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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du mois de septembre 2024

Programme de la semaine précédente Programme de la semaine Programme de la semaine suivante
(du 2024-09-23 au 2024-09-30)(du 2024-09-30 au 2024-10-06)(du 2024-10-06 au 2024-10-13)

Semaine du 2024-09-30 au 2024-10-06


Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Du 04/10/2024 de 13:00 à 14:00

R1-09

NORITOMO Yuma (Cornell University)

Does the Timing of Productivity Shocks in Childhood Affect Educational Attainment?


EU Tax Observatory Seminar

Du 04/10/2024 de 12:00 à 13:00

R1-14

LANGENMAYR Dominika (KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt)

Navigating the Amazon: The Incidence of Digital Service Taxes





Large digital firms pay little profit tax in many countries, prompting several countries to introduce digital services taxes on these firms to indirectly tax their profits. We study the incidence of digital service taxes using data on Amazon, the largest online retailer. We find that Amazon increased its fees by almost the exact amount of the digital service tax. Firms using Amazon as a platform have largely been able to pass these increased costs onto consumers. On average, the incidence of digital service taxes falls almost entirely on consumers, though there is significant heterogeneity among countries.

Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 03/10/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21

BAYER Christian (U Bonn)

Distributional Dynamics



écrit avec Luis Calderon, University of Bonn and Moritz Kuhn, University of Mannheim CEPR, and IZA




We develop a new method for deriving high-frequency synthetic distributions of con- sumption, income, and wealth. Modern theories of macroeconomic dynamics identify the joint distribution of consumption, income, and wealth as a key determinant of aggregate dynamics. Our novel method allows us to study their distributional dynamics over time. The method can incorporate different microdata sources, regardless of their frequency and coverage of variables, to generate high-frequency synthetic distributional data. We extend existing methods by allowing for more flexible data inputs. The core of the method is to treat the distributional data as a time series of functions that follow a state-space model, which we estimate using Bayesian techniques. We show that the novel method provides the high-frequency distributional data needed to better understand the dynamics of con- sumption and its distribution over the business cycle



Texte intégral

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Du 03/10/2024 de 12:30 à 13:45

R2-01

GIRAY AKSOY CEVAT ((EBRD & Kings College London))

*


TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 03/10/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

R1-14

VELLODI Nikhil (PSE)

A Theory of Self-Prospection



écrit avec Polina Borisova (PSE)




A present-biased decision maker (DM) faces a two-armed bandit problem whose risky arm generates random payoffs at exponentially distributed times. The DM learns about payoff arrivals through informative feedback. At the unique stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the multi-self game, positive feedback supports greater equilibrium welfare than both negative and transparent feedback. Regardless of the form of feedback, the DM's behavior exhibits indecision, deriving from their desire to procrastinate. We relate our findings to the theory of {it self-prospection} --- the process of imagining future goals and outcomes when seeking motivation in the present.

Behavior seminar

Du 03/10/2024 de 11:00 à 12:00

R2-21

CALCAGNO Riccardo (Politecnico di Torino)

*


Behavior Working Group

Du 03/10/2024 de 10:00 à 11:00

R2-21

DAGORN Etienne (INED)

The Roots of Gendered Behaviour : online experiment with teachers





Evidence shows that teachers interact differently with boys and girls, grade them differently and provide different feedback and career advice. These gendered teaching practices have significant effects on boys' and girls' school achievement and educational choices, especially in scientific subjects where strong gender stereotypes prevail. However, little is known about the behavioral roots of such gendered practices. We first develop a theoretical model to rationalize teachers' potential gendered behaviour. We then empirically test those mechanisms using an online experiment with secondary education teachers from several subjects. Teachers are asked to evaluate fictitious school transcripts for which we randomly change the information displayed, namely the student's gender (to measure the extent of their gendered practices). Then, they are invited to play a set of gender-blind and gender-revealed dictator games (to measure gender identity) and to take an implicit association test (to measure gender implicit biases). The preliminary results will be presented during the talk.

Development Economics Seminar

Du 02/10/2024 de 16:30 à 18:00

R2-01

VOENA Alessandra (Stanford University)

Traditional Institutions in Modern Times: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate



écrit avec Natalie Bau, Gaurav Khanna, Corinne Low




This paper examines whether an important cultural institution in India – dowry – can enable male migration by increasing liquidity at the time of marriage. We hypothesize that one cost of migration is the disruption of traditional elderly support structures, where sons co-reside with parents and care for them in their old age. Dowry can attenuate this cost by providing sons and parents with a liquid transfer that eases constraints on income sharing. To test this, we collect two novel datasets on property rights over dowry among migrants and among families of migrants. Net transfers of dowry to a man’s parents are common. Consistent with using dowry for income sharing, transfers occur more when sons migrate, especially when they work in higher-earning occupations. Nationally representative data confirms that migration rates are higher in areas with stronger historical dowry traditions. Finally, exploiting a large-scale highway construction program, we show that men from areas with stronger dowry traditions have a higher migration response to a reduction in migration costs. Despite its potential negative consequences, dowry may play a role in facilitating migration and therefore, economic development.

Economic History Seminar

Du 02/10/2024 de 12:30 à 14:00

R1-09

SARKAR Jayita ( University of Glasgow)

An Anti-Decolonization Bloc. Rössing in Apartheid Namibia





Transnational capital developed Ro?ssing Uranium Limited in South Africa-controlled apartheid Namibia in the 1960s and 1970s. While official newspapers in Windhoek claimed that Ro?ssing was an outcome of renewed hopes of a nuclear energy renaissance after the 1973 oil shock, a closer look at the archives presents a different story. As international pressure increased on the South African government to relinquish its illegitimate control of Namibia—— evident in the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion in June 1971, activism of Sean MacBride as the UN Commissioner for Namibia, and the UN Decree 1 of December 1974—— foreign mining companies increased their extractivism of Namibian natural resources, including uranium. Fearing that an independent and universal Namibia would evict them, these companies began overmining, exporting raw materials and continuing to dispossess Black labor. Ro?ssing was similar but different: it was a combination of the old and the new. Built through majority funding from the Anglo- Australian Rio Tinto Zinc along with contributions from Canadian Rio Algom, French Total Compagnie Minie?re et Nucle?aire, and South African Industrial Development Corporation, it functioned as a secretive and repressive proto-state, while also coopting the language of corporate social responsibility of the 1970s through its philanthropic Ro?ssing Foundation. It was a joint-stock company established with White capital that was closely aligned locally with the German Sudwester settler identity of Swakopmund while dispossessing Black Native laborers toiling in Arandis, Damaraland. Based on corporate and business archives (Ro?ssing, Total Energies, and National Association of Manufacturers), international archives (UNESCO, UNCN, and United Nations), and activists’ collections (Barbara Rogers papers and CANUC), this chapter presents Ro?ssing as a transimperial reactionary bloc throughout the 1970s and 1980s determined first, to prevent independence of Namibia and second, to survive unscathed should independence arrive anyway.

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Du 01/10/2024 de 17:30 à 18:30

R1-14

GPET Seminar

Du 01/10/2024 de 13:30 à 16:00

R2-21




13.30 Pot de rentrée Group GPET (terrasse 2ème étage) 14:15 Andrea Cornejo “Improving linguistic acquisition for migrant students” 15:00 Hannes Tepper : “Do This or Do That? A Model to Prioritize Reforms”

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 01/10/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

R221

WACH Oliver (Freie Universität Berlin)

Building Socialism on Abandoned Land: Collectivization and Civic Engagement in Poland





This article examines the long-term impact of collectivized agriculture in Poland on civic engagement and political preferences. Contrary to the belief that socialism eroded social capital, my findings indicate a positive legacy of collectivized farming on contemporary social capital and left-wing political leanings. For identification purposes I exploit the historical fact that collectivization was more successful on areas that experienced the deportation of the ethnic minorities between 1944 and 1947 and employ an instrumental variable and regression discontinuity approach. An alternative instrumental approach that exploits spatial variation in the 1944 land reform confirms the results. I provide evidence that places with collective farms became the center of village social life and developed a distinct culture. Furthermore, this study utilizes new datasets from interwar and socialist Poland and introduces a novel municipal crosswalk enabling consistent historical analysis with data from century of Polish history.

Du 01/10/2024 de 09:00 à 12:30

R1-15




• Andrea Cornejo • Hannes Tepper

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 30/09/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15

R1-09

CORRAO Roberto (MIT)

Optimally Coarse Contracts



écrit avec Joel Flynn and Karthik Sastry




We study a principal-agent model with imperfectly contractible actions and a cost of determining what is contractible. If contractibility costs satisfy a monotonicity property---implied by any arbitrarily small difficulty in distinguishing actions when writing the contract---then optimal contracts are necessarily coarse, specifying finitely many actions out of a continuum. By contrast, costs of enforcing a contract affect allocations but yield complete contracts. We provide first-order conditions that describe the structure of optimally incomplete contracts. Applying these results, the model rationalizes discrete pay grades in employment contracts. The presence of private information about productivity coarsens the optimal pay scale.

Econometrics Seminar

Du 30/09/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15

ZOOM

RITZWOLLER David (Stanford University)

TBA


Régulation et Environnement

Du 30/09/2024 de 11:00 à 12:15

R1-09

SINGER Gregor (LSE)

"Complementary Inputs and Industrial Development: Can Lower Electricity Prices Improve Energy Efficiency?”





The transition from traditional labor intensive to modern capital intensive production is a key factor for industrial development. Using half a million observations from Indian manufacturing plants, I analyze the effects of a secular decrease in industrial electricity prices through the lens of a model with technology choices and complementarities between electricity and capital inputs. Using instrumental variables, I show how lower industrial electricity prices can increase both labor productivity and electricity productivity. Apart from positive effects on firm economic and environmental performance, cost-price pass through significantly benefitted consumers, and the productivity improvements limited increases in carbon emissions.