Calendrier du mois de mai 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 31/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
YASH BHATIYA Apurav (University of Warwick)
Do Enfranchised Immigrants Affect Political Behaviour?
This paper analyses 3 million UK Parliament speeches between 1972 and 2011 to understand how enfranchised immigrants affect political behaviour towards existing and prospective immigrants. Since the birth of the Commonwealth of Nations in 1931, the immigrants from commonwealth countries in the UK have a right to vote in the national elections, while the non-commonwealth immigrants do not have this enfranchisement power. I find an increase in the share of enfranchised immigrants makes the incumbent spend more time in the Parliament talking about immigrants, address immigrants with a positive sentiment and vote to make immigration tougher. An increase in disenfranchised immigrants leads to the opposite effect. The enfranchised immigrants undertake more socio-political actions (signing a petition, participating in protests, contacting a politician etc.) compared to disenfranchised immigrants, which drives politician's behaviour. Disenfranchised immigrants only start catching up with the enfranchised immigrants after naturalisation.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 31/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
HAYASHI Takashi (University of Glasgow)
Social discount rate: spaces for agreement
écrit avec Co-author: MIchele Lombardi
We study the problem of aggregating discounted utility preferences
into a social discounted utility preference model. We use an axiom capturing
a social responsibility of individuals' attitudes to time, called consensus
Pareto. We show that this axiom can provide consistent foundations for
welfare judgments. Moreover, in conjunction with the standard axioms of
anonymity and continuity, consensus Pareto can help adjudicate some
fundamental issues related to the choice of the social discount rate: the
society selects the rate through a generalized median voter scheme.
Texte intégral
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 31/05/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/95087063366?pwd=NjhMT2xKWTlnb3B0dS9veGFicm1BUT09
REVERDY Camille (University of Paris 1 )
Technical regulations, intermediate inputs and sourcing decisions
écrit avec Irene Iodice (Paris 1)
Motivated by the growing share of technical standards regulating intermediate inputs, this paper investigates the role of standards in the sourcing decisions of international firms. We begin by building a novel database which fills the missing information on the product classification of all technical barriers to trade (TBTs) that have been notified to the WTO over the period 1995-2020, improving on the coverage of TBTs compared to existing sources. We combine this information with a World Bank database on the depth of trade agreements, including information such as the inclusion of specific provisions on TBT. We then cross-reference this database with a firm-level panel of French importers. We find that the introduction of a TBT by the European Union affect French firms' incentive to source its inputs within the EU. Following the enforcement of a TBT by the EU, we observe that the propensity to switch supplier country depends on firms' characteristics.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 31/05/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
Online
YOUNG BRUN Marie (PSE)
The political economy of carbon taxation with vertical and horizontal inequality
This paper investigates how majority voting over a carbon tax is impacted by the distribution of the tax burden. I introduce both income and urban-rural inequalities in a majority voting framework. To capture heterogeneity in salient carbon-intensive expenditures, such as car fuel or heating energy, urbans and rurals differ by the amount of subsistence polluting good they must consume. The analytical results show (i) polarization of the vote around the urban-rural divide can occur when the necessity consumption of carbon-intensive good is suffciently large; (ii) the majority tax rate can be over- or under-effcient, compared to the pigouvian rate, depending on the relative size of the income and the urban-rural inequalities.
Calibrating the model using Household Budget Survey micro-data for France, I investigate how comple- mentary policies affect the vote over carbon tax. Recycling the tax revenue lump-sum has a small but positive effect on the majority voting tax. The adopted tax rises both with a subsidy policy reducing polluting ne- cessity consumption for the rural population e.g. subsidizing effciency-improving heating renovations and with a policy reducing the proportion of rurals. But the former additionally reduces the political polarization around the urban-rural divide, while the later exacerbates it. Future work analyzes whether some European countries are more likely to be politically affected by the distributional impacts of the urban-rural divide and income inequality, using the European data available in the Eurostat HBS dataset.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 31/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
PATTY Morgan (LEDa, PSL)
Top Dominance
To deal with issues of inconsistency faced by iterated elimination of weakly or strictly dominated strategies (IEWDS or IESDS), we propose a new elimination procedure. Our procedure, named iterated elimination of top dominated strategies (IETDS), is based on the new notion of top dominance. It is more consistent than IESDS in a certain sense. Top dominance is more restrictive than weak dominance (and may be more restrictive than strict dominance): it requires weak dominance and strict payoff domination of the strategy on a specific profiles set. Furthermore, it requires that the dominating strategy to be not weakly dominated. Contrary to IESDS, IETDS may reduce the set of Nash equilibria (whilst never eliminating strict Nash equilibria) without the problems of order dependence, mutability and spurious Nash equilibria encountered by IEWDS and IESDS.
PSE Internal Seminar
Du 28/05/2021 de 13:15 à 13:45
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 28/05/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
BARBETA MARGARIT Anna (PSE)
Cultural norms, women's agency and policy effectiveness
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 27/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
online
PATTY Morgan (LEDa, PSL)
Top dominance
To deal with crucial issues of iterated elimination of weakly or strictly dominated strategies (IEWDS or IESDS), we propose a new elimination procedure. Our procedure, named iterated elimination of top dominated strategies (IETDS), is based on the new notion of top dominance. It is more consistent than IESDS in a certain sense. Top dominance is more restrictive than weak dominance (and may be more restrictive than strict dominance): it requires weak dominance and strict domination of the strategy on a specific profiles set. Contrary to IESDS, IETDS may reduce the set of Nash equilibria (whilst never expanding it and never eliminating strict Nash equilibria) without the problem of inconsistencies and order dependence faced by IEWDS and IESDS.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 27/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Using Zoom
SIEGLOCH Sebastian (Manheim)
Direct, Spillover and Welfare Effects of Regional Firm Subsidies
écrit avec Nils Wehrhöfer, Tobias Etzel
We analyze the effects of a large place-based policy, subsidizing up to 50% of investment costs of manufacturing firms in East Germany after reunification. We show that a 1-percentage-point decrease in the subsidy rate leads to a 1% decrease in manufacturing employment. We document important spillovers for untreated sectors in treated counties, untreated counties connected via trade and local taxes, whereas we do not find spillovers on counties in the same local labor market. We show that the policy is at least as efficient as cash transfers to the unemployed, but is more effective in curbing regional inequality.
Behavior Working Group
Du 27/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
ZAPPALà Guglielmo (PSE)
Drought exposure and accuracy: Motivated reasoning in climate change beliefs
Despite scientific consensus, there is no unanimity among citizens in the beliefs about climate change. Understanding how people form beliefs about climate change and what drives their interpretation of climatic events is essential, especially in developing countries and among agricultural communities, who may most suffer from climate change consequences. Using survey data from rural households in Bangladesh matched with objective drought data, this paper studies how long-term average drought exposure and short-term deviations shape belief formation and accuracy in recollecting past drought events. In order to further investigate how agents interpret these past drought events, I use an instrumental variable approach to test and validate that individuals are subject to confirmation bias. The results show that the probability of overestimating the number of past drought events and the intensity with which individuals overestimate are significantly biased in the direction of their prior beliefs. The findings highlight the need of models that account for behavioral factors such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning to study climate change preference formation, and its implications for effective communication.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 26/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
CATTANEO Cristina(European Institute on Economics and the Environment)
DASGUPTA Shouro(CMCC)
MASSETTI Emanuele(Georgia Tech University)
Climate Variability and worldwide migration. Current evidence and future projections
écrit avec joint with Fabio Farinosi
The literature linking climatic drivers and migration is growing, but there is still limited evidence and substantial uncertainty on multilateral flows on a global scale. This paper fills this gap in research by projecting changes in inflows and outflows of migrants from medium-term population and climate change. We estimate a panel bilateral gravity equation for emigration rates controlling for various indicators of decadal weather averages in the origin countries. We control for temperature, precipitation, droughts, and excess precipitation. The sample covers 100 origin and 166 destination countries for each decade from 1960 to 2010. We project bilateral changes in migration using the parameter estimates of the gravity equation, along with projections of socio-economic variables under shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP) and climate change scenarios from General Circulation Models (GCM) for various representative concentration pathways (RCPs). We find that average decadal emigration flows increase from 80 to nearly 140 million depending on the SSP, RCP and future year. Changes in migration are mainly due to population growth in the origin countries. By constraining the population of the origin countries to remain at current levels, we find that the number of climate international migrants is comparable in size to the emigration flows observed today.
Economic History Seminar
Du 26/05/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Via Zoom
MARAZYAN Karine (UP1)
La dynamique des litiges arbitrés par les Tribunaux Indigènes. Une exploration pour le Sénégal entre 1906-1922
En 1903, l’administration coloniale française réforme le fonctionnement de la justice en AOF et acte, entre autres décisions, l’ouverture de « Tribunaux Indigènes » (TI). Ces tribunaux, présidés par des personnalités locales de statut indigène, sont habilités à juger selon la coutume toutes affaires opposant des personnes de statut indigène (hormis les crimes). La consignation des litiges arbitrés par les TI du Sénégal dans des registres conservés aux Archives Nationales du Sénégal donne une occasion unique de documenter le volume et les caractéristiques des différends portés devant les TI par la population locale, ainsi que les décisions des juges, en interaction avec les modifications de l’environnement économique, social et politique du Sénégal. Pour cette présentation : à partir des séries de litiges reconstituées pour 43 TI entre 1906 et 1922, nous discuterons de quelques faits stylisés relatifs aux litiges portés devant les TI : leurs motifs, leur répartition géographique, et leur dynamique sur la période considérée. Dans un second temps, nous tenterons de mieux comprendre les variations de court terme observées. Un choc négatif de revenu peut causer une hausse des litiges portés devant les TI notamment parce que des engagements pris sont plus difficiles à respecter. Nous évaluerons ainsi le rôle de chocs de revenu agricole, approximés par des chocs de pluviométrie, dans la prévalence des litiges portés devant les TI.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 25/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
BLUMENTHAL Benjamin (ETH Zurich)
Political Agency with Heterogeneously Informed Voters
Virtual Development Economics Seminar
Du 25/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
YANAGIZAWA-DROTT David (University of Zurich and CEPR)
*
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 25/05/2021 de 14:30 à 16:00
Using Zoom
CONCONI Paola (Oxford)
Trade Protection Along Supply Chains
écrit avec C. Bown (Peterson Institute and CEPR), A. Erbahar (Erasmus University, Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute), L. Trimarchi (Université de Namur)
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 25/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
HARPEDANNE Louis-Marie ()
Mediating Financial Intermediation
écrit avec Aymeric Bellon and Noemie Pinardon Touati
This paper studies the resolution of disputes between firms and their lenders through external
mediators, who suggest a non-legally binding solution to resolve a disagreement after commu-
nicating with all parties. We exploit an administrative database on firms’ outcomes matched
to the French credit registry and plausible exogenous variation in eligibility to public media-
tors across counties for identification. Credit, employment and investment increase following
the mediation, causing an overall reduction in firms’ liquidation of 34.6%. All the effects are
driven by firms that borrow from more than one financial institution, supporting the view that
mediators solve coordination problems between lenders.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 21/05/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
GITTARD Mélanie (PSE)
Climate variability, migration and population in Kenya
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 21/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:30
Via Zoom
M. RANALDI Marco (Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality, City University of New York)
Global Distributions of Capital and Labor Incomes: Capitalization of the Global Middle Class
This article is the first to study global distributions of capital and labor income among individuals in 2000 and 2016. By constructing a novel database covering approximately the 80% of global output and the 60% of world population, two major findings stand out. First, the world underwent a spectacular process of capitalization. The share of world individuals with positive capital income rose from 20% to 32%. Second, the global middle class benefited the most, in rela- tive terms, from such a capitalization process. In China, the average growth rate of capital income was 20 times higher than in western economies. The global composition of capital and labor income is, therefore, more equal today, and the world is moving towards a global multiple-sources-of-income society.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 20/05/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
Using Zoom
OSOTIMEHIN Sophie (Université du Quebec à Montreal)
Misallocation and Intersectoral linkages
écrit avec Latchezar Popov
We analytically characterize the aggregate productivity loss from distortions in the presence of sectoral production linkages. We find that accounting for low input substitutability reduces the productivity loss and the impact of intermediate-input suppliers. Moreover, with elasticities below one (i.e. below Cobb-Douglas), sectoral linkages do not systematically amplify the productivity loss. We quantify these effects in the context of the distortions caused by market power, using industry- level data for 35 countries. With our benchmark calibration, the median aggregate productivity loss from industry-level markups is 1.2; assuming Cobb-Douglas elasticities would lead to overestimating the productivity loss by a factor of 1.8.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 20/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Online
CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1)
Logrolling affects the relative performance of alternative q-majority rules
It has been argued that simple majority rule is the best decision rule for a committee taking a large number of binary decisions. In addition to a general symmetry condition, the underlying argument assumes that members vote sincerely on each proposal. We argue that the conclusion changes if members engage in logrolling agreements. We propose simple algorithms to predict agreements and voting outcomes under different q-majority rules, and apply them to a large number of randomly generated preference profiles. We find that on average, logrolling improves the performance of unanimity rule, and worsens the performance of majority rule. If the number of decisions to be taken is large enough, unanimity rule outperforms majority rule. We conduct a laboratory experiment to verify whether subjects engage in the predicted agreements, and whether the relative performance of unanimity rule improves as predicted. Predicted agreements occur more often under unanimity rule and when they increase the aggregate payoff, while they are less likely if they are more complex (involve bigger coalitions and bundles of project). On aggregate, logrolling always has a positive impact under unanimity rule while it has a mixed impact under majority rule. We conclude that in the presence of logrolling, greater majority requirements may be desirable.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 20/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Using Zoom
STOSTAD Morten (PSE)
Inequality as an Externality: Consequences for Tax Design
This paper proposes to treat income inequality as an economic externality in order to introduce the societal effects of inequality into welfarist models. These effects can include (but are not limited to) changes in political efficiency, economic growth rates, or interpersonal trust levels. We introduce such effects in a simple and generalizable welfarist framework and show that they can have sizeable optimal policy consequences that cannot be captured by standard risk aversion or social welfare weights. Novel policy implications are illustrated through the classical optimal non-linear income taxation model, where the social planner must face a trade-off between revenue collection and income inequality levels. Resulting policy consequences are disproportionately located at the top; optimal top marginal tax rates are strongly and robustly dependent on the magnitude of the inequality externality. We use several real-world examples to show that tax policy previously unsupported by optimal taxation theory can be explained in our framework. The findings indicate that the magnitude of the inequality externality could be considered a crucial economic variable.
Du 20/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
ZIDAR Owen (Princeton)
*
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 19/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:30
RIVA Angelo(European Business School and PSE)
GRANDI Elisa(PSE)
HEKIMIAN Raphaël(ISG)
Banks, networks and crisis before WWI
Development Economics Seminar
Du 19/05/2021 de 16:30 à 18:00
Via Zoom
KARING Anne (Princeton)
The Social Multiplier from Visibility: Experimental Evidence from Deworming in Kenya
écrit avec Karim Naguib
Economic History Seminar
Du 19/05/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Via zoom
GRAFE Regina (Institut universitaire européen de Florence)
How to analyse long run institutional diversity? Some lessons from the early modern Atlantic
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 18/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
HUANG Yuchen (PSE)
Determinants of Redistribution Preferences in Contemporary China
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 18/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
CAGE Julia (Sciences Po)
Hosting Media Bias. Evidence from the Universe of French Television and Radio Shows, 2002-2020
écrit avec Moritz Hengel (Sciences Po Paris), Nicolas Hervé (INA) et Camille Urvoy (Sciences Po Paris)
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 17/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
D. MARIANI Rama (University of Rome, Tor Vergata and CEIS)
Immigrant Supply of Marketable Child Care and Native Fertility in Italy
écrit avec with F.C Rosati
The availability of child-care services has often been advocated as one of the instruments to counter the fertility decline observed in many high-income countries. In the recent past large inflows of low-skilled migrants have substantially increased the supply of child-care services. In this paper we examine if immigration as actually affected fertility exploiting the natural experiment occurred in Italy in 2007, when a large inflow of migrants – many of them specialized in the supply of child care – arrived unexpectedly. With a difference-in-differences method, we show that immigrant female workers have increased native births by a number that ranges roughly from 2 to 4 per cent. We validate our result by the implementation of an instrumental variable approach and several robustness tests, all concluding that the increase in the supply of child-care services by immigrant women has positively affected native fertility.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 17/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
MADSEN Erik (NYU)
Incentive Design for Talent Discovery
écrit avec Co-authors : Basil Williams, Andrzej Skrzypacz
In many organizations, employees enjoy significant discretion regarding project selection. If projects differ in their informativeness about an employee’s quality, project
choices will be distorted whenever career concerns are important. We analyze a model
in which an organization can shape its employees’ career concerns by committing to
a system for allocating a limited set of promotions. We show that the organization
optimally overpromotes certain categories of underperforming employees, trading off
efficient matching of employees to promotions in return for superior project selection.
When organizations can additionally pay monetary bonuses, we find that overpromotion is a superior incentive tool when the organization needs to offer high-powered
incentives; otherwise, bonuses perform better.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 17/05/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/97399860624?pwd=QlA3TGtITGNtZkpuT0VLSDVUMllCdz09
SZTAJEROWSKA Monika (PSE)
Investor-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Agreements: Bringing Evidence to Controversy
écrit avec Emily Blanchard (Dartmouth Tuck School of Business, CEPR)
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is central feature of the more-than 3,000 international investment agreements in place today. Despite their ubiquity, ISDS provisions are the subject of increasingly heated public debate about national sovereignty, corporate interests, and the limits of international agreements. To what extent are ISDS provisions simply the necessary conditions for mutually beneficial cross-border investments? How, if at all, has the use of these provisions changed over time? While ISDS has received recent attention in the theoretical trade literature (e.g. Kohler and Stähler, 2019; Ossa, Sykes and Staiger, 2020; Schjelderup and Stähler, 2021), remarkably little is known about the use of ISDS provisions in practice. This paper leverages a new, unique ISDS case- and firm-level dataset to present novel stylised facts about the nature and evolution of the ISDS system, multinational firms using it, law firms involved, and the underlying market mechanisms that drive the patterns and prevalence of ISDS cases. Analysis is structured around two key questions. First, to what extent has there been a fundamental change in the prevalence, composition, and underlying nature of ISDS cases? And second, what are the likely drivers of these patterns — specifically, are there discernible changes in “litigation technology” that have changed when, how, and why firms use ISDS provisions in practice?
Régulation et Environnement
Du 17/05/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
PICCOLO Salvatore (University of Bergamo)
On the Private and Social Value of Consumer Datain Vertically-Integrated Platform Markets
écrit avec Co-authors : Jorge Padilla, Helder Vasconcelos
We characterize and compare the private and social incentives to collect consumer data by a
vertically-integrated online intermediary who competes with third-party sellers listed on its platform
and is required by regulation to share with rivals all the information it gathers. With linear intermediation fees and price competition, the intermediary over-invests in accuracy compared to the social optimum when the intra-platform competition is sufficiently weak and when demand is not too responsive to quality. By contrast, the intermediary tends to under-invest in accuracy when the intra-platform competition is strong enough, and demand is sufficiently responsive to quality. With quantity competition, the intermediary always over-invests in accuracy. Importantly, when consumers exhibit privacy concerns, the over-investment problem worsens, whereas the under-investment problem mitigates. We also investigate the impact of alternative (non-linear) contractual arrangements.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 17/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
FLESCH Janos (Maastricht University)
A competitive search game with a moving target
The talk is based on two papers. The first is joint work with Benoit Duvocelle, Mathias Staudigl, Dries Vermeulen, and the second with Benoit Duvocelle, Hui Min Shi, Dries Vermeulen.
Abstract: We introduce a discrete-time search game, in which two players compete to find an object first. The object moves according to a time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. The players know the Markov chain and the initial probability distribution of the object, but do not observe the current state of the object. The players are active in turns. The active player chooses a state, and this choice is observed by the other player. If the object is in the chosen state, the active player wins and the game ends. Otherwise, the object moves according to the Markov chain and the game continues at the next period. We show that this game admits a value, and for any error-term epsilon>0, each player has a pure (subgame-perfect) epsilon-optimal strategy. Interestingly, a 0-optimal strategy does not always exist. We derive results on the properties of the value and the epsilon-optimal strategies. Moreover, we examine the performance of the finite truncation strategies. We devote special attention to the time-homogeneous case, where additional results hold. We also investigate a related model, where the active player is chosen randomly at each period. In this case, the results are quite different, and greedy strategies (which always recommend to choose a state that contains the object with the highest probability) play the main role
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 14/05/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
MO Zhexun ()
Wool comes from the sheep's back - Determinants of Redistributive Preferences in Contemporary China
écrit avec Yuchen Huang (PSE), and Yuqian Chen (Harvard)
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 12/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
FACCHINI Giovanni(University of Nottingham)
BIAVASCHI Constanza(Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
Immigrant franchise and immigration policy: Evidence from the Progressive Era
What is the role played by immigrant groups in shaping migration policy in the destination country? To study this question we exploit historical variation in access to the franchise induced by different residency requirements across U.S. states. We start by documenting that naturalized immigrants were more geographically mobile than natives. Next we show that congressmen representing districts with large numbers of naturalized U.S. citizens were more likely to support an open migration policy, but that more stringent residency requirements attenuate this effect. Our results indicate that congressmen electoral accountability to naturalized immigrants was a key factor in explaining this outcome.
Economic History Seminar
Du 12/05/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Via zoom
GOURGUES Guillaume (Triangle, université Lyon 2)
L’affaire Lip et l’économie politique du chômage
Si l'affaire Lip, désignant le conflit de l'usine horlogère de Besançon entre 1973 et 1977, est largement considérée comme un moment clé de l'histoire des mouvements sociaux, elle a été nettement moins étudiée sous l'angle des politiques macro-économiques et de l'intervention de l'Etat. Pourtant, en occupant leur usine et en luttant par la grève productive, les ouvriers bisontins ont bel et bien posé un problème public de grande envergure : celui des licenciements économiques et de leur régulation par la puissance publique, dans la période charnière des années 1970. En revenant sur notre travail archivistique (qui se prolonge) autour de la lutte ouvrière, de la reprise et de la liquidation de l'usine nous proposerons de revenir sur ce que Lip permet de comprendre de la séquence de fixation de l'ordre économique contemporain. Nous procèderons, pour ce faire, en trois temps. Premièrement, nous expliquerons en quoi la lutte et la victoire des ouvriers de Lip s'apparentent à une contestation experte de la raison économique des licenciements. Deuxièmement, nous reviendrons sur les réactions du patronat et de la haute administration face à ce combat économique mêlant syndicats, experts économiques et fractions du patronat. Troisièmement, nous tirerons des enseignements plus généraux sur la manière dont la seconde liquidation de l'entreprise Lip, en 1976, incarne une posture néolibérale qui se fige au sein de l'Etat, et circule jusqu'à aujourd'hui.
Virtual Development Economics Seminar
Du 11/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
ATKIN David (MIT& CPER)
*
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 11/05/2021 de 16:00 à 17:00
RICHARD Marion (PSE)
Transitions into Poverty and Subjective Well-Being
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 11/05/2021 de 14:30 à 16:00
Using Zoom
BONFIGLIONI Alessandra (Queen Mary University of London)
Robots, Offshoring and Welfare
écrit avec Rosario Crino, Gino Gancia and Ioannis Papadakis
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 11/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
SANTINI Paolo ()
Team up against inequality: the effect of peer salaries on academic collaborations
écrit avec *
Pay transparency has emerged as an effective tool to reduce inequalities, but it might carry some unintended consequences. Using comprehensive data on the salary and the academic production of economic faculties in the US, I investigate the effect of pay transparency on the endogenous probability of collaborating. Exploiting exogenous shocks on the information of coworkers’ pay, I show that exposing pay differences does harm team formation, but only when the differences in remuneration are not justified by underlying productivity differences or when the unjustified gaps cannot be closed by a change in the compensation policy. The effect is sizeable: a 100K $ difference, which represents the inter-quantile difference in compensations, reduces the probability of two authors co-writing a paper by 18 %. These findings are consistent with the idea that relative income concerns have broad social and labor market implications, particularly on cohesion, and that hence exposing inequalities might come at a cost.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 10/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
BAH Tijan (University of Navarra)
How has COVID-19 affected the intention to migrate via the backway to Europe and to a neighboring African country? Survey evidence and a salience experiment in The Gambia
écrit avec joint with Catia Batista, Flore Gubert, David McKenzie
The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in border closures in many countries and a sharp reduction in overall international mobility. However, this disruption of legal pathways to migration has raised concerns that potential migrants may turn to irregular migration routes as a substitute. We examine how the pandemic has changed intentions to migrate from The Gambia, the country with the highest pre-pandemic per-capita irregular migration rates in Africa. We use a large-scale panel survey conducted in 2019 and 2020 to compare changes in intentions to migrate to Europe and to neighboring Senegal. We find the pandemic has reduced the intention to migrate to both destinations, with approximately one-third of young males expressing less intention to migrate. The largest reductions in migration intentions are for individuals who were unsure of their intent pre-pandemic, and for poorer individuals who are no longer able to afford the costs of migrating at a time when these costs have increased and their remittance income has fallen. We also introduce the methodology of priming experiments to the study of migration intentions, by randomly varying the salience of the COVID-19 pandemic before eliciting intentions to migrate. We find no impact of this added salience, which appears to be because knowledge of the virus, while imperfect, was already enough to inform migration decisions. Nevertheless, despite these decreases in intentions, the overall desire to migrate the backway to Europe remains high, highlighting the need for legal migration pathways to support migrants and divert them from the risks of backway migration.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 10/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
BARDHI Arjada (Duke University)
Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics
écrit avec Co-author: Nina Bobkova
We study optimal minipublic design with endogenous evidence. A policymaker selects a group of citizens—a minipublic—for advice on the desirability of a policy. Citizens can discover local evidence but might be deterred by uncertainty about the policymaker’s adoption standard. We show that such uncertainty can be detrimental to evidence discovery even with costless evidence, civic-minded citizens, and ex ante aligned players. Evidence discovery is hardest to sustain under moderate uncertainty. The optimal minipublic has low diversity: it overrepresents citizens around the median citizen and underrepresents those at the margins. Our findings bear implications for the French Citizens’ Convention on Climate.
Econometrics Seminar
Du 10/05/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
online
ABADIE Alberto (MIT)
A Penalized Synthetic Control Estimator for Disaggregated Data
écrit avec Co-author: Jérémy L'Hour
Synthetic control methods are commonly applied in empirical research to estimate the effects of treatments or interventions on aggregate outcomes. A synthetic control estimator compares the outcome of a treated unit to the outcome of a weighted average of untreated units that best resembles the characteristics of the treated unit before the intervention. When disaggregated data are available, constructing separate synthetic controls for each treated unit may help avoid interpolation biases. However, the problem of finding a synthetic control that best reproduces the characteristics of a treated unit may not have a unique solution. Multiplicity of solutions is a particularly daunting challenge when the data includes many treated and untreated units. To address this challenge, we propose a synthetic control estimator that penalizes the pairwise discrepancies between the characteristics of the treated units and the characteristics of the units that contribute to their synthetic controls. The penalization parameter trades off pairwise matching discrepancies with respect to the characteristics of each unit in the synthetic control against matching discrepancies with respect to the characteristics of the synthetic control unit as a whole. We study the properties of this estimator and propose data-driven choices of the penalization parameter.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 10/05/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
GOMES Joseph Flavian (Economics School of Louvain and the Institute of Economic and Social Research (IRES))
Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity
écrit avec Co-author : Andrea Mantovani
Online marketplaces, such as Amazon, or online travel agencies, such as Booking.com, greatly expand consumer information about market offers, but also raise sellers’ marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent show-rooming, platforms adopted price parity clauses, which restrict sellers’ ability to offer lower prices in alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban price parity has been at the center of the policy debate, but so far little consensus has emerged. In this paper, we investigate a natural alternative to lifting price parity; namely, we study how to optimally cap platforms’ commissions. The optimal cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should not charge fees greater than the externality that its presence generates on other market participants. Employing techniques from extreme-value theory, we are able to express the optimal cap in terms of observable quantities. In an application to online travel agencies, we find that current average fees are welfare increasing only if platforms at least double consumers’ consideration sets (relative to alternative ways of gathering information online). This suggests that, in some markets, regulation capping commissions should bind if optimally set.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 10/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
online
DEMEZE-JOUATSA Ghislain-Herman (Bielefeld University)
Repetition and cooperation: a model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity
We present a model of repeated games in which players can strategically make use of objective ambiguity. In each round of the repeated game, in addition to the classic pure and mixed actions, players can employ objectively ambiguous actions by using imprecise probabilistic devices such as Ellsberg urns to conceal their intentions. We find that adding an infinitesimal level of ambiguity can be enough to approximate collusive payoffs via subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game. Our main theorem states that if each player has many continuation equilibrium payoffs in ambiguous actions, any feasible payoff vector of the original stage-game that dominates the mixed strategy maxmin payoff vector is both ex-ante and ex-post approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game with discounting. Our condition is also necessary.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 07/05/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
DE GAUDEMARIS Louise (PSE)
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EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 07/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:30
Via zoom
O SULLIVAN Mary (Université de Genève)
History as Heresy: The US Great Depression as a Real Puzzle
In spring 2020, in the face of the covid-19 pandemic, central bankers in rich countries made unprecedented liquidity injections to stave off an economic crisis. Such radical action by central banks gained legitimacy during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and enjoys strong support from prominent economists and economic historians. Their certainty reflects a remarkable agreement on a specific interpretation of the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States, an interpretation developed by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in A Monetary History of the United States (1963). In this article, I explore the origins, the influence and the limits of A Monetary History’s interpretation for the insights it offers on the relationship between theory and history in the study of economic life. I show how historical research has been mobilised to show the value of heretical ideas in order to challenge economic orthodoxies. Friedman and Schwartz understood the heretical potential of historical research and exploited it in A Monetary History to question dominant interpretations of the Great Depression in their time. Now that their interpretation has become our orthodoxy, I show how we can develop the fertile link between history and heresy to better understand our economic past.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 06/05/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
Using Zoom
NDIAYE Abdoulaye (NYU Stern)
Redistribution with Performance Pay
écrit avec Paweª Doligalski, Nicolas Werquin
Half of the jobs in the U.S. feature pay-for-performance. We study nonlinear in-come taxation in a model where such labor contracts arise as a result of moral hazardfrictions within rms. We derive novel formulas for the incidence of arbitrarily nonlin-ear reforms of a given tax code on both average earnings and their sensitivity to outputrisk. We show theoretically and quantitatively that, following an increase in tax pro-gressivity, the higher sensitivity of earnings to performance caused by the crowding-outof private insurance is almost fully oset by a countervailing performance-pay eectdriven by labor supply responses. As a result, earnings risk is hardly aected by pol-icy. We then turn to the normative analysis of a government that levies taxes andtransfers to redistribute income across workers with dierent levels of uninsurable pro-ductivity. We nd that setting taxes without accounting for the endogeneity of privateinsurance is close to optimal. Thus, the common concern that standard models of tax-ation underestimate the cost of redistribution is, in the context of performance-basedcompensation, overblown.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 06/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
online
COMPTE Olivier (PSE)
On belief formation and the persistence of superstitions
We propose a belief-formation model where agents attempt to discriminate between two theories, and where the asymmetry in strength between confirming and disconfirming evidence tilts beliefs in favor of theories that generate strong (and possibly rare) confirming evidence and weak (and frequent) disconfirming evidence. In our model, limitations on information processing provide incentives to censor weak evidence, with the consequence that for some discrimination problems, evidence may become mostly one-sided. Sophisticated agents who know the characteristics of the censored data-generating process are not lured by this accumulation of evidence, but less sophisticated ones end up with incorrect beliefs.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 06/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Using Zoom
DRACA Mirko (Warwick)
How Polarised are Citizens? Measuring Ideology from the Ground Up
écrit avec Carlo Schwarz
Strong evidence has been emerging that major democracies have become more politically polarised, at least according to measures based on the ideological positions of political elites. We investigate whether the general public (`citizens') followed the same pattern. To this end, we propose a novel methodology to identify the underlying ideologies of citizens by applying Latent Dirichlet Allocation (an unsupervised machine learning algorithm) to political survey data. This approach indicates that in addition to a left-right scale, confidence in institutions defines another major ideological dimension. Using this framework, we are able to decompose the shift in ideological positions across the population over time and create measures of `citizen slant' and polarisation. Specifically, we find evidence of a `disappearing centre' in a sub-group of countries with citizens shifting away from centrist ideologies into anti-establishment `anarchist' ideologies over time. This trend is especially pronounced for the US.
Behavior seminar
Du 06/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
online
VON HINKE Stéphanie (University of Bristol)
Dynamic complementarity in skill production: Evidence from genetic endowments and birth order
écrit avec Dilnoza Muslimova, Hans van Kippersluis, Niels Rietveld, Fleur Meddens
On average, firstborns complete more education than their laterborn siblings. We study whether this effect is amplified by genetic endowments. Our family-fixed effects approach allows us to exploit exogenous variation in birth order and genetic endowments among 15,019 siblings in the UK Biobank. We find that those with higher genetic endowments benefit disproportionally more from being firstborn compared to those with lower genetic endowments, providing a clean example of how nature and nurture interact in producing skills. Moreover, since parental investments are a dominant channel driving birth order effects, our results are consistent with dynamic complementarity in skill formation.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 05/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
VALETTE Jérôme(Univ.Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)
KEITA Sekou(IAB)
The Usual Suspects. Offenders' Orign, Media Reporting and Natives' Attitudes Towards Immigration
écrit avec with Thomas Renault
Immigration and crime are two first-order issues that are often considered jointly in people’s minds. This paper analyzes how media reporting policies on crime impact natives’ attitudes towards immigration. We depart from most studies by investigating the content of crime-related articles instead of their coverage. Specifically, we use a radical change in local media reporting on crime in Germany as a natural experiment. This unique framework allows us to estimate whether systematically disclosing the places of origin of criminals affects natives’ attitudes towards immigration. We combine individual survey data collected between January 2014 and December 2018 from the German Socio-Economic Panel with data from more than 545,000 crime-related articles in German newspapers and data on their diffusion across the country. Our results indicate that systematically mentioning the origins of criminals, especially when offenders are natives, significantly reduces natives’ concerns about immigration.
Texte intégral
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 05/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:30
DE VICQ Amaury (PSE)
Great Depression and flight-to-safety in the Netherlands
écrit avec Rubens Peeters
Du 05/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:30
via Zoom
DE VICQ Amaury (PSE)
Great Depression and flight-to-safety in the Netherlands
écrit avec Rubens Peeters
Development Economics Seminar
Du 05/05/2021 de 16:30 à 18:00
Via Zoom
BOUDREAU Laura (Columbia University)
Multinational enforcement of labor law: Experimental evidence from Bangladesh’s apparel sector
Western stakeholders are increasingly demanding that multinationals sourcing from developing countries be accountable for working conditions upstream in their supply chains. In response, many multinationals privately enforce labor standards in these countries, but the effects of their interventions on local firms and workers are unknown. I partnered with 29 multinational retail and apparel firms to enforce local labor laws on their suppliers in Bangladesh. I implemented a field experiment with 84 garment factories, randomly enforcing a mandate for safety committees. The intervention increases compliance with the law and improves measures of safety. My findings are consistent with a model of imperfect monitoring in which MNCs provide positive penalties for noncompliance. These improvements do not appear to come at significant costs to suppliers in terms of efficiency. Factories with better managerial practices drive the improvements, while those with poor practices do not improve, and in these factories, workers’ job satisfaction declines.
Economic History Seminar
Du 05/05/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Via Zoom
BENGTSSON Erik (Lund University)
The Declining Salience of the Wage Bargaining Round in Sweden since the1960s: Distribution, Hegemony, and Political Economy
The hypothesis and starting point of the paper is that in a society where the more or less centralized bargaining round between unions and employers is a major event every or every second year, as it was in Sweden from the 1950s to the 1980s, the social nature of the distribution of income is constantly highlighted. Demands from the one side are put against demands from the other side, representatives make statements in support of their case. There is a public argumentation, regularly occurring, on who should get what. Employees and employers both contribute to output, and both deserve a share of the pie. In contrast, in a society where the bargaining round is a non-event, income distribution is depoliticized. As Wolfgang Streeck has pointed out in Gekaufte Zeit, an asymmetry appears: the demands of capital appear as impersonal “demands for the functioning of the system as a whole”, while the demands of workers appear as disturbances in the system. The paper studies the media coverage of wage bargaining rounds in Sweden in the 1960s and 2000s, focusing on the leading (liberal) daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter. Comparing the coverage of the 1962 and 1964 wage rounds and the 2004, 2007 and 2010 wage rounds, the difference is clear in that the unions and employers in the 1960s are depicted as masters of their universe, while in the 2000s they are depicted as functionaries who should (must) follow the lead of the central bank and the commercial banks. Thus even if the Swedish wage bargaining system in some ways is quite similar in the 2000s compared to the 1960s – union density is about the same, and coordination of wage bargaining similar if a bit more decentralized – the functioning and outcomes of the bargaining system is very different in the 2000s compared to the 1960s. I discuss the implications for class identification, political cleavages, and inequality.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 04/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
JEGARD Martin (INRAE)
The optimal distribution of polluting activities across space: An application to France
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 04/05/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
GETHIN Amory (PSE)
Inequality, Redistribution, and Growth: Evidence from South Africa, 1993-2019
écrit avec Léo Czajka and Aroop Chatterjee
Can government redistributive policies successfully curb rising inequality and promote inclusive growth in emerging economies? This paper sheds new light on this question by combining survey, tax, and historical administrative data to evaluate the impact of taxes and transfers on the distribution of growth in South Africa since the end of the apartheid regime. Our new database is fully consistent with macroeconomic totals reported in the national accounts and allocates the entirety of government revenue and expenditure to individuals, including indirect taxes and in-kind transfers, with unprecedented level of detail. We document a dramatic divergence in the growth of top and bottom income groups: between 1993 and 2019, the pretax income of the top 1% rose by 50%, while that of the poorest 50% fell by a third. However, the widening of pretax income gaps has been almost fully compensated by the growing size and progressivity of the tax-and-transfer system, effectively mirroring a “chase between rising inequality and enhanced redistribution”. The decline of racial inequalities since the end of apartheid has been entirely driven by the boom of top Black income groups and is only marginally reduced by taxes and transfers. Our results have important implications for fiscal policy, the measurement of poverty, and the analysis of the link between inequality and growth.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 03/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
SEDOVA Barbora (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research)
Global food prices, local weather and migration in Sub-Saharan Africa
écrit avec joint with Lars Ludolph
In this paper, we study the effect of exogenous global crop price changes on migration from agricultural and non-agricultural households in Sub-Saharan Africa. We show that, similar to the effect of positive local weather shocks, the effect of a locally-relevant global crop price increase on household out-migration depends on the initial household wealth. Higher international producer prices relax the budget constraint of poor agricultural households and facilitate migration. The order of magnitude of a standardized price effect is approx. one third of the standardized effect of a local weather shock. Unlike positive weather shocks, which mostly facilitate internal rural-urban migration, positive income shocks through rising producer prices only increase migration to neighboring African countries, likely due to the simultaneous decrease in real income in nearby urban areas. Finally, we show that while higher producer prices induce conflict, conflict does not play a role for the household decision to send a member as a labor migrant.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 03/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
NIKOLOWA Radoslawa (QMUL)
Corporate Capture of Blockchain Governance
écrit avec Co-authors: Daniel Ferreira, Jin Li
We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. Our main result is that the proof-of-work system leads to a situation where a large firm captures the governance of the blockchain.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 03/05/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/92902544804?pwd=NFJlbWo5NUVVd01NUG5tMjQvRS9PUT09
MUNOZ-MORALES Juan (IESEG)
Traded Non Tradables: Offshoring Service Jobs Through Labour Mobility
This paper investigates how labour mobility policies can allow "non tradable" services to be offshored on-site, exposing new sectors and workers to foreign competition, and raising questions on whether destination or origin labour taxes should apply to these novel flows of workers. To shed light on this issue, I study the largest historical experiment of services exports mobility liberalization in the world: the European posting policy. Within the EU, firms are free to send their workers abroad in order to perform a service, while workers "posted" abroad are exempted from taxes in the destination country. Assembling novel and exhaustive administrative data on this continent-wide experiment, I show that the staggered lifting of posting mobility restrictions increased permanently international service provision by 500% within the EU. Cross-border services supply has also been highly responsive to tax rules applied to posted workers. Combining quasi-experimental tax reforms and a theory-consistent gravity estimation, I show that the elasticity of posting flows with respect to payroll cost differentials created by the scheme lies above 1. I then turn to the unequal distribution of these aggregate mobility-trade effects, both between and within countries. Liberalizing on-site offshoring redistributed economic activity and tax revenue to sending — mostly low-wage — countries, increasing non-tradable employment in sending countries by 17% and taxes paid at home by sending firms by 30%, while employment in exposed sectors in receiving countries decreases by 6%. Using detailed firm-level data, I show that workers' wage rate rise by 10%, while capital-owners increase their profits by 30%, after a firm starts posting workers abroad, implying that services suppliers in formerly non-tradable sectors captured 2/3 of the overall mobility-dependent export premium. I find that these gains however disappear when the posting mission ends, suggesting that non-tradable services sectors exhibit little "learning by exporting".
Régulation et Environnement
Du 03/05/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
FABRA Natalia (uc3m)
Technology Neutral vs. Technology Specific Procurement
écrit avec Co-author : Juan Pablo Montero
An imperfectly-informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she procure these units? Should she run technology specific or technology neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies (technology banding or minimum technology quo tas)? Should she instead post separate prices for each technology? What are the trade-offs involved? We find that one size does not fit all: the preferred instrument depends on the nature of the available technologies, the extent of information asymmetry regarding their costs, the costs of public funds, and the degree of market power. Using Spanish data on recently deployed renewable energies across the country, we illustrate how our theory can shed light on how to more effectively procure these technologies.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 03/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
online
FEUILLOLEY Laurent (LIRIS,CNRS, Université Lyon 1)
The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling
écrit avec Co-authors: José Correa, Andrés Cristi, Tim Oosterwijk, and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis
The secretary problem is a classic online decision problem. In this problem, an adversary first chooses some n numbers, then these numbers are shuffled at random and presented to the player one by one. For each number, the player has two options: discard the number and continue, or keep the number and stop the game. The player wins if she keeps the highest number of the whole set. It is clearly not possible to win all the time: when one decides to stop there might be a higher number in the rest of the sequence, and when one discards a number, it might actually be the highest of the sequence. But surprisingly one can win with probability 1/e. This has been known for several decades. An issue with the secretary problem is that it assumes that the player has absolutely no information about the numbers, which reduces its applicability. A recent research direction is to understand what happens when one knows a distribution or samples etc. We study a simple such setting for which we prove tight results.