Calendrier du 12 mars 2020
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 12/03/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
IOVINO Luigi (Bocconi)
POSTPONED
écrit avec Mikhail Golosov University of Chicago
We consider optimal public provision of unemployment insurance when government's ability
to commit is imperfect. Unemployed persons privately observe arrivals of job opportunities
and choose probabilities of communicating this information to the government. Imperfect
commitment implies that full information revelation is generally suboptimal. We define a
notion of the social value of information and show that, due to the incentive constraints, it
is a convex function of the information revealed. In the optimum each person is provided
with an incentive to either reveal his private information fully or not reveal any of it, but the
allocation of these incentives may be stochastic. In dynamic economies unemployed persons
who enter a period with higher continuation utilities reveal their private information with lower
probabilities. The optimal contract can be decentralized by a joint system of unemployment
and disability benefits in a way that resembles how these systems are used in practice in
developed countries.
Texte intégral
Du 12/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:45
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 12/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LETROUIT Lucie (Université Gustave Eiffel)
Why can't we be friends? An evolutionary approach to the emergence of ethno-cultural hierarchies
Economic behaviors are deeply infl uenced by social norms and, in particular, ethnocultural hierarchies. That's why understanding how such hierarchies emerge and persist through individual interactions in multi-cultural societies is of crucial importance for economists. This paper proposes a three-group (one majority and two ethno-cultural minorities) evolutionary game model of the emergence of ethno-cultural hierarchies in the context of a typical western country where one social group is much larger than the others. From a methodological point of view, this model's originality stems from the multiple groups and strategies implied, which renders the use of graph theory necessary. The model's main results are the following: (1) in accordance with the empirical literature on the subject, ethno-cultural hierarchy views tend to be shared by most individuals within and across groups, (2) minority-di fferentiating ethno-cultural hierarchies, where di fferent minorities are associated with di fferent social statuses, are evolutionarily very resilient and often persist in the long run, instead of more egalitarian ones, because they play a divide-and-rule" role that prevents minorities from allying and jointly demanding more equality, (3) old minorities in a country benefi t from the arrival of a new minority in the long run, if this new minority is culturally close enough to the majority, either directly through status improvement or indirectly through the social recognition of this new minority.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 12/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
RAUX Morgan (AMSE and PSE)
Looking for the Best and Brightest: Hiring difficulties and high-skilled foreign workers
This paper shows that firms' demand for high-skilled foreign workers partly results from their hiring difficulties. Relying on a within-firm identification strategy, I compare recruitment decisions made by a given employer for similar jobs differing in recruitment difficulties. I quantify how the time to fill a vacancy affects the employer's probability to look for recruiting a foreign worker. To identify this relationship, I have collected and assembled a new and original dataset at the job level. It matches online job postings to administrative data on H-1B visas applications in the US. I find that a standard deviation increase in job posting duration increases employers' probability to look for a foreign worker by 1.5 percentage points. This effect is mainly driven by firms sending only a few visa applications. It increases to 3 to 4 percentage points for architects, engineers and computer scientists.