Archives du séminaire Industrial Organization
Industrial Organization
Le 23/05/2016 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Rey Patrick (TSE) Competitive Cross-Subsidization
Zhijun Chen (Monash University)
Texte intégral
Industrial Organization
Le 11/04/2016 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Burguet Roberto (IAE & Barcelona GSE) Bidding for Input in Oligopoly
József Sákovics
Industrial Organization
Le 21/03/2016 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Dubois Pierre (TSE) On the Role of Parallel Trade on Manufacturers and Retailers Profits in the Pharmaceutical Sector
Morten Saethre
Industrial Organization
Le 15/02/2016 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Ornaghi Carmine (Univ. Southampton) Price and Advertising Competition among Prescription Drugs
G. Siotis and M. Castanheira
Industrial Organization
Le 18/01/2016 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Miklos-Thal Jeanine (Univ. Rochester) Resale Price Maintenance when Playing Favorites is Prohibited
G. Shaffer
Industrial Organization
Le 14/12/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
CAILLAUD Bernard, caillaud@pse.ens.fr (Univ. Rochester) *; () ;
La séance est annulée
Industrial Organization
Le 16/11/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
REISINGER Markus (FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF FINANCE ET MANAGEMENT) Sequencing bilateral negotiations with externalities
J. Münster
Industrial Organization
Le 12/10/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
SPIEGEL Yossi (Tel Aviv University School of Management ) Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership Structure and Foreclosure
Co-authors : Nadav Levy and David GiloyTexte intégral
Industrial Organization
Le 21/09/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
ESTEVES ROSA BRANCA (UNIV. DO NINHO) Competitive Targeted Advertising with Price Discrimination
Co-author : Joana Resende (Universidade do Porto)Texte intégral
Industrial Organization
Le 01/06/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
HESKI Bar Isaac (University of Toronto) Multidimensional Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Efficiency
Co-author(s) : Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver
Industrial Organization
Le 18/05/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
SPIEGLER Ran Spiegler (Tel-Aviv University and University College London) Search Design and Broad Matching
Industrial Organization
Le 13/04/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
FUMAGALLI Chiara (University of Bocconi) Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure
Industrial Organization
Le 16/03/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
We study how production and promotion budgets can play a strategic role for movie studios to secure the most profitable release dates by scaring off the competition. In a game-theoretic setting, where two studios choose their budget before simultaneously setting the release date of their movie, we prove that two equilibrium configurations are possible: either releases are simultaneous (at the demand peak) or they are staggered (one studio delays the release of its movie so as to avoid any overlap with the other movie). Interestingly, in the latter equilibrium, the first-mover secures its position by investing more in production and promotion than the second-mover. We test the predictions of our theoretical model on a dataset that comprises more than 1500 American movies released in ten countries from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2013. Our empirical analysis largely confirms that higher budgets allow studios to move release dates closer to the demand peaks.
BELLEFLAMME Paul (UCL) Strategic Promotion and Release Decisions in the Movie Market
Co-author(s) : Dimitri Paolini
Industrial Organization
Le 09/02/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
We examine the e ect of pharmaceutical patent protection on the speed of drug launch, price, and quantity in 60 countries from 2000-2013. The World Trade Organization required its member countries to implement a minimum level of patent protection within a speci ed time period as part of the TRIPS Agreement. However, members retained the right to impose price controls and to issue compulsory licenses under certain conditions. These countervailing policies were intended to reduce the potential static losses that result from reduced competition during the patent term. Using detailed patent data at both the product and country levels, we exploit the fact that selection into reatment" with a post-TRIPS patent is exogenously determined by compliance deadlines that vary across countries. We nd that patents have important consequences for access to new drugs: in the absence of a patent, launch is unlikely. That is, even when no patent barrier exists, generic entry may not occur. Conditional on launch, patented drugs have higher prices but higher sales as well. The price premium associated with patents is smaller in poorer countries. Price discrimination across countries has increased for drugs patented post-TRIPS and prices are negatively related to the burden of disease, suggesting that countervailing policies to o set expected price increases may have had the intended e ects.
KYLE Margaret (Mines Paris Tech) Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Innovation: Evidence from TRIPS
joint with Yi Qian
Industrial Organization
Le 19/01/2015 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. We get three predictions: (i) lenders' bids are bunched at the amount owed, (ii) if all auctions observed exhibit a common value component, there are gaps in lenders' bids, (iii) if there are both independent private values and common value component auctions, there will be no gaps, but non-monotonicity of the probability of sale in the reserve price. Using novel data from Palm Beach County (US), we show that (i) and (iii), but not (ii) are consistent with the data. Further, the data is consistent with the claim that adverse selection plays less of a role for securitized than for non-securitized mortgages. Our theory also allows an analysis of the welfare effect of judicial versus non-judicial foreclosures.
NIEDERMAYER Andras NIEDERMA (Uni Mannheim) Foreclosure Auctions
Co-author(s) : Artyom Shneyerov (Concordia University, CIREQ, CIRANO) and Pai Xu(University of Hong Kong)
Industrial Organization
Le 15/12/2014 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
RODRIGUEZ Ángel López (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) Cross-ownership, R&D spillovers and Antitrust Policy
Co-author(s) : Xavier Vives
Industrial Organization
Le 17/11/2014 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
WATANABE Yasutora (HKUST Business School Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) Entry by Merger: Estimates from a Two-sided Matching Model with Externalities
Industrial Organization
Le 13/10/2014 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Entrepreneurs face higher commercialization costs than incumbents. We show that this implies that entrepreneurs will choose more risky projects than incumbents, aiming to reduce their high expected marginal commercialization cost. However, entrepreneurs may select too safe projects from a social point of view, since they do not internalize the business steal- ing e¤ect. We also show that commercialization support induces entrepreneurship but may lead to mediocre entrepreneurship by inducing entrepreneurs to choose less risky projects, whereas R&D support encourages entrepreneurship without a¤ecting the type of entrepre- neurship. Using Swedish patent citation data, we ?nd empirical support for predictions of the model.
VASCONCELOS Helder (University of Porto and CEPR) Why entrepreneurs choose risky R&D projects - but still not risky enough
Co-author(s) : Erika Färnstrand Damsgaard, Per Hjertstrand, Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars PerssonTexte intégral
Industrial Organization
Le 22/09/2014 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
BENNEDSEN Morten (INSEAD) Family firms and labour market reforms
Industrial Organization
Le 17/03/2014 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Cabral Luis (New York University – Stern School of Business) Straggered Contracts, Market Power and Welfare
Industrial Organization
Le 17/02/2014 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
In a continuous-time model with uncertain market development, two potential entrants detect a nascent demand only if it reaches a threshold, which depends on nature, and can be firm-specific. Entry occurs by investing irreversibly before competing in quantities. When a post-entry first-mover market advantage is persistent, we examine how the firms' relative ``alertness'' drives the equilibrium outcomes. If the firms detect the new demand immediately (perfect alertness), equilibrium entry decisions are always sequential. Preemption occurs, rent dissipation is monotone in the magnitude of the market advantage, which reduces both firms' expected value, and rent-equalization is preserved. If the firms detect the new demand relatively late (imperfect alertness), the equilibrium outcomes differ qualitatively from those in standard real option games: (i) In case of symmetric detection, the probability of simultaneous entry is nonzero (it can be one). When preemption occurs there is no rent equalization, with the post-entry first-mover market advantage resulting in higher equilibrium expected value to the leader; (ii) In case of asymmetric detection, the more alert firm postpones entry by investing exactly when its rival detects demand, and preemption always occurs, again to the benefit of the leader. The positive marginal effect of the first-mover advantage on the leader's equilibrium value increases in the inter-firm alertness differential; (iii) With more demand volatility the impact of imperfect alertness on the entry sequence is less likely, and the value differential across firms decreases. This always benefits the second entrant, which enters even later, and possibly at a loss for the leader.
VERSAEVEL Bruno (EM LYON & GATE) Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics
Industrial Organization
Le 20/01/2014 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
SHELEGIA Sandro (Université de Vienne) Beliefs and consumer search
Industrial Organization
Le 16/12/2013 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment P, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
HERMALIN Benjamin (Haas School – UC Berkeley, visiting Oxford Univ.) *
Industrial Organization
Le 18/11/2013 de 11:30:00 à 12:45:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment P, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
VERBOVEN Frank (University of Leuven) Unbundling the incumbent : Evidence form UK Broadband
Co-author(s) : M.Nardotto and T.Valletti.
ATTENTION DEBUT DU SEMINAIRE A 11H30
Industrial Organization
Le 14/10/2013 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, 1er étage, Salle de réunion
MONTEZ Joao (London Business School) How buybacks increase retail competition
Industrial Organization
Le 16/09/2013 de 12:00:00 à 13:30:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
JEON Doh-Shin (Toulouse Sschool of Economics) News Aggregators and Competition Among Newspapers on the Internet
Co-autheur(s): N. Nasr EsfahaniTexte intégral
Industrial Organization
Le 15/04/2013 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
DE SILVA Dakshina (Toulouse Sschool of Economics) Disadvantaged business enterprise goals in government procurement contracting: An analysis of bidding behavior and costs
Organisateur : Bernard Caillaud
Industrial Organization
Le 18/02/2013 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
We consider two rms competing both to sell their output and purchase their input from an upstream rm, to which they o er non-linear contracts. Firms may engage in strategic overbuying, purchasing more of the input when the supplier is capacity constrained than when it is not in order to exclude their competitor from the nal market. Warehousing is a special case in which a downstream rm purchases more input than it uses and disposes of the rest. We show that both types of overbuying happen in equilibrium. The welfare analysis leads to ambiguous conclusions.
AVENEL Eric (Toulouse Sschool of Economics) Equilibrium strategic overbuying.
Co-auteur : Clémence Christin.Texte intégral
Industrial Organization
Le 21/01/2013 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Anja LAMBRECHT (LBS) When does Retargeting Work ? Timing Information Specificity
Co-auteur : K.Tucker
Industrial Organization
Le 17/12/2012 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
KRETSCHMER Tobias (LMU Münich) TBA
Industrial Organization
Le 19/11/2012 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
PEITZ Martin (Univ. Mannheim) New perspectives on media mergers
Industrial Organization
Le 15/10/2012 de 12:00:00 à 13:15:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
Régis Renault (Univ. Mannheim) “Platform Content”