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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 06 juin 2019

Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 06/06/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00

PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21

WAUGH Michael (New York University, Stern School of Business)

Quantifying the Losses from International Trade



écrit avec Spencer G. Lyon New York University




Did trade with China harm the US economy in the 2000s? A popular narrative suggests so—that the rapid rise in Chinese import penetration lead to an expanding trade deficit and negative impacts on wages and employment within narrowly defined labor markets. We provide an alternative interpretation of this evidence by developing a dynamic, standard incomplete market model with Ricardian trade and frictional labor markets and calibrated to match local-labor-market evidence. Despite being consistent with the evidence of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), a rising trade exposure induces a boom: a increase in GDP and employment, a modest increase in consumption, and an improving trade deficit. Much heterogeneity in the gains from trade underlays the aggregate effects; however, very few actually lose from trade.



Texte intégral

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 06/06/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30

SMAGGHUE Gabriel (UC3M)

Chinese Competition, Inequality and Collective Wage Agreement: Evidence from France





We show that there exists substantial heterogeneity across occupations on the negative effect of Chinese competition. A one standard deviation increase in Chinese competition reduces total earnings over the period 1997-2015 by 24% of 1997 earnings for managers and engineers, 18% for mid-level occupation workers and only 11% for production workers. The larger earning decline suffered by high skilled workers mostly reflects a larger drop in their hourly wage (the impact of China on hours worked is comparable across occupations). These results suggest the presence of downward wage rigidities mediating trade adjustments. We confirm this mechanism using industry-variation on minimum wage agreements. We find that in more regulated industries, the impact of the China shock is more concentrated on skilled workers. Overall, this evidence show that labor market institutions can shape the link between trade and inequalities.

Behavior seminar

Du 06/06/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00

salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

FLEURBAEY Marc (PSE)

Rationality under risk and uncertainty





What is rational to do for a decision-maker who is not able to identify states of the world or final consequences, and is not able to assign probabilities to all the relevant events? A set of dominance conditions deriving from stochastic dominance, formulated in a model in which the objects of preferences are act-event pairs, implies expected utility and, in a variant of Savage's theorem, the use of a well-defined probability measure compatible with the decision-maker's beliefs. As in Skiadas (1997b), the model is flexible enough to incorporate feelings such as ambiguity aversion in the evaluation of consequences. However, there is a sense in which ambiguity aversion is acceptable for individuals but appears unreasonable (which is not the same as irrational) for policy-makers.