Calendrier du 12 décembre 2022
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 12/12/2022 de 17:00 à 18:15
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
FENG Tangren (Bocconi)
*Interim Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: Designing Simple Mechanisms in Complex Environments.
We study interim strategy-proof (ISP) Mechanisms with interdependent values: It requires that truth-telling is an interim dominant strategy for each agent, i.e., conditional on an agent’s own private information, the truth-telling maximizes her interim expected payoff for all possible strategies the other agents could use. We provide full characterizations of ISP mechanisms in two classical settings: single unit auctions and binary collective decision-makings. Our results highlight the tension between informational externalies and strategic externalites when designing ISP mechanisms.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 12/12/2022 de 13:00 à 14:00
Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle 116
ZUNIGA-CORDERO Alvaro ()
TBA