Calendrier du 12 octobre 2022
Development Economics Seminar
Du 12/10/2022 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R1.09 Campus Jourdan
KONDYLIS Florence (World Bank)
Learning from self and learning from others: Experimental evidence from Bangladesh
écrit avec with John Loeser, Mushfiq Mobarak, Maria Jones, and Daniel Stein
Can decentralizing demonstration accelerate diffusion of new technologies? We randomize approaches to demonstration of a new flood-saline-resilient seed in Bangladesh, led either by a single farmer or with expanded participation holding fixed village-level demonstration scale. Decentralization increases the impacts of demonstration on adoption: more farmers learn by demonstrating, and additional demonstrators strengthen social learning. However, in the long run, the impacts of demonstration fall and additional impacts of decentralization strikingly vanish. We estimate a Bayesian model of learning the returns to a new technology; adoption is nonmonotonic in learning, and decentralizing demonstration increases expected gains from demonstration.
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 12/10/2022 de 16:00 à 17:30
Salle R1.14, Campus Jourdan
CADOREL Jean-Laurent ()
The french historical yield curve since 1870
Economic History Seminar
Du 12/10/2022 de 12:00 à 13:30
Salle R1.13, Campus Jourdan
BENVENISTE Stéphane (INED-AMSE)
Political and Business Dynasties in France: a Social Gradient in Returns to Elite Education
Dynasties constitute a visible sign of intergenerational persistence and raise questions on the legitimacy of the ruling elite. Among graduates of prestigious higher education institutions, this paper quantifies occupational following in the French political and business elites. I link nominative data on 103,309 graduates from 12 French Grandes Écoles born between 1931 and 1975 to their professional careers between 1958 and 2019 as politicians with national-level mandates or as board members of French firms. Identifying familial lineage though shared surnames, I find that children of political and business leaders had higher chances than their graduate peers to embrace careers in the elite, emphasizing a social gradient in returns to elite education. Political dynasties were particularly sizeable, although progressively declining. These dynasties also affect the composition of the French elite. Indeed, dynastical board members are less frequently graduates from top institutions than first-generation directors, and members of the elite manage to propel their offspring much younger to top business and political positions.