Calendrier du 05 octobre 2020
Régulation et Environnement
Du 05/10/2020 de 17:30 à 18:30
https://zoom.us/j/98281389413?pwd=cWxiVzVPdVdCYm1Ec2pDcDYybk5tQT09
MENG Kyle (UCSB)
Spatial Correlation, Trade, and Inequality: Evidence from the Global Climate
écrit avec Jonathan I. Dingel Chicago Booth & NBER, Solomon M. Hsiang UC Berkeley & NBER
This paper shows that greater global spatial correlation of productivities can increase crosscountry welfare dispersion by increasing the correlation between a country’s productivity and its gains from trade. We causally validate this prediction using a global climatic phenomenon as a natural experiment. We ?nd that gains from trade in cereals over the last half-century were larger for more productive countries and smaller for less productive countries when cereal productivity was more spatially correlated. Incorporating this role for spatial interdependence into a projection of climate-change impacts raises projected international inequality, with higher welfare losses across most of Africa.
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Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 05/10/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
https://zoom.us/j/92600440081?pwd=NEN5RlBFQ1pWWlhQc2c5VHRabUllZz09
ALGER Ingela (TSE)
Homo Moralis goes to the voting booth
écrit avec Jean-François Laslier
The paper reviews the implications of evolutionary Kantian morality for three classical problems in the theory of voting: the divided majority problem, the costly participation dilemma, and the strategic revelation of information.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 05/10/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/99631640491?pwd=WlpUZXJhNHdHNm42cHBMQXJvTEhPQT09
BOCQUET Leonard (PSE)
Inefficient Market Selection: The Role of Uncertainty and Credit Frictions
According to Schumpeterian theory, recessions should have a cleansing effect on the economy: low productive firms are pushed to exit while high productive firms manage to survive, thereby increasing average productivity. However, new empirical evidence reports that highly productive firms default too during downturns, hence implying that market selection is not efficient during recessions (Guerini et al. 2020). What causes market selection to become inefficient? In this paper, we argue that Schumpeterian theory confuses productivity and profitability. Any mechanism weakening the correlation between the former and the latter worsens the quality of market selection. Here, we propose a model of heterogeneous firms with an endogenous exit margin, incorporating two of such mechanisms. First, uncertainty generates a potential discrepancy between the sales and the costs: high productive firms which failed to anticipate correctly their level of sales can make very low profits. Second, financial frictions lead unproductive firms to be more credit constrained, hence preventing them to take too much risk and reducing their risk of default. Finally, we show that the distribution of leverage is a sufficient statistic for assessing whether recessions are cleansing or not.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 05/10/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
room 314 (third floor) at Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème.
AMOUSSOU-GUENOU Yackolley (CEA List & LIP6, Sorbonne Université)
Is distributed consensus possible in committee-based blockchains?
We study the rational behaviors of participants in committee-based blockchains. Committee-based blockchains rely on specific blockchain consensus that must be guaranteed in presence of rational participants. We consider a simplified blockchain consensus algorithm based on existing or proposed committee-based blockchains that encapsulates the main actions of the participants: voting for a block, and checking its validity. Knowing that those actions have costs, and achieving the consensus gives rewards to committee members, we study using game theory how strategic players behave while trying to maximizing their gains.