Calendrier du mois de juillet 2024
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 18/07/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
ANDREESCU Marie (PSE)
Skill obsolescence in senior workers. Evidence from an audit study
écrit avec Luc Behaghel and Joyce Sultan-Parraud
Age is the main criterion of discrimination on the labor market in France. This paper analyzes the main obstacles that senior workers face on the labor market and explores the pre-emptive policies that can be put in place to mitigate their effect. Only 57% of workers are still employed after their 55th anniversary. Three objective reasons for the insufficient employment rate of workers above 55 years old have been identified in literature. On the supply side, older job-seekers are less likely to be as active in their searching behavior as their younger counterparts. On the demand side, employers often complain about the higher cost of recruiting a more experienced worker and about the physical limitations of the latter. However, insufficient attention has been paid to subjective perceptions of age. The discriminative distaste of employers for older workers remains the main cause of premature forced retirement. We break-down this age discrimination into four main mechanisms: the perception of time until retirement, the acquisition of excessively specific human capital, the obsolescence of skills and the residual subjective preference for youth. This study offers the first experiential quantification of these effects. We run a large-scale correspondence study, sending fictitious CVs of senior workers to over 1000 companies that offer white collared-jobs. We present the first results of our study as well as prospective evolution of the protocol.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 11/07/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
DUCHINI Emma (University of Essex)
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT TAKEOVER, LEADERSHIP CHANGE, AND PERSONNEL POLICY
écrit avec Victor Lavy, Stephen Machin, Shqiponja TelhaJ
Low-performing, high-poverty, public schools notoriously struggle to attract and retain good
teachers. This paper studies a setting where independent organizations, including charities and
businesses, take over the management of under-performing schools, while funding remains
public. Exploiting the staggered expansion of English Sponsor-led academies since the early
2000s, we show that the Sponsor-led takeover leads to substantial changes in the teaching body
and the school personnel policy. The probability that the Sponsor appoints a new headteacher
doubles upon the takeover, with the new headteacher being, on average, better paid, and more
likely to come from outstanding schools. The takeover also induces teacher sorting, with older
and lower-achieving teachers leaving the school, and new teachers joining the Sponsor-led school
from outstanding schools. Lastly, Sponsors substantially restructure teachers’ rewarding scheme
and abandon a pay scale entirely based on seniority, leading to a 10 percent increase in pay
dispersion across equally experienced teachers.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 04/07/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
CHAMPALAUNE Pascale (PSE)
Wages, City Structure and Air Pollution
Compact, dense cities are more productive and offer higher wages, through agglomeration externalities. They also tend to be seen as more environmentally friendly, as they have lower CO2 emissions per capita. But urban density may also bring about higher local pollution. It can be either be compensated for via higher wages (as a consumption disamenity), or have negative productivity effects, leading to lower wages (as a production disamenity). As such, this paper asks: does local air pollution enhance the urban wage premium, or does it attenuate it? In a first step, I expose a simple cross-city spatial equilibrium, and exploit its structure to provide measures of city-level productivity and amenities. I use French panel data over the 2002-2018 period and a double instrumental variable strategy to tackle endogeneity of urban features and air pollution to estimate the parameters of interest. I find that density does foster fine particulate matter (PM2.5) concentration, and that the latter is indeed a consumption disamenity, but an even stronger production disamenity. I show that this triggers a loss in the wage gains from agglomeration on average. Cities with higher wages offer a larger compensation for air pollution, and as they are also the most populated, the compensation effect dominates at the worker level. There is also marked heterogeneity by skill, as high-skill workers receive larger compensation for air pollution than low-skill ones. All in all, the results suggest that while local air pollution reduces productivity even at low levels, compensation kicks in at higher levels, thus generating spatial wage disparities.
Economic History Seminar
Du 03/07/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30
R1.09
ROUANET Louis (University of Texas at El Paso in the Department of Economics and Finance.)
Long live the Republic: The political consequences of revolutionary land redistribution
To be politically viable, a Revolution needs the support of key interest groups that benefit from the survival of the new regime. The redistribution of clergy property during the French Revolution created a group –the new owners of clergy assets- whose wealth depended on the Revolution’s fate, thus increasing political support for the Revolution. This land redistribution policy had long-run consequences on political support for republicanism. Using data on elections during the beginning of the Third Republic, we show that the sale of clergy assets during the French Revolution substantially reduced support for anti-Republican candidates. Our results suggest that Republicans may not have prevailed in the 1870s without the liquidation of the Church's wealth 80 years earlier. The sale of Church assets reduced Catholic worship and increased Protestant worship. We use the presence of monasteries prior to the Reformation and the Commercial Revolution as instruments to suggest our findings are causal. Finally, we rule out a reduction in landed inequality as the main channel explaining the effect of this revolutionary land redistribution on politics and ideology.