Calendrier du 04 octobre 2018
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 04/10/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
LE FORNER Héléne ()
Family Structure, Children’s Time Use and Parental Times
While a large number of studies emphasizes a negative effect of parental separation
on child development, little attention has been paid to the channels of this effect. This
paper shows that child and parental time invesments could be a driving channel of
the negative effect of parental separation. Using detailed time-use diaries from the
PSID-Child Development Supplement, I estimate an individual fixed effects model and
find that a change in family structure has a negative impact on time spent with at
least one parent present. Times with parents together and with fathers (only) are
highly affected, but mothers compensate partially for this decrease. Besides, to see if it
matters for child development, I estimate cognitive and non-cognitive skills production
functions using several specifications. I shed light on the heterogeneity of parental time
inputs for emotional and cognitive skills. Child and parental time investments appear
to be a possible driving channel of the effect of parental separation, especially at stake
for children whose parents get separated in their early childhood and children with
more highly educated parents.
Du 04/10/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 04/10/2018 de 12:30 à 12:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdn - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DWORCZAK Piotr (Northwestern University)
The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
écrit avec Giorgio Martini (Stanford GSB)
Consider a Bayesian persuasion problem in which the Sender’s preferences depend only on the
mean of posterior beliefs. We show that there exists a price schedule for posterior means such that
the Sender’s problem becomes a consumer-like choice problem: The Sender purchases posterior means
using the prior distribution as her endowment. Prices are determined in equilibrium of a Walrasian
economy with the Sender as the only consumer and a single firm that has the technology to garble
the state. Welfare theorems provide a verification tool for optimality of a persuasion scheme, and
characterize the structure of prices that support the optimal solution. This price-theoretic approach
yields a tractable solution method for persuasion problems with infinite state spaces. As an application,
we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality of a monotone partitional signal.
We show that the approach extends to competition in persuasion and persuasion problems with no
restrictions on Sender’s utility.