Calendrier du 12 juin 2017
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 12/06/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BACCARA Mariagiovanna (Washington University in Saint Louis)
Optimal Dynamic Matching
Abstract
We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially.
There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher quality
matches, and minimizing agentsí waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a
stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative
fashion instantaneously. In decentralized settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium,
but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gain from
centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate
welfare improvements generated by transfer schemes and by matching individuals in
fixed time intervals.