of engagement and varied whether or not decisions affected interaction partner outcomes. Participants made bargaining offers to responders from these different populations and could observe whether their offer was accepted or rejected. Participants quickly adapted to group-specific rules in learning environments without social consequences, but were overly generous and ended up misrepresenting what would be acceptable when decisions affected their partner’s outcomes. We propose a computational model, combining Bayesian principles and social preferences, that mechanistically explains how generosity leads to biased sampling, impeded learning, and false beliefs about what offers are deemed acceptable. Using functional neuroimaging, we mapped key computational variables in two major brain networks, previously associated with value-based and social decision-making. Results suggest that generosity, related to brain regions associated with decision-conflict and perspective-taking, can induce self-fulfilling beliefs in pro-sociality norms that may help to increase cooperation and reduce conflict between distinct groups but also create inaccurate stereotypes and economic inefficiencies.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 18/03/2021 de 10:00 à 11:30
REIS Ricardo (London School of Economics)
The constraint on public debt when r is smaller than g but g is smaller than m: joint with Lecture Chaire Banque de France
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 17/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
ROSSI-HANSBERG Esteban (Princeton)
The Economic Geography of Global Warming
écrit avec joint with Jose Luis Cruz Alvarez
Global warming is a worldwide and protracted phenomenon with heterogeneous local economic effects. In order to evaluate the aggregate and local economic consequences of higher temperatures, we propose a dynamic economic assessment model of the world economy with high spatial resolution. Our model features a number of mechanisms through which individuals can adapt to global warming, including costly trade and migration, and local technological innovations and natality rates. We quantify the model at a 1° × 1° resolution and estimate damage functions that determine the impact of temperature changes on a region’s fundamental productivity and amenities depending on local temperatures. Our baseline results show welfare losses as large as 15% in parts of Africa and Latin America but also high heterogeneity across locations, with northern regions in Siberia, Canada, and Alaska experiencing gains. Our results indicate large uncertainty about average welfare effects and point to migration and, to a lesser extent, innovation as important adaptation mechanisms. We use the model to assess the impact of carbon taxes, abatement technologies, and clean energy subsidies. Carbon taxes delay consumption of fossil fuels and help flatten the temperature curve but are much more effective when an abatement technology is forthcoming.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 17/03/2021 de 16:30 à 18:00
Via Zoom
BEST Michael (Columbia University)
The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats
écrit avec Oriana Bandiera, Adnan Qadir Khan, & Andrea Prat
We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab,Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives to a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. Time use data reveal agents’ responses vary along the same margin: autonomy increases the time devoted to procurement and this leads to lower prices only when monitors cause delays. By contrast, incentives work when monitors do not cause delays. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy.
Virtual Development Economics Seminar
Du 16/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
HANNA REMA (Harvard Kennedy School and CEPR)
Food vs. Food Stamps: Evidence from an At-Scale Experiment in Indonesia
écrit avec w/ Abhijit Banerjee, Benjamin A. Olken, Elan Satriawan and Sudarno Sumarto
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 16/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
LOGEART Rosanne ()
The Environmental Safeguards Team: An analysis of NGOs advocacy at the European Commission
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 16/03/2021 de 14:30 à 16:00
Using Zoom
COSTINOT Arnaud (MIT)
International Trade and Earnings Inequality: A New Factor Content Approach
écrit avec R. Adao (Chicago Booth), P. Carrillo (GWU)
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 16/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
GETHIN Amory (PSE)
Political Cleavages in Western Democracies, 1948-2020
écrit avec Clara Martinez-Toledano, Thomas Piketty
This paper exploits a new dataset on the determinants of voting behaviors in over 300 elections held between 1948 and 2020 to document the long-run transformation of political cleavages in 21 Western democracies. In the 1950s-1960s, the vote for left-wing (social democratic and affiliated) parties was associated with lower-educated and low-income voters. It has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to “multi-elite party systems” in the 2000s-2010s: high-education elites now vote for the “left”, while high-income elites still vote for the “right”. This transition has been reinforced by the rise of green and far-right parties since the 1980s and by the emergence of a new "libertarian-authoritarian" axis of political conflict. We also analyze the evolution of other dimensions of political conflict related to age, gender, religion or geography, and provide evidence that the reversal of the educational cleavage is the most significant change, common to nearly all Western democracies, that the structure of electoral behaviors has undergone in the past decades.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 15/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:15
STRAZZERI Maurizio (University of Konstanz)
Assessing the Role of Asylum Policies in Refugees’ Labor Market Integration: The Case of Protection Statuses in the German Asylum System
I study the effect of refugees’ protection status on labor market outcomes focusing on a recent cohort of Syrian and Iraqi refugees entering Germany between 2013 and 2016. My empirical analysis exploits a sudden and unpredictable change in the assessment of the Federal Agency responsible for asylum claims to grant full refugee status in accordance with the Geneva convention to refugees from these two countries in March 2016. Using data from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees and exploiting the policy change in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, estimation results indicate a substantial negative effect of subsidiary protection status on earnings and employment.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 15/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
PATHAK Parag (MIT)
Worth the Trip? Effects of School Transportation in Boston and New York
The question of who attends school where has long been in the public eye, nowhere more so than Boston and New York City. School assignment in these districts came to national attention in the 1960s and 70s in the wake of court-mandated busing for racial balance. In Boston and New York today, centralized assignment with district-wide choice allows students to enroll far from home, perhaps enhancing integration. Urban school transportation is extraordinarily costly, however, and the social and educational consequences of this expenditure unclear. This paper estimates school distance and travel time effects using an identification strategy that exploits the Boston and New York City school matches. Instrumental variables estimates that exploit centralized assignment show that longer travel times indeed increase student exposure to other racial groups, especially for black students. But the same empirical strategy suggests that more distant enrollment does little to boost student achievement, high school graduation rates, or college enrollment. A shift towards assignment rules favoring walkable schools therefore seems unlikely to affect educational outcomes.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 15/03/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
AMBER Stefan (TSE)
Environmental markets exacerbate inequalities
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 12/03/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
RENK Andréa (PSE and Université de Namur)
Forced sterilization and subsequent demand for healthcare: evidence from the Emergency state in India (1975-1977)
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 11/03/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
Using Zoom
LACAVA Chiara ( Goethe University Frankfurt)
Why are some regions so much more productive than others?
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 11/03/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
https://sciencespo.zoom.us/j/94141173582 ID de réunion : 941 4117 3582
COUTTENIER Mathieu (ENS Lyon)
The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Production Network Approach
We provide new evidence on how conflict adversely affects economic outcomes. Specifically, we ask whether and how the production network is a first-order determinant of the propagation of conflict to firms outside of conflict zone. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants and geo-coded information on Maoist insurgency, we first provide an estimate of the direct exposure to conflict. Firms located in conflict affected areas suffer a loss of 7-11% of their output. Estimating structurally a general equilibrium model of production networks, we then obtain an estimate for the overall macroeconomic impact of the Maoist insurgency by taking this propagation effects into account. We find that the Maoist insurgency resulted in a 0.4-0.7% decline in aggregate output of Indian’s manufacturing sector. Only the 20% of this loss is due to direct exposure to conflict, whereas the remaining 80% explained by the indirect exposure to conflict through the network production.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 11/03/2021 de 12:00 à 13:00
online
MOULIN Hervé (University of Glasgow)
Worst Case Voting and Bargaining
écrit avec with Anna Bogomolnaia & Ron Holzman
The guarantee of a given anonymous mechanism is the worst case welfare an agent can secure even against unanimously adversarial other agents. The higher the guarantee, the easier the participation in the mechanism. The worst case design question is how high can such guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? We adress this question in the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model. Feasible guarantees include the Uniform lottery over of the p deterministic outcomes, and those implemented by the Random Dictator mechanism or Voting by Veto. Finding the set M(n; p) of maximal (unimprovable) guarantees is simple only if n > p ñit reduces to the Uniform one ñ, and when n = 2 ñit is a polytope where each vertex combines a round of veto with one of random dictatorship ñ. If 3 6 n < p the set M(n; p) is a simplicial complex of dimension d = d p n e, that we describe in detail only when d = 1. In general the Uniform, Veto and Random Dictator guarantees are still the building blocks of 2 d simplices in M(n; p); each of dimension d. The corresponding guarantees are easy to interpret and implement.
Behavior Working Group
Du 11/03/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
MUN Sofiia (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Deliberate Randomization and Ambiguity: Is There a Connection?
écrit avec Elias Bouacida (Lancaster University, Management School)
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 10/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
GIESING Yvonne(Ifo Institute)
LAURENTSYEVA Nadzeya(LMU)
Firms Left Behind: Emigration and Firm Productivity
This paper establishes a causal link between the emigration of skilled workers and firm productivity. We create a new instrument for emigration by exploiting industry-level variation in the European labor mobility regulations from 2004 to 2017. Using a new self-collected industry-level migration dataset and a large administrative firm-level panel, we show that emigration reduces firm productivity in the short term. The negative effect concerns all firms along the initial productivity distribution and is more pronounced when emigrants are positively selected. At the industry level, the effects are attenuated by firms’ entry and exit dynamics. Additional evidence highlights a loss of firm-specific human capital and reduced training due to increased turnover.
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 10/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:30
STEINFELD Frederic (University of Gothenburg)
De-Coding the Image of the Firm: How Balance Manipulation Changes the Perspective on Historical Company Performance
Du 10/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:30
via Zoom
STEINFELD Frederic (University of Gothenburg)
De-Coding the Image of the Firm: How Balance Manipulation Changes the Perspective on Historical Company Performance
Economic History Seminar
Du 10/03/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Via Zoom
MAITTE Corine()
TERRIER Didier()
Autour du livre de Corine Maitte et Didier Terrier, Les Rythmes du labeur. Enquête sur le temps de travail en Europe occidentale, XIVe-XIXe siècles, Paris, La Dispute
Le fil rouge de notre réflexion sur les Rythmes du labeur est constitué par une interrogation en forme d’évidence : comment peut-on parler d’une formidable augmentation du temps de travail dans les usines lors des débuts du processus d’industrialisation, puis de sa baisse lente et continue à l’issu du tournant des années 1840-1850 si l’on ignore tout, ou presque, des durées du travail antérieures et cela, en contournant l’intensité de l’effort productif ? Notre présentation insistera sur trois aspects de notre travail. Le premier concerne la méthode : saisir l’ampleur des possibles au plus près des individus, car l’intelligence de la diversité des situations exige une connaissance la plus fine possible de la manière dont le temps de travail de chacun est compté. Le second est l’analyse, si possible à hauteur d’homme, des différentes temporalités du travail, de la journée à l’année ; c’est de leur entrelacement que résulte en longue durée l’extrême bigarrure des emplois du temps. Le troisième porte sur le lien entre la durée et l’intensification du labeur car les tentatives pour lier temps, quantités de travail et formes de rémunérations sont mises en œuvre très tôt et cheminent dans la pratique tout autant que dans la théorie. Durée et contenu du travail sont inséparables.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 09/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
FABRE Antoine ()
Udapting rental values for local taxation : an ex ante evaluation in the French context
écrit avec Guillaume Chapelle, Chloé Lallemand
Rental values used for French local taxation on real estate are currently drawn from a 1970 evaluation, and a recent law plans to update them. This will imply a reallocation of these values between households, and then a reallocation of the tax burden. This paper provides an ex ante evaluation of this update, focusing on the biggest French urban areas. We use exhaustive administrative data on local taxation and housing market transactions in order to estimate for each dwelling the difference between the current administrative rental value and an updated one. The year of construction is a significant factor of this difference according to the results. Values of dwellings built before 1950 would increase by 15% on average, while values of the those built after this period would decrease by 16%. Our results also predict substantial increases in values in further suburbs. This could be interpreted as the result of urban sprawl observed over the last 50 years. On average, values of households in the first decile of income would decrease by 5.6%, while those of households in the last decile would increase by 9%.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 08/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
GHOSE Devaki (The World Bank)
Trade, Internal Migration, and Human Capital: Who Gains from India’s IT Boom?
How do trade shocks a?ect welfare and inequality when human capital is endogenous? Using an external IT demand shock and detailed internal migration data from India, I ?rst document that both IT employment and engineering enrollment responded to the rise in IT exports, with IT employment responding more when nearby regions have higher college age population. I then develop a quantitative spatial equilibrium model featuring two new channels: higher education choice and differential costs of migrating for college and work. Using the framework, I quantify the aggregate and distributional e?ects of the IT boom, and perform counterfactuals. Without endogenous education, estimated aggregate welfare gain from the export shock would have been half and regional inequality about a third higher. Reducing barriers to mobility for education, such as reducing in-state quotas for students at higher education institutes, would substantially reduce inequality in the gains from the IT boom across districts.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 08/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
GREEN Brett (WUSTL)
Due Diligence
Due diligence is common practice prior to the execution of corporate or real estate transactions. We propose a model of the due diligence process and analyze its effect on prices, efficiency, and the division of surplus. In our model, if the seller accepts an offer, the acquirer has the right to gather information and chooses when to execute the transaction. Our main result is that the acquirer engages in “too much” due diligence relative to the social optimum. Nevertheless, allowing for due diligence can improve both total surplus and the seller’s payoff compared to a setting with no due diligence. The optimal contract involves both a price contingent on execution and a non-contingent transfer, resembling features such as earnest money or break-up fees that are commonly observed in practice.
Econometrics Seminar
Du 08/03/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
KASY Maximilian (University of Oxford)
The social impact of algorithmic decision making: Economic perspectives
écrit avec https://maxkasy.github.io/home/files/papers/adaptive_combinatorial.pdf
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 08/03/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/99575966216?pwd=VmVmb2FZSklHU01SWU5aK3pLODVwdz09
VANNELLI Giulio (Università degli Studi di Trento, PSE)
Global Value Chains participation and firm boundaries: evidence from French FDI
écrit avec Giorgia Giovannetti (Università degli Studi di Firenze, EUI), Gianluca Santoni (CEPII)
The tremendous development of new technologies during the last decades allowed for an increasing interconnection between countries' economies and firms' activities: both commercial and financial linkages along value chains intensified, and also overlapped. As a consequence, Global Value Chains (GVCs) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) have dominated the international economics literature as two sides of the same coin. Using French administrative data, this paper studies the relationship between these two topics at the firm level. Trade and investments are found to be complement, with the first increasing the future likelihood of the latter. Using trade in intermediates as a proxy for GVCs participation, I prove that GVCs-related trade drives the effect.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 08/03/2021 de 12:00 à 13:30
Online
CHANCEL Lucas ()
Global carbon inequality
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 05/03/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
WRIGHT Kelsey (PSE)
Social protection in Niger
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 05/03/2021 de 11:00 à 12:30
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/93744251521?pwd=RGV0cGpxZVBSdzFrTTRNbVU2ZTg5dz09
NAJI Lllias (UVSQ et EHESS)
La retraite à 60 ans : renseigner le « tournant » des années 1980 par les archives des négociations (1981-1983)
Le « tournant » des années 1980 représente un objet central pour les approches du changement institutionnel, qu’’il s’agisse de la sociologie des élites, de l’histoire économie ou de l’économie politique des régimes d’accumulation du capital. Cette communication s’appuie sur ces différentes littératures pour contribuer à la sociohistoire de cette période, à partir de l’objet des réformes des retraites. La retraite à 60 ans est en effet annoncée dès 1981 avant d’être adoptée définitivement en 1983, suite à deux années de négociations portant sur le régime général de la CNAV, les régimes généraux de l’AGIRC-ARRCO et le régime d’assurance chômage de l’UNEDIC. A partir d’une analyse d’archives et d’entretiens centrée sur les jeux d’acteurs entre syndicats, patronat et administrations, cette communication présente trois résultats. Premièrement, dès 1982, les retraites sont un champ d’application de la « bataille des charges » menée par le patronat et une partie de l’administration, contre les résistances opposées par les syndicats. Deuxièmement, la réforme de la retraite à 60 ans est située à la frontière temporelle de deux justifications de la baisse du chômage : par l’abaissement de l’âge de sortie de la population active (décennie 1970), et par la limitation du coût du travail (décennie 1980 et 1990). Troisièmement, la fabrication de la politique de retraite participe au basculement vers un régime de répartition de la valeur ajoutée qui s’avère plus favorable aux profits et moins favorable aux salaires, au long des années 1980. Cette communication entend ainsi participer à la connaissance du « tournant » des années 1980 à partir de l’étude des jeux d’acteurs impliqués dans la fabrication des politiques de retraites.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 04/03/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
Using Zoom
PARODI Francesca (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
Consumption Tax Cuts in a Recession
Consumption taxes are often used across OECD countries as fiscal stimulus tools during recessions. In this paper, I use an estimated structural life-cycle model featuring multiple consumption categories to assess the effectiveness of temporary cuts to the Value Added Tax (VAT) rates on non-durable luxuries and durables as stimulus instruments. I find a 5% increase in consumption of non-durable luxuries in response to a temporary reduction of their VAT rate by 60% and an 80% increase in purchases of durables in response to a temporary cut of their VAT rate by 30%. The larger effect on durable purchases is due to intertemporal substitution and is driven by young and wealthy households bringing forward future durable purchases. Due to the partial irreversibility feature of durables, this effect is dampened if households anticipate higher future aggregate uncertainty.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 04/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
online
QU Xiangyu (Paris 1)
Perfect Altruism Breeds Time Consistency
écrit avec Co-author : Antoine Billot
Public policies are supposed to be determined by maximization of the social lifetime util- ity. This paper focuses on the general process, aggregation rules and unanimity conditions, which makes these policies socially eligible by individuals through their own discount factors and instantaneous utilities. We show that perfect altruism via an adapted form of unanimity is the key condition helping to characterize a time consistent society concerned with intergen- erational fairness in the presence of individuals who are heterogeneous in discount factors as well as in instantaneous utilities. In addition, different intensity levels of altruism are proved to provide different forms of aggregated social discounting and instantaneous utility, these forms giving birth to several lifetime utilities, from the standard exponential discounted function to the quasi-hyperbolic and the k-hyperbolic ones. Moreover, by showing that the degree of so- cial present-bias can be regulated by the choice of the number of periods involving altruism through unanimity, new insights emerge and potentially overturn some of the most standard economic policy recommendations.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 04/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Using zoom
* * ()
Firm-Led Mobility: Equity-Efficiency Effects of a Novel Mobility Channel
This paper investigates a novel international mobility channel where firms, rather than individuals, initiate the cross-border relocation of workers. Firm-led mobility (FLM) is more substantial in magnitude, and more responsive to shocks than traditional, individual-based migration. It also has radically different efficiency and equity implications for workers, firms and governments. I exploit the unique setting provided by a Europe-wide "posting" scheme, that fully liberalizes international mobility through the supply of cross-border services by companies. Assembling novel and exhaustive administrative data on this continent-wide FLM scheme, and drawing on rich quasi-experimental policy variation, I estimate that staggered FLM liberalization reforms increased overall geographical mobility by 500% without crowding-out other mobility channels. FLM is highly responsive to international cost differentials: I estimate that firm-led mobility flows have an elasticity of 1.6 with respect to wage differentials, twice as much as the standard migration elasticity. I provide suggestive evidence that firms alleviate part of the frictions constraining individual migration, thus rationalizing the magnitude of these effects. I then turn to the unequal distribution of these aggregate gains, both between and within countries. Unlike standard emigration, firm-led mobility redistributed economic activity and tax revenue to sending — mostly low-wage — countries, increasing employment in sending countries by 17% and taxes paid at home by sending firms by 30%, while employment in exposed sectors in receiving countries decreases by 6%. Firm-led mobility is also associated with benefits that mostly accrue to firms instead of workers: using detailed firm-level data, I show that workers' wage rate rise by 10%, while capital-owners increase their profits by 30%, after a firm starts posting workers abroad, suggesting that firms capture 2/3 of the overall mobility surplus.
Behavior seminar
Du 04/03/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
on line
DRAGONE Davide (university of Bologna)
Solving the milk addiction puzzle
écrit avec Co-author : Davide Raggi
The milk addiction paradox refers to an empirical finding in which non-addictive commodities such as milk appear to be addictive. This paradoxical result seems more likely when consumption is persistent and with aggregate data. Using both simulated and real data, we show that the milk addiction paradox disappears when estimating the data using an AR(1) linear specification that describes the saddle-path solution of the rational addiction model, instead of the canonical AR(2) model. The AR(1) specification is able to correctly discriminate between rational addiction and simple persistence in the data, to test for the main features of rational addiction, and to produce unbiased estimates of the short and long-run elasticity of demand. These results hold both with
individual and aggregated data, and they imply that the AR(1) model is a better empirical alternative for testing rational addiction than the canonical AR(2) model.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 03/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
LIBOIS François (PSE)
Man Overboard! Industrial Fishing as Driver of Out-Migration in Africa
écrit avec joint with Irène Hu
Environmental drivers of migration attract more and more attention. This article focuses on the effect of fish stock depletion on migration in Africa and uses a novel dataset on fishing intensity (Kroodsma et al., 2018). Based on a panel of the 37 African countries with access to the sea over the period 2012-2018, we show that within country variation in fishing intensity increases migration to OECD countries. We find strong evidence that the competition created by industrial fishing vessels overfishing African seas and depleting fish stocks, increase the number of asylum seekers to OECD in general and of male asylum seekers to European OECD countries in particular. A 1% increase in the previous year’s fishing effort along an African country’s coast increases the number of asylum seekers towards the OECD by 0.05% and by 0.06% the number of male asylum seekers to European OECD countries. We then show that findings at the macro level are consistent in terms of mechanisms with micro level estimates using household level demographic data.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 03/03/2021 de 16:30 à 18:00
Via Zoom
DUFLO Esther (MIT)
Encouraging Social Distancing: Evidence from Several Randomized Controlled Trials
Economic History Seminar
Du 03/03/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Via Zoom
DELALANDE Nicolas(Sciences Po)
BARREYRE NICOLAS (EHESS)
Un monde de dettes publiques: une histoire politique
Les dettes publiques ont été une caractéristique essentielle de la construction des États modernes, un moteur de l’histoire du capitalisme, et un enjeu géopolitique puissant. Des crises révolutionnaires aux empires, dans l’essor puis la chute de l’ordre mondial d’après-guerre, la question des dettes publiques n’a ainsi jamais été du seul ressort des cercles économiques. Adoptant une perspective politique et historique, attentif à ses dimensions globales, ce livre propose des clés pour comprendre la centralité, toujours aujourd’hui, des dettes publiques, et pourquoi il est nécessaire de les prendre comme une question politique qui nécessite des réponses tout aussi politiques.
La tendance souvent exprimée de nos jours de considérer la dette publique comme une source de fragilité ou d’inefficacité économique, en effet, manque le fait essentiel que, depuis le dix-huitième siècle, les dettes publiques ont souvent été des leviers pour les États pour affermir leur souveraineté et construire leurs institutions, notamment mais pas seulement en temps de guerre. Il est frappant de constater que certaines solutions utilisées dans le passé pour répondre à des crises de dettes publiques sont aujourd’hui tenues hors de toute considération – symptôme des changements des rapports de force entre créanciers, contribuables, retraités et salariés depuis quarante ans.
Reconnectant l’histoire du capitalisme et l’histoire de la démocratie, cette histoire politique globale des dettes publiques est une contribution à ce débat.
Virtual Development Economics Seminar
Du 02/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
QIAN Nancy (Northwestern University)
Aid Crowd-Out: The Effect of NGOs on Government-Provided Services
écrit avec w/ Erika Deserranno and Aisha Nansamba
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 02/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
DOUSSET Léa (PSE)
Competitive Educational Environment and Female Students' Success: Evidence from the French Elite Scientific Higher Education
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 02/03/2021 de 14:30 à 16:00
Using Zoom
PETERS Dominik (Dauphine)
European Immigrants and the United States' Rise to the Technological Frontier
écrit avec Costas Arkolakis and Sun Kyoung Lee
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 02/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
JAFFRELOT Christophe ()
The deepening and diversification of inequalities in India
Traditional forms of inequalities along class lines and the urban/rural divide have increased in post-liberalisation India (which did not necessarily mean - till recently - that the poor were getting poorer).
But new forms of inequality have also crystallised. In this presentation, I will focus on two recent phenomena: the making of class differentiation within caste groups and the relative socio-economic decline of Muslims vis-à-vis other religious communities.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 01/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:15
PORCHER Charly (Dartmouth College)
Migration with Costly Information
Information is critical for migration decisions. Yet, depending on where they reside and who they interact with, individuals may face different costs of accessing information about employment opportunities. How does this imperfect and heterogeneous information structure affect the spatial allocation of economic activity and welfare? I develop a quantitative dynamic model of migration with costly information acquisition and local information sharing. Rationally inattentive agents optimally acquire more information about nearby locations and learn about other locations from the migrants around them. I apply this model to internal migration in Brazil and estimate it using migration flows between regions. To illustrate its quantitative implications, I evaluate the counterfactual effects of the roll-out of broadband internet in Brazil. By allowing workers to make better mobility choices, expanding internet access increases average welfare by 1.6%, reduces migration flows by 1.2% and reduces the cross-sectional dispersion in earnings by 4%.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 01/03/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
MOLINA Hugo (INRAE)
Buyer Alliances in Vertically Related Markets
Alliances of buyers to negotiate input prices with suppliers are commonplace. Using pre- and post-alliances data on household purchases of bottled water, I develop a struc tural model of bilateral oligopoly to estimate the effects of alliances formed by retailers on their bargaining power vis-à-vis manufacturers and retail prices paid by consumers. Results provide evidence of a countervailing buyer power effect that reduces retail prices by roughly 7%. Exploring determinants of buyer power, I find that changes in retailers’ bargaining ability play an important role in the countervailing force exerted by buyer alliances which, absent this effect, would have harmed retailers.