Calendrier du 10 juin 2021
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 10/06/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
Using Zoom
WANG Zheng (Aix-Marseille School Of Economics)
Dynamic Oligopoly and Price Stickiness
écrit avec Iván Werning
How does market concentration affect the potency of monetary policy? To
tackle this question we build a model with oligopolistic sectors. We provide
a formula for the response of aggregate output to monetary shocks in terms of
demand elasticities, concentration, and markups. We calibrate our model to the
evidence on pass-through, and find that higher concentration significantly am-
plifies non-neutrality. To isolate the strategic effects of oligopoly, we compare
our model to one with monopolistic firms and modified consumer preferences
that ensure firms face comparable residual demands. Finally, the Phillips curve
for our model displays inflation persistence and endogenous cost-push shocks.
Texte intégral
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 10/06/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Online
KOESSLER Frédéric (PSE)
Mediation and Information Design in Large Games
écrit avec Co-authors: Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala
We define the notion of Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibrium (BCWE) for general non-atomic games with anonymous players and incomplete information. BCWE describes the set of all outcomes that could arise when a mediator (such as a social planner or a traffic information system) provides information and helps players coordinate their decisions. We show that, whatever the information structure, a (Bayes Wardrop) equilibrium of the corresponding game induces a BCWE. Conversely, a revelation principle holds: every BCWE can be implemented with a direct recommendation system and obedient strategies. If the game admits a convex potential (e.g., traffic routing games or adoption games with negative externalities) and there is complete information, every BCWE is a convex combination of Wardrop equilibria: mediation is essentially irrelevant. If the game does not admit a convex potential, correlated signals can expand the set of equilibrium outcomes and improve welfare, even under complete information. Under incomplete information, every BCWE outcome of a game with a convex potential can be fully implemented: there exists an information structure such that every Bayes Wardrop equilibrium induces that outcome. Finally, we show that BCWE is the appropriate solution concept to study information design in games with a finite set of players when the set of players tends to infinity.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 10/06/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Using Zoom
PAUL-VENTURINE Julia ()
Reducing the gender pay gap: can we let firms take action?
In France, women earn about 20% less than men and the cost of this discrimination against women is estimated to be substantial. Policies to decrease the gender pay gap are thus key but state intervention is often criticized as creating one-approach-for-all which is inappropriate for the specific difficulties faced by each sector and firm. In this context, France decided in November 2010 to decentralize the level of action by mandating firms of more than 50 employees to negotiate and sign agreements on professional equality between men and women. In this paper, I estimate the causal effect of the signature of such agreements on the wage gap and other measures of gender inequalities. I combine different administrative datasets to build a unique database identifying the year of signature for each firm. I exploit the staggered signature of agreements over the 2010-2013 period and find that the law had indeed an effect on the signature of those agreements but none on the gender wage gap or on any other measure of inequalities. Those results can be explained by several factors. First, the law made mandatory the signature of agreements but no obligation of results was put in place. Second, the labour inspectors would enforce only the signature of agreements but not their content. Hence, firms did sign agreements but without negotiating any constraining actions, leading to those null effects.