Calendrier du 11 décembre 2023
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 11/12/2023 de 17:00 à 18:30
R1-09
WALKER-JONES David (University of Surrey)
Difficult Decisions
écrit avec Yoram Halevy and Lanny Zrill
We investigate the problem of identifying incomplete preferences in the domain of uncertainty by proposing an incentive-compatible mechanism that bounds the behavior that can be rationalized by very general classes of complete preferences. Hence, choices that do not abide by the bounds indicate that the decision maker cannot rank the alternatives. Data collected from an experiment that implements the proposed mechanism indicates that when choices cannot be rationalized by Subjective Expected Utility they are usually incompatible with general models of complete preferences. Moreover, behavior that is indicative of incomplete preferences is empirically associated with deliberate randomization
Econometrics Seminar
Du 11/12/2023 de 16:15 à 17:30
PSE, room R1-14
POULIOT Guillaume (University of Chicago)
An Exact t-Test
Multivariate linear regression and randomization-based inference are two essential methods in statistics and econometrics. Nevertheless, the problem of producing a randomized test for the value of a single regression coefficient that is exactly valid when errors are exchangeable, and which is asymptotically valid for the best linear predictor, has remained elusive. In this paper, we produce a test that is exactly valid with exchangeable errors and which allows for general covariate designs; covariates may be continuous as well as discrete, and may be correlated. The test is asymptotically valid when the errors are not exchangeable, in particular in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity.
Regional and urban economics seminar
Du 11/12/2023 de 13:30 à 17:30
R1-15
GUYON Nina(ENS-PSL and PSE)
PAUL-VENTURINE Julia()
KULKA Amrita(University of Warwick)
CHAPELLE Guillaume(University of Cergy-Paris)
FACK Gabrielle(Université Paris-Dauphine-PSL and PSE)
SANTA-MARIA Marta(Sciences Po Paris)
Land-Use Regulation and Housing Supply
Régulation et Environnement
Du 11/12/2023 de 12:00 à 13:30
R1-09
MARA Marleen (Sciences Po)
*Competitive Award of Scarce Airport Slots: an Empirical Analysis
This paper studies the welfare impacts of introducing a market-based mechanism for the allocation of scarce airport take-off and landing slots. The usual revealed preference approach that recovers values from optimal bids is unavailable because there are no bids to invert. Instead, slot values are defined as the additional profit that an airline carrier generates by operating a flight in the slot. These values are estimated using a flight-level structural model of demand and supply of airline tickets, which accounts for consumer departure time preferences, scheduling efficiencies across the carrier’s global flight network, and aircraft-specific costs. Counterfactual simulations assess the welfare impacts of auctioning slots and highlight the asymmetries across carriers due to scheduling and hub efficiencies. Moreover, synergies across departure slots are quantified to shed light on how to best design the auction mechanism.
Paris Migration Economics Seminar
Du 11/12/2023
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/evenements/abstract.asp?IDReu=659