Calendrier du 09 mars 2017
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 09/03/2017 de 16:30 à 17:45
Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
REIS Ricardo (London School of Economics)
*
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 09/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
salle R1-11, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GOMES RENATO (TSE)
Drip Prices and Missed Sales
écrit avec joint with TIROLE Jean
Abstract: Firms often sell a basic good as well as ancillary ones.
Hold-up concerns have led to regulations on ancillary good pricing
such as price transparency and caps on the add-on price. The hold-up
narrative, however, is an inaccurate description of many retail
settings in which add-ons are offered below cost (e.g. free shipping),
and of the infrequent card surcharging in countries where the
“no-surcharge rule” was lifted.
We argue that the key to unifying these conflicting narratives is the
seller’s concern about losing sales on the basic good. When the
ancillary good is self-supplied (or equivalently supplied by a
competitive upstream ancillary-good industry) and consumers are
well-informed about prices (attentive or repeat customers), the firm
passes through the cost of the ancillary good to the consumer if the
(endogenous) markup on the basic good is small, but absorbs partly or
fully any ancillary good cost increase if this markup is high, so as
not to run the risk of losing sales. The ancillary good is always sold
below cost. When the ancillary good is provided by a supplier with
market power, the latter has an incentive to jack up the intermediate
price so as to benefit from the seller’s cost absorption strategy. We
show that the optimal regulation is a price floor on the ancillary
good, equal to the intermediate price. We also show that absent
regulation, there is an overprovision of the ancillary good when the
ancillary good is supplied by a two-sided platform.
When consumers are initially unaware of the ancillary good price, the
price of the basic good acts as a signal of the ancillary good price:
A high price for the basic good makes the firm more wary of missed
sales and thus reassures the consumer about the ancillary good price.
We study the optimal regulation
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 09/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-07, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BEHAGHEL Luc (PSE)
Next please! Estimating the effect of treatments allocated by randomized waiting lists
écrit avec Clément de Chaisemartin
Oversubscribed treatments are often allocated by randomized waiting lists. Applicants
are ordered randomly, and treatment offers are made following that order. Upon receiving
an offer, applicants can either accept it or decline it. Offers stop when all the seats for
treatment have been filled. We refer to applicants that accept their offer as takers.
We start by showing that there is a correlation between receiving an offer and being a
taker, because offers continue until sufficiently many applicants have accepted their offer.
Therefore, receiving an offer cannot be used as an instrument to estimate the effect of
the treatment. We then show how one can solve this problem by downweighting takers
that receive an offer. Based on this result, we propose a new estimator of the effect of the
treatment, and we show that it is consistent. We review recent articles using randomized
waiting lists to estimate treatment effects, and we show that the most commonly used
estimator is not consistent. Finally, we use our estimator to revisit Behaghel et al. (2017).
Behavior seminar
Du 09/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:00
Salle R2-01 Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BRAMOULLÉ Yann (Ecole d'Economie d'Aix-Marseille)
Hiring through Networks: Favors or Information
écrit avec kenan Huremovic
In many different contexts, connected candidates are more likely to be hired or promoted than unconnected ones. This may be due to favoritism or better information on candidates' abilities. Attempts at identifiying both effects have generally relied on productivity measures collected after hiring. In this paper, we develop a new method to identify favors and information from data on hiring. Under natural assumptions, we show that observable characteristics have a lower impact on the probability to be hired for connected candidates and that this reduction precisely captures the information effect. We then show how to recover biases due to favors from overall shifts in hiring probabilities. We apply this new method on data on academic promotions in Spain. We find weak evidence of information effects and strong evidence of favoritism. These results are consistent with those obtained from later productivities.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 09/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:30
salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PANDE Rohini (Yale)
A préciser.