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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 05 novembre 2020

Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 05/11/2020 de 16:00 à 17:15

USING ZOOM

LIPPI Francesco (EIEF)

The Macroeconomics of Sticky Prices with Generalized Hazard Functions



écrit avec Fernando Alvarez and Aleksei Oskolkov




We give a thorough analytic characterization of a large class of sticky-price models where the firm's price setting behavior is described by a generalized hazard function. Such a function provides a tractable description of the firm's price setting behavior and allows for a vast variety of empirical hazards to be fitted. This setup is microfounded by random menu costs as in Caballero and Engel (1993) or, alternatively, by information frictions as in Woodford (2009). We establish two main results. First, we show how to identify all the primitives of the model, including the distribution of the fundamental adjustment costs and the implied generalized hazard function, using the distribution of price changes or the distribution of spell durations. Second, we derive a sufficient statistic for the aggregate effect of a monetary shock: given an arbitrary generalized hazard function, the cumulative impulse response of output to a once-and-for-all monetary shock is proportional to the ratio of the kurtosis of the steady-state distribution of price changes over the frequency of price adjustment. We prove that Calvo's model yields the upper bound and Golosov and Lucas's model the lower bound on this measure within the class of random menu cost models.



Texte intégral

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 05/11/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30

salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

BLOCH Francis ( Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)

Myopic and Farsighted Stable Sets in 2-player Strategic-Form Games





This paper revisits the analysis of stable sets in two-player strategic- form games using recent advances in farsighted stability. Our two main contributions are (i) to establish a connection between myopic stable sets and the stable matchings of an auxiliary two-sided matching problem and (ii) to provide a characterization of singleton farsighted stable sets based on a structural property of 2-player games called “the block partition property.” Our analysis also generalizes and unifies existing results on myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player games.

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 05/11/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30

USING ZOOM

CHAROUSSET Pauline (PSE)

Does Time to Degree Affect Participation in Higher Education and Labour Market Outcomes? Evidence from the French Vocational Track Reform





In 2009, the French reform of the vocational track aimed at increasing the average schooling level of vocational track students. The reform tried to boost the attractiveness of the vocational baccalauréat path, by replacing the two-stage 4-year curriculum by an integrated 3-year curriculum. Using two alternative empirical strategies, we show that the reform considerably improved vocational track students' educational attainment and access to academic credentials. We estimate that the reform increased vocational track students' probability of obtaining the baccalauréat by 9.9 percentage points, from a baseline of 26.5 percent, and their rate of access to higher education by 3.0 percentage points, from a baseline of 10.9 percent. Some labour market outcomes might be available by Thursday!

Behavior seminar

Du 05/11/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00

online

L’HARIDON Olivier (Université Rennes 1)

An Effective and Simple Tool for Measuring Loss Aversion



écrit avec Craig S. Webb (Department of Economics, University of Manchester) and Horst Zank (Department of Economics, University of Manchester)




For prospect theory (PT), a truth-telling mechanism for assessing personal beliefs, the quadratic scoring rule, is extended to obtain a new measurement tool for loss aversion. Under the plausible assumption that utility is linear for small scale gains and similar for losses, the loss aversion index (short: lambda ) measures the size of the concave kink of the gain-loss utility function at the reference point. We control for the bias captured by decision weights in PT, and quantify efficiently with only three quadratic scores. The additional benefits of the new tool are inherited from characteristic properties of scoring rules: they are relatively simple to implement, easy to understand by subjects, incentive compatible, and they dispense of chained measurements. In an experiment, we demonstrate these features of the new tool for risk and extend it to ambiguity; we find a median value of lambda= 1 at the aggregate level for both sources of uncertainty. Probability and event weighting, while less pronounced, accord with earlier findings from the literature; specifically, we find that these weights depend on the sign of the corresponding outcomes, supporting reference-dependent preferences. Event weighting persist at the individual level; after controlling for these weights, we find very few subjects who are loss averse or gain seeking.