Calendrier du 02 novembre 2016
Development Economics Seminar
Du 02/11/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
XU Guo (LSE)
The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire
I study how social connections and patronage affect the allocation and performance of senior bureaucrats using newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration. Exploiting the ministerial turnover in London as a source of within-governor variation in social connections, I find that governors are more likely to be appointed to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior. At the same time, they provide more tax exemptions, generate less revenue, invest less and are less likely to be recognized for their service. Both promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage. This coincides with an increased matching assortativeness of appointees. Colonies administered for longer periods by connected governors during the period of patronage exhibit lower fiscal capacity today. I provide evidence consistent with policy persistence.