Calendrier du 07 septembre 2021
Virtual Development Economics Seminar
Du 07/09/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
On line
FIELD Erica (Duke University & CEPR)
A signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh
écrit avec with Nina Buchmann, Rachel Glennerster, Shahana Nazneen and Xiao Yu Wang
Behavior seminar
Du 07/09/2021 de 15:00 à 16:00
Online
ROEMER John (YALE)
Game-theoretic analyses of childhood vaccination behavior: Nash vs. Kant
écrit avec Philippe De Donder, Toulouse School of Economics; Humberto Llavador, Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Stefan Penczynski, University of East Anglia; John E. Roemer, Yale University; Roberto Velez, Centro Estudios Espinosa Yglesias, Mexico City. Research Assistants: Collin Schumock, Austin Jang
Whether or not to vaccinate one's child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether or not to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive alternalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an increasingly prevalent behavior, due to deleterious side effects that parents believe may accompany vaccination.
The standard game-theoretic approach is to assume that parents make decisions according to the Nash behavioral protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. Because of the positive externality that each child’s vaccination creates for others, the Nash equilibrium suffers from the free-rider problem. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively -- they may optimize according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We test, on a sample of six countries, whether vaccination behavior conforms better to the individualistic or cooperative protocol. To do so, we conduct surveys of parents in these countries, to ascertain their beliefs about the subjective probability and severity of deleterious side effects of vaccination.
Our analysis shows that in all the countries of our sample, the Kant model dominates the Nash model. We conjecture that, due to the free-rider problem inherent in the Nash equilibrium, social norms have developed, quite generally, inducing parents to vaccinate with higher probability than they would in the non-cooperative solution.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 07/09/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan
PASTORE Thomas ()
The Belle-Epoque of Portfolios?
I reconstruct in this paper the historical performance of individual portfolios owned by Parisian investors in 1912, during the French Belle-Epoque, characterized by a massive concentration of wealth. Despite not bearing additional idiosyncratic risk and maintaining a low correlation with the market, the wealthier investors received higher risk-adjusted returns and captured a positive alpha. This relatively greater performance of large portfolios was achieved through the larger geographic and sectorial scope of their investments, higher returns on equity, corporate bonds and foreign assets, and a portfolio composition tilted toward expensive assets with positively skewed returns.
Du 07/09/2021
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La séance est annulée