Calendrier du 07 novembre 2019
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 07/11/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
RAZIN Assaf ()
Welfare State vs. Market Forces in a Globalization Era
écrit avec Efraim Sadka and Alexander Schwemmer
Globalization radically changes income distribution and triggers intense international tax competition, and, consequently, entails the extensive restructuring of the welfare state. We analyze a parsimonious model of an open economy, in its trade and finance transactions with the rest of the world, governed by voter-majority-controlled welfare state. The paper highlights key trade-related and finance-related mechanisms, linking forces of globalization to the welfare-state fiscal structure. The Welfare state, which provides social benefit that are financed by levying labor and capital taxes, is governed by the majority of the voter population; thus reflecting their economic interests At the root cause of the interactions between the welfare state and globalization lies the world markets, which inflict intense pressures on the welfare state. Globalization pressures force significant fiscal changes for the economy to be able to compete in trade and capital markets internationally. Furthermore, they radically affect incomes from capital investments and and from labor sevices of various classes. Income-based olitical cleavages are shown to be grounded on trade-related and macro-related fundamentals, familiar from a standard open-economy model. They are: (i) The degree of trade border frictions, (ii) The degree of international finance frictions, (iii) The relative factor abundance that determines the capital intensity of the country’s exports; and, (iv) The domestic savings and productivity of domestic investment, which determines whether the country is a financial capital exporter or importer.
We find that when the country is capital-abundant relative to the rest of the world, or when it exhibits strong saving propensity, a welfare state governed by the skilled-rich magnifies the intensity of globalization. In contrast, when the country is labor abundant relative to the rest of the world, or it exhibits slow saving propensity, a welfare state governed by the unskilled-poor would tends to magnify the intensity of globalization. The welfare state boost the utility of the losers from globalization, regardless whether the skilled-rich or the unskilled poor govern its policies , or the factor supply and the saving propensity are the economy’s fundamentals.
Texte intégral
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 07/11/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PEI Harry (Northwestern University)
Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment
I introduce a reputation model in which all types of the reputation-building player are facing lack-of-commitment problems. I study a repeatedtrust gamein which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win thetrust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit frombetrayal is her persistent private information. I provide a tractable formula for the highest equilibrium payoff forevery type of that patient player. Interestingly, incomplete information affects this payoff only through the lowestbenefit in the support of the prior belief. In every equilibrium that attains this highest payoff, the patient player’sbehavior depends nontrivially on past play. I establish bounds on her long-run action frequencies that apply toall of her equilibrium best replies. These features of her behavior are essential for her to extract information rentwhile preserving her informational advantage. I construct a class of such high-payoff equilibria in which thepatient player’s reputation depends only on the number of times she has betrayed as well as the number of timesshe has been trustworthy in the past. The method I developed is useful for studying other repeated incompleteinformation games between a patient informed player and a sequence of myopic uninformed players.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 07/11/2019 de 12:30 à 13:45
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
PETRONGOLO Barbara (Queen Mary University of London)
Economic incentives, home production and gender identity norms
écrit avec Co-authors: A. Ichino, M. Olsson, and P. Skogman Thoursie
We infer the role of gender identity norms from the reallocation of childcare across parents, following changes in their relative wages. By exploiting variation from a Swedish tax reform, we estimate the elasticity of substitution in parental childcare for the whole population and for demographic groups potentially adhering to differently binding norms. We find that immigrant, married and male breadwinner couples, as well as couples with a male first-born, react more strongly to tax changes that induce a more traditional allocation of spouses time, while the respective counterpart couples react more strongly to tax changes that induce a more egalitarian division of labor.