Calendrier du mois de mai 2015
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 27/05/2015 de 17:00 à 18:00
MSE (salle B2.2)
ARABZADEH Hamzeh ()
TBA
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 20/05/2015 de 17:30 à 19:00
DUHAUTOIS Richard (CEE-RECHERCHE)
Quelques exemples de travaux empiriques sur le football
Development Economics Seminar
Du 20/05/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
DIPPEL Christian (UCLA)
THE RENTS FROM TRADE AND COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS: REMOVING THE SUGAR COATING
écrit avec Co-author(s) : Avner Greif and Daniel Trefler
We are especially indebted to Jim Robinson who, in the initial stages of the project when we were wallowing in case studies drawn from disparate times and places, encouraged us to focus on the British Empire and the under-exploited Colonial Blue Book data. We are also indebted to Elhanan Helpman for his encouragement in exploring the relationship between international trade and domestic institutions. We benefited from discussions with Daron Acemoglu, Lee Alston, Magda Bisieda, Kyle Bagwell, Stanley Engerman, James Fenske, Murat Iyigun, Suresh Naidu, Diego Puga, Alan Taylor, and seminar participants at Boulder, CIFAR, LSE, Ryerson, Stanford, Toronto (Law Faculty), Western, the World Bank, UC Davis, and UC San Diego. Trefler gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). All three co-authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, CIFAR Program in Institutions, Organizations, and Growth, Toronto, ON M5G 1Z8. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
WIP (Work in progress) Working Group
Du 20/05/2015 de 11:00 à 12:30
HE Yinghua (Rice U)
*
écrit avec Asma BenhendaHow to Identify Good Teachers? Teachers Evaluation and Student AchievementAnne HilgerNon-cognitive skills, social networks, and labor market outcomes in BangladeshCamille TerrierThe Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
WIP (Work in progress) Working Group
Du 20/05/2015 de 11:00 à 12:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
HE Yinghua (Rice U)
*
écrit avec Asma Benhenda "How to Identify Good Teachers? Teachers Evaluation and Student Achievement" Anne Hilger "Non-cognitive skills, social networks, and labor market outcomes in Bangladesh" Camille Terrier "The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence"
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 19/05/2015 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
BOUGUEN Adrien ()
Changing Behavior or Changing Perceptions? New Perspectives from a Parental Intervention in South Africa
NGOs, Development and Globalization
Du 19/05/2015 de 14:00 à 18:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
écrit avec Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline (University Paris I, Paris School of Economics) "Merchants of Doubt: Lobbying Strategy when Scientific Credibility is Uncertain" (with Thomas Lyon) Michel Maietta (Action Against Hunger and IRIS) "Humanitarian access in crisis : risk aversion and innovation stalemate"
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 18/05/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
AL NAJJAR Nabil (NORTHWESTERN)
"This Time is Different.."
Systematic deviations from ostensibly rational beliefs appear in many economic, financial, and business contexts. This paper introduces a steady-state competitive equilibrium model (Hopenhayn (1992), Melitz (2003)) where firms maximize expected profit and hold beliefs that are calibrated with market aggregates. Firms agree that the aggregates accurately describe the distribution of productivities of others, but believe their own productivity is drawn from a better distribution. Each firm believes its own project is special, that `this time is different.' In the steady-state, all firms and outside observers agree that market participants are, on average, over-optimistic and that there is over-entry. The equilibrium response to this collective `bias' is a combination of lower prices, higher failure rates, and tighter credit. Corporate financing arrangements are determined in equilibrium, and display a combination of credit-rationing and funding at rates that firms view as too high.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 11/05/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
ALAOUI Larbi (UNIVERSITY POMPEU FABRA)
Endogenous Depth of Reasoning" écrit avec Antonio Penta
We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard models of strategic thinking, in this framework the player's `depth of reasoning' is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach, individuals act as if they follow a cost-benefit analysis. The depth of reasoning is a function of the player's cognitive abilities and his payoffs. The costs are exogenous and represent the game theoretical sophistication of the player; the benefit instead is related to the game payoffs. Behavior is in turn determined by the individual's depth of reasoning and his beliefs about the reasoning process of the opponent. Thus, in our framework, payoffs not only affect individual choices in the traditional sense, but they also shape the cognitive process itself. Our model delivers testable implications on players' chosen actions as incentives and opponents change. We then test the model's predictions with an experiment. We administer different treatments that vary beliefs over payoffs and opponents, as well as beliefs over opponents' beliefs. The results of this experiment, which are not accounted for by current models of reasoning in games, strongly support our theory. We also show that the predictions of our model are highly consistent, both qualitatively and quantitatively, with well-known unresolved empirical puzzles. Our approach therefore serves as a novel, unifying framework of strategic thinking that allows for predictions across games.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 07/05/2015 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
FERRANDO Mery (UCL AND PSE)
"Educational Outcomes of Minorities: the Impact of Politicians"
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 04/05/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
BOBTCHEFF Catherine (TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS)
More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing
écrit avec Co-author : Raphaël Levy
We consider a real option model in which a cash-constrained entrepreneur learns prior to investing, but at a speed which is private information. The entrepreneur seeks outside funding, and uses the timing of his investment to signal his con dence in the venture, and accordingly obtain cheaper credit. In the benchmark case with no informational friction, we show that the optimal investment date may be nonmonotonic or decreasing in learning speed, depending on the prior NPV of the project: better learning increases the value of the option, but also increases the speed of updating. In the presence of asymmetric information, the cash constraint may result in distortions in the investment timing policy, and the ine ciency is higher the more stringent the constraint. In addition, the welfare loss is sometimes higher for projects of higher quality. Ine cient investment policy may take both the form of over-investment (hurried investment as compared to the benchmark), when both entrepreneur types learn su ciently fast, and of under-investment (delayed investment), when the slow-learning type does not learn fast enough. Therefore, the severity of the cash constraint a ects the magnitude of the timing distortion, but not its direction.