Calendrier du 01 décembre 2016
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 01/12/2016 de 16:30 à 17:45
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital) 75013 Paris, salle du 6ème étage
FORNARO Luca (CREI)
*Aggregate Demand Externalities in a Global Liquidity Trap
écrit avec Federica Romei
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 01/12/2016 de 13:00 à 14:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
KETZ Philipp (PSE)
Detailed decomposition of differences in distributions with an application to the black-white test score gap
écrit avec Blaise Melly (University of Bern)
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 01/12/2016 de 13:00 à 14:00
Abstract : We consider a hybrid model at the intersection between the standard two-sided matching market as proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) and a housing market as proposed by Shapley and Scarf (1974). Two types of agents have to be matched to a common side of objects. Agents of one type have preferences that depend on the object they are matched to but also which agent of the other type is matched to this object. To investigate the link with the two-sided matching literature, we define a natural concept of ownership structure that determines for each possible triplet of match, which agent owns the object. We then define a pairwise stability property of matchings with respect to an ownership structure i.e. where only an owner could ask another agent to join his current object. We first show that there are ownerships structures for which no such matching exists. However, we show that it exists for one-sided ownership structures i.e. when agents of one type are always the owners. In this framework, we show that contrary to a standard two-sided matching market, there may not be any core matching even if stable matchings exist. The existence is restored if we assume that agents of the side always owning the objects have lexicographic or separable preferences. To investigate the link with a housing market model, we define an initial allocation of the objects to one agent and define the standard notion of core in this framework. Even with one sided initial allocation, we show that the latter may also be empty. However, with such initial allocations, we show that there always exists a Pareto-efficient matching that cannot be blocked by coalitions of size two.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 01/12/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
ENIKOLOPOV Ruben (Barcelona Institute of Political Economy and Governance)
Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia
Behavior seminar
Du 01/12/2016 de 12:00 à 13:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 2
LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE)
Preferences for voting rules
Behavior Working Group
Du 01/12/2016 de 11:00 à 11:45
A2 room, Jourdan
SENIK Claudia ()
Choice experiments to elicit inequality aversion