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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du mois de mai 2020

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Du 29/05/2020 de 12:45 à 13:45

Using ZOOM

RENK Andréa (PSE and Université de Namur)

Do supply shocks change technology choices? Evidence from the 2015 Nepal blockade


EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Du 29/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:30

MSE-Paris 1, Salle 18 (nouveau bâtiment),106-112 Bd de l’hôpital 75013

HERRERA Helios (Warwick)

Séance annulée


PSE Internal Seminar

Du 28/05/2020 de 12:30 à 14:30

Du 28/05/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-14

LETROUIT Lucie(Université Gustave Eiffel)
RUIZ Celia(PSE)

TBA


brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 28/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00

PSE- Using ZOOM

SIGNORELLI Sara (PSE)

Too Constrained to Grow. Analysis of Firms' Response to the Alleviation of Skill Shortages





Skill shortages are a growing concern in the context of rapid technological change. However, little evidence exists on what is the actual cost associated with them and on the effectiveness of potential solutions. This paper evaluates whether a French policy encouraging immigration of skilled workers with highly-demanded competencies had a positive effect on the output and productivity of firms that were constrained by the lack of native candidates. The analysis is based on exhaustive administrative data and relies on a difference-in-differences approach. Results show that firms operating in the most constrained local labor markets react to the reform by hiring more workers in tight occupations. This leads to growth in their revenues and value added as well as generating some crowding-in of other types of employment. The effect is stronger in departments with lower job to job mobility, suggesting that high-skill migration can be an effective tool to relax skill constraints in the less dynamic areas of the country, where native workers are reluctant to move.

Paris Migration Seminar

Du 27/05/2020 de 17:30 à 18:30

https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_oOx9mNg2QxmWi73vB8WvkQ

PERI Giovanni (University of California Davis)

Integrating Refugees: Language Training or Work-First Incentives?




Texte intégral

Du 27/05/2020 de 17:30 à 18:30

https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_krHYn-19QuSZRFL3AdqUtw

MAYDA Anna Maria (Georgetown University)

*




Texte intégral

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Du 27/05/2020 de 17:00 à 19:00

Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

COLLET Stéphanie (Goethe-Universitaet Frankfurt am Main)

Histoire Financière : TBA


Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Du 27/05/2020 de 17:00 à 19:00

Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

COLLET Stéphanie (Goethe-Universitaet Frankfurt am Main)

Histoire Financière


Economic History Seminar

Du 27/05/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

BARTELS Charlotte (DIW Berlin)

The Long-Term Effects of Equal Sharing:Rvidence from Hitorical Inheritance Rules for Land : SEANCE ANNULEE


Virtual Development Economics Seminar

Du 26/05/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30

KREMER Michael (Harvard University)

Is Development Innovation a Good Investment? Which Innovations Scale? Evidence on social investing from USAID’s Development Innovation Ventures.



écrit avec Sasha Gallant, Olga Rostapshova, and Milan Thomas

Paris Trade Seminar

Du 26/05/2020 de 14:30 à 16:00

PSE, Using Zoom

FADINGER Harald(Mannheim)
DI GIOVANNI Julian(NY Fed)

Using ZOOM


Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 26/05/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00

Zoom

GALBIATI Roberto (Sciences-Po)

Wealth Accumulation and Institutional Capture: the Rise of the Medici and the Fall of the Florentine Republic



écrit avec Marianna Belloc, Francesco Drago and Mattia Fochesato




We study the rise of the Medici family and the fall of the Florentine Republic in the 15th century. In this period, political offices were assigned by a system which combined elections and selection by lot. During the 1420s, the Medici family increased its influence and de facto captured the system of office allocation while leaving the political institutions formally unchanged. We use data on the results of the drawings for the four main government offices of the city between 1395 and 1457 and match them with data on individual wealth at different points in time in the 15th century. Our analysis documents the systematic capture of the process of office allocation in favor of individuals belonging to the Medici’s network. When we move to the analysis of the relationship between wealth and political office holders, we show that after the Medici’s institutional soft-capture, holding a political office is strongly and directly associated with individual wealth accumulation, especially for office holders from the Medici faction. By contrast, we find a very limited effect between the number of terms in office and individual wealth before the rise of the Medici to political power. By comparing results for the two periods, before and after the institutional capture, and using complementary data sources, we provide several pieces of evidence that explain our findings in terms of collusion and rent extraction.

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 25/05/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30

salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

NEEMAN Zvika (Tel Aviv)

ANNULE


Régulation et Environnement

Du 25/05/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00

online

MELINDI-GHIDI Paolo (Université de Nanterre)

Particularism, dominant minorities and institutional change



écrit avec Raouf Boucekkine, Rodolphe Desbordes




We develop a theory of institutional transition from dictatorship to minority dominant-based regimes in resource-dependent economies. We depart from the standard political transition framework à la Acemoglu-Robinson in four essential ways: (i) population is heterogeneous, there is a minority/majority split, heterogeneity being generic, simply reflecting subgroup size; (ii) there is no median voter in the post-dictatorship period, political and economic competition is favorable to the minority (fiscal particularism); (iii) (windfall) natural resources are introduced, and (iv) we distinguish between labor income and resources, and labor supply is endogenous. We first document empirically fiscal particularism, its connection with natural resource endowment, and the impact of both on revolutionary bursts. Second, we construct a full-fledged model incorporating the four characteristics outlined above. We show, among others, that polarization is a sufficient condition for revolutions, while natural resource rents are not although they do matter when polarization is low. In agreement with our empirical facts, countries engaging in revolutions tend to be slightly less resource-rich than other countries. We also outline the interplay between natural resource rents, polarization and labor market conditions at the dawn of institutional change. Our theory is appropriate to understand the institutional dynamics of highly homogeneous resource-rich countries which, after a post-independence autocratic regime, turn to be dominated by minorities.



Texte intégral

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Du 25/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00

Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris

SHMAYA Eran ()

*


Du 20/05/2020 de 17:30 à 18:30

https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_oOx9mNg2QxmWi73vB8WvkQ

MAYDA Anna Maria (Georgetown University)
PERI Giovanni(University of California Davis)

*




Texte intégral

Paris Migration Seminar

Du 20/05/2020 de 17:30 à 18:30

https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_krHYn-19QuSZRFL3AdqUtw

MAYDA Anna Maria (Georgetown University)

*




Texte intégral

Du 20/05/2020 de 17:30 à 18:30

https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_krHYn-19QuSZRFL3AdqUtw

MAYDA Anna Maria (Georgetown University)
PERI Giovanni(University of California Davis)

https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_krHYn-19QuSZRFL3AdqUtw




Texte intégral

Development Economics Seminar

Du 20/05/2020 de 16:30 à 18:00

Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

CALVI Rosella (Rice University)

Séance annulée


Economic History Seminar

Du 20/05/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

HUBERMAN Michael(U.Montreal)
FRESSOZ Jean-Baptiste(CRH/EHESS)

Politics is local: Social Housing in Red Vienna, 1923-1933 - Séance annulée


Virtual Development Economics Seminar

Du 19/05/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30

SADOULET Elisabeth (UC Berkeley)

Catching a Wider Net: Sharing Information Beyond Social networks



écrit avec Manzoor Dar, Alain de Janvry, Kyle Emerick, and Erin Kelley

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 19/05/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00

Zoom

LACROIX Jean (Université Paris-Saclay)

Democratic purges in 1945 France: Was it all about separating the wheat from the chaff?



écrit avec Toke S. Aidt and Pierre-Guillaume Méon




To facilitate their consolidation, new democracies often purge supporters of former regimes. We refer to such purges as democratic purges. As opposed to purges in autocracies, democratic purges must strike a balance between annihilating the threats from the associates of the former regime and following the rule of law. How do new democracies strike this balance? In 1945, France set up an extraordinary Court aimed at legally purging the members of the Vichy regime: the Jury d’Honneur. In this paper, we investigate the bias of the Jury d’Honneur to clear politicians. To distinguish statistical discrimination from taste-based discrimination, we see if the cases in which the Jury d’Honneur overruled the opinions of local courts exhibit the same characteristics. As we observe that the Jury d’Honneur biased its decision towards different groups, we focus on the in-group bias it had towards law graduates, a historically powerful group in French politics. The Jury overruled the decision of local courts to purge law graduates in 26.47 percent of the cases whereas it did so in 13.49 percent of the cases for other defendants. In front of the Jury, the clearance rate of law graduates was 8 percentage points higher than other politicians’ whereas it was 2 percentage points lower in front of local courts. A network analysis of documents contained in individual files moreover points to the connections of law graduates as a factor explaining the bias of the Jury d’Honneur. This bias was not unconsequential as it appeared mainly in electoral litigations cases.

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 18/05/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30

salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

YANG Li (University of Michigan and BREAD)

*


Régulation et Environnement

Du 18/05/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00

salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

CRAWFORD Gregory (UZH)

ANNULE


Paris Game Theory Seminar

Du 18/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00

Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris

SMOLIN Alex (TSE)

*


Paris Migration Seminar

Du 18/05/2020 de 04:00 à 05:30

https://zoom.us/j/91521532483?pwd=UG5tL3I2NU9VSFMyejV1eEpiZWl3UT09

RENNER Laura(University of Freiburg)
SCHMID Lena(University of Freiburg)

Junior Seminar: A ‘Good Deal’? U.S. Military Aid and Refugee Flows to the United States




Texte intégral

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Du 15/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:30

MSE, Salle -, 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris

STURN Richard (University of Graz, Austria, Institute of Public Economics)

TBA


Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 14/05/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00

PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21

BLANCO Julio Andres (Michigan)

POSTPONED Devaluations, Inflation, and Labor Income Dynamics.



écrit avec Andrés Drenik, Emilio Zaratiegui




We study labor income dynamics during large devaluations in Argentina, using a novel monthly administrative employer-employee matched dataset covering the universe of formal workers in the 1994-2019 period. After the 2002 devaluation, real labor income decreases due to a sluggish nominal income adjustment relative to a massive increase in inflation. In the recovery, inequality decreases due to slower recovery of income at the top of the income distribution. Between-firm heterogeneity is the main contributor to the heterogeneous speed of recovery. Labor market mobility and unionization are the driving mechanisms for the heterogeneous recovery. Facts are robust across other devaluations.



Texte intégral

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 14/05/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00

online

TERCIEUX Olivier (PSE)

Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money



écrit avec M. Akbarpour, J. Combe, Y. He, V. Hiller and R. Shimer




We propose a new matching algorithm—Unpaired kidney exchange—to tackle the problem of double coincidence of wants without using money. The fundamental idea is that “memory” can serve as a medium of exchange. In a dynamic matching model with heterogeneous agents, we prove that average waiting time under the Unpaired algorithm is close-to optimal, and substantially less than the standard pairwise and chain exchange algorithms. We evaluate this algorithm using a rich dataset of the kidney patients in France. Counterfactual simulations show that the Unpaired algorithm can match nearly 57% of the patients, with an average waiting time of 424 days (state-of-the-art algorithms match about 31% with an average waiting time of 675 days or more). The optimal algorithm performs only slightly better: it matches 58% of the patients and leads to an average waiting time of 410 days. The Unpaired algorithm confronts two incentive-related practical challenges. We address those challenges via a practical version of the Unpaired algorithm that employs kidneys from the deceased donors waiting list. The practical version can match nearly 87% of patient-donor pairs, while reducing the average waiting time to about 141 days.



Texte intégral

Travail et économie publique externe

Du 14/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00

Using ZOOM

PAN Jessica (National University of Singapore)

Gender Differences in Job Search and the Earnings Gap: Evidence from Business Majors



écrit avec Patricia Cortes, Laura Pilossoph and Basit Zafar




To understand gender differences in the job search process, we collect rich information on job offers and acceptances from past and current undergraduates of Boston University's Questrom School of Business. We document two novel empirical facts: (1) there is a clear gender difference in the timing of job offer acceptance, with women accepting jobs substantially earlier than men, and (2) the gender earnings gap in accepted offers narrows in favor of women over the course of the job search period. Using rich survey data on risk preferences and beliefs about anticipated earnings, we present empirical evidence that the patterns in job search are largely driven by higher levels of risk aversion of women and higher levels of overconfidence of men. We next develop and estimate a formal job search model that incorporates these gender differences in risk aversion and degree of (over)confidence about the offer distribution. The estimated model is broadly able to match the survey findings. Our counterfactual exercises show that gender differences in risk preferences and overconfidence have similar quantitative importance in explaining the observed gender gap in accepted earnings. While overconfidence, on average, leads to higher earnings for males, the welfare implications are heterogeneous.

Paris Migration Seminar

Du 13/05/2020 de 17:30 à 18:30

https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_skDEDq9DSCO6BkQ1p5JKZQ

MOBARAK Musfiq (Yale University)

*




Texte intégral

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Du 13/05/2020 de 17:00 à 19:00

Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

COLLET Stéphanie (Goethe-Universitaet Frankfurt am Main)

Histoire Financière


Development Economics Seminar

Du 13/05/2020 de 16:30 à 18:00

Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

NOACK Claudia (Oxford)

Séance annulée


Economic History Seminar

Du 13/05/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

AMRITH Sunil (Harvard)

Séance annulée


Virtual Development Economics Seminar

Du 12/05/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30

JAYACHANDRAN Seema (Northwestern University)

Reshaping Adolescents' Gender Attitudes: Evidence from a School-Based Experiment in India


Du 12/05/2020 de 16:30 à 19:00

PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, Salle R1-09

SPITZER Yannay(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
MESPLE-SOMPS Sandrine(IRD, Paris-Dauphine-PSL University, CNRS, LEDa, DIAL.)
NILSSON Björn(Université Paris Sud)

Like an Ink Blot on Paper: Testing the Diffusion Hypothesis of Mass Migration, Italy 1876-1920




Texte intégral

Paris Trade Seminar

Du 12/05/2020 de 14:30 à 16:00

PSE, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014, Paris - salle R2-21

HANDLEY Kyle (Michigan)

POSTPONED


Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 12/05/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00

Zoom

MARTíNEZ-TOLEDANO Clara (Imperial College London)

Paraísos Fiscales, Wealth and Mobility



écrit avec David Agrawal and Dirk Foremny




Historically, Spain had a centralized wealth tax, but since the late nineties the authority to set wealth taxes was decentralized to the regions. However, it was only following a brief suppression during the recent financial crisis that regions started to take substantial advantage of this decentralization. Although most regions levied top tax rates of 2.5% to 3.75%, Madrid elected not to adopt a wealth tax. This provides a unique opportunity to study the mobility of taxable wealth. We exploit administrative data on individual wealth tax returns prior to the decentralization, along with longitudinal data on individual capital income tax returns and residential locations. Exploiting a generalized difference-in-differences design, we find that regional wealth taxes substantially affect the location of taxable wealth. By four years following the decentralization, the share of wealth tax filers and the share of taxable wealth in Madrid increased by approximately 7%. We then turn to an individual location choice model and find that a one percentage point increase in the net-of-tax rate for a region increases the probability of relocating wealth to that region by 8 percentage points. The effects of wealth taxes are largest for older individuals, but do not depend on the amount of real estate, suggesting that the relocation of wealth is driven by tax evasion rather than real relocations. Overall, our results have important implications for the design of wealth taxes, as recently proposed in several countries.

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 11/05/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30

salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

TAKASHI Hayashi (University of Glasgow)

*


Régulation et Environnement

Du 11/05/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00

salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

PICCOLO Salvatore (University of Bergamo)

ANNULE


Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 07/05/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00

PSE - Using ZOOM https://zoom.us/j/98487882758?pwd=eWxMT2NIdDBaZjNXUW4wdkVCbVBjUT09

SCHILLING Linda (Polytechnique)

Cryptocurrencies, Currency Competition, and the Impossible Trinity





We analyze a two-country economy with complete markets, featuring two national currencies as well as a global (crypto)currency. If the global currency is used in both countries, the national nominal interest rates must be equal and the exchange rate between the national currencies is a risk- adjusted martingale. We call this result 'Crypto-Enforced Monetary Policy Synchronization (CEMPS)'. Deviating from interest equality risks approaching the zero lower bound or the abandonment of the national currency. If the global currency is backed by interest-bearing assets, additional and tight restrictions on monetary policy arise. Thus, the classic Impossible Trinity becomes even less reconcilable.

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 07/05/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00

online

GHOSH Rajarshi (ESSEC)

ZOOM. Optimal Identification: An Equilibrium Model of Decision Making under Uncertainty in a Social Context





In the economic literature, there is little behavioral foundation for why and how people use their social identity in decision making. This paper presents an equilibrium model that studies the use of social identity in decision making under uncertainty through the interaction between the agent and her social context. The uncertainty in the decision-making process stems from the fact that agents only have access to noisy private data about their ability type. Agents learn from experience whether they will consider data related to their social identity when they process this private data into an estimate of the probability of success of a task. With the use of their social identity, agent's aim to maximize the likelihood that they will make the welfare-maximizing choice, given the possible realizations of their private data. The model shows therefore that agents use their social identity to reduce the uncertainty in decision making, which shows that choice behavior can be driven by the agents' observable characteristics, even when these observable characteristics have no direct effect on the agents' utility. I derive the conditions under which a social identity becomes salient and show that agents choose the identity from the set of salient identities that best reduces uncertainty given the cost of adoption of this identity. Through a selection, population and minority effect, the agents' perception of the social context is self-reinforcing and both asymmetric and symmetric population equilibria co-exist. Finally, I analyze the implications for labor market outcomes and I derive the necessary demand-side conditions for effective affirmative action policy.

Travail et économie publique externe

Du 07/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00

Using ZOOM

KIRCHER Philipp (EUI)

Eliciting time preferences under changing background consumption - the case of job search



écrit avec Michele Belot and Paul Muller




We propose a new method of eliciting individual time preference measures in settings where background consumption might vary substantially. The method relies on allocating lottery tickets with low winning probabilities but high rewards. In standard intertemporal choice models, but even in many non-standard ones, the high reward decouples the allocation of lottery tickets from the current and expected future background consumption levels (i.e., from changes in wealth and other income over time). Standard time preference measures elicit the marginal value of money across different periods of time. If consumption remains constant, in standard models this identifies the discount factor. If consumption is volatile, it measures the discount factor and changes in the marginal consumption utility. Consider a hand-to-mouth job seeker who receives unemployment benefits currently but expects to obtain well-paying job next period. Compare him to a similar individual with the only difference that he does not expect to find a job next period. Even with identical discount factor the former has less need of additional money in the second period because he expects to earn well, so will appear more eager to take current payments than future ones compared to the second. Without further controls he appears to have a lower discount factor. Our high-stakes lottery method intends to isolate the pure discount factor effect by offering rewards far outside the current range of consumption. We show within standard theories that this indeed uncovers the true discount factor independently from expectations about the consumption stream. We also show how this extends to environments with non-standard preferences, and with savings, and show that our measure still ordered individuals correctly. We validate our method on experimentally on two student samples drawn from the same pool. They are subjected to a standard time preference elicitation method, and to our method. One set of students is asked about discount factors in December at a time when their current budget is reduced by extraordinary expenditures for Christmas and Saint Nicholas gifts. The other one is asked in February when no such extra constraints exist. Our hypothesis is that both groups share the same true discount factor, but the former have less consumption now then in the future and therefore value current money higher. We expect this not to a?ect our measure, but the standard one. We also expect both measures to correlate well for the second group without income shocks, but not for the first. Finally, we apply our method to elicit discount factors from unemployed job seekers which naturally have varying income streams. We show a low degree of present bias, and are in the process of studying e?ects on job findings, reservation wages and effort over time.

Behavior seminar

Du 07/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00

online

BROOME John (University of Oxford)

ZOOM - Population, separability and discounting





When economists aggregate people’s wellbeing to make judgement about the overall good of a society, they sometimes discount later wellbeing compared with earlier wellbeing. This makes good sense only if all wellbeing is dated, which implies that wellbeing is separable across times. But this sort of separability makes it hard to take proper account of the value of extending people’s lives. Any solution to this problem will depend on a theory about the value of population. The upshot is that any theory of discounting is committed to a particular ethics of population.

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 07/05/2020

RUIZ Celia (PSE)

POSTPONED


Paris Migration Seminar

Du 06/05/2020 de 17:30 à 18:30

https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_-b5FPHqCRZqYpGyOtDExHg

SPITZER Yannay (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Testing the Diffusion Hypothesis of Mass Migration, Italy 1876-1920




Texte intégral

Development Economics Seminar

Du 06/05/2020 de 16:30 à 18:00

Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

KALA Namrata (MIT)

Séance annulée


Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Du 06/05/2020 de 16:30 à 17:15

MO Zhexun(PSE)
YACOUBOU DJIMA Ismael(PSE)
RICHARD Marion(PSE)

The Colonial Legacy of the Office du Niger on Smallholder Agriculture in Mali


Du 06/05/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan - 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

Economic History Seminar

Du 06/05/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

BISHARA Fahad (University of Virginia)

Into the Bazaar: Indian Ocean Vernaculars in the Age of Global Capitalism - CANCELED



écrit avec Séance annulée

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 05/05/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

SCARELLI Thiago (PSE)

Constrained Own-Account Work in Developing Markets: Evidence from Brazil - Reporté





This study explores a fundamental trade-off imposed by imperfect labor markets: individuals may work on their own at any time, but they can only occupy a potentially more productive wage job after a search period. We formalize this intuition using a simple extension of the canonical job search framework, which leads to a set of implications that can help to explain the prevalence of own-account work in developing labor markets. In particular, we show that a suffciently high time discount rate can rationalize the puzzling choice of own-account work when it offers a lower instantaneous return relative to wage employment. In the second half of this research, we use this theoretical structure to empirically characterize the minimum discount rate that is consistent with the observed occupational decisions of Brazilian own-account workers given the wage employment opportunities they potentially face. In our baseline speciffication, we find that in nearly 70% of the cases the lower bound implied by the observed choices is strictly above the rates available on the credit market, which we interpret as evidence of a financially constrained occupational choice. This result suggests that the majority of own-account work in Brazil is driven by the combination of labor market frictions and financial market failures.

Régulation et Environnement

Du 04/05/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00

ANNULE

SOVINSKY Michelle (University of Manheim)

ANNULE - Internet (Power) to the People: The Impact of Demand-side Subsidies in Colombia





Finding strategies to bridge the digital divide has been a major goal of public policy over the last decades. Accordingly, multiple demand-side interventions have been implemented to decrease Internet adoption barriers. In this paper, we assess the impact on internet adoption from a pricing subsidy to low-income households implemented by the Colombian government during the period 2012-2014. This is not a straightforward exercise as not all consumers in a small geographic region are offered the same plans and, more prohibitively, data on the size of the targeted market are not available. We develop a method that allows us to estimate a structural demand model of household preferences for Internet services and to gauge the effects of the subsidy policy while overcoming these limitations. We find that households present heterogeneity with respect to price sensitivity and that their adoption decisions are driven by the type of ISP (i.e., national or local provider) and the type of service (i.e., broadband or narrowband). We find that the price subsidy (of 12%) resulted in a 33% point increase in internet adoption among low-income consumers. The largest impact was in markets that had higher average coverage prior to the subsidy. Counterfactual results show that increasing the reliability of the service would increase adoption by almost as much as a price subsidy and would be most beneficial to households in less technically savvy markets. Our findings suggest that pricing subsidies are effective in closing the digital divide, but that policies focused on increasing the reliability of services are equally important.