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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 13 septembre 2021

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 13/09/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15

Salle R1-09 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS

AKBARPOUR Mohammad (Stanford)

Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms



écrit avec DUKE KOMINERS Scott ; LI Shengwu ; MILGROM Paul ¶




In many real-world resource allocation problems, optimization is computationally intractable, so any practical allocation mechanism must be based on an approximation algorithm. We study investment incentives in strategy-proof mechanisms that use such approximations. In sharp contrast with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism, for which individual returns on investments are aligned with social welfare, we find that some algorithms that approximate efficient allocation arbitrarily well can nevertheless create misaligned investment incentives that lead to arbitrarily bad overall outcomes. However, if a near-efficient algorithm “excludes bossy negative externalities,” then its outcomes remain near-efficient even after accounting for investments. A weakening of this “XBONE” condition is necessary and sufficient for the result.

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Du 13/09/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00

MSE - Room 116

SABBADINI Giulia (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID))

Firm-Level Prices and Markups:The Role of Immigrant Employment and Input Quality





Exploiting data for French manufacturing traders, this paper presents evidence of a positive effect of immigrant workers on firm-level markups that is attributable to price differences. Immigrant workers allow firms to access imported intermediate inputs of higher quality and therefore produce higher quality final goods for the export market. This quality advantage translates into firms charging higher export prices and markups. I provide econometric evidence in support of this mechanism. First, I show that the prices of exported final goods are positively affected by immigrant workers within narrowly defined varieties. Consistently, I find that immigrant workers positively affect the quality of exported final goods. Second, I show that there is a positive relationship between the price of imported intermediate inputs and the share of immigrant workers, which reflects differences in input quality. Finally, I provide suggestive evidence that immigrant workers allow firms to buy higher quality inputs by lowering upstream information frictions.



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Régulation et Environnement

Du 13/09/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15

Salle R1-13 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS

JEGARD Martin (INRAE)

An Optimal Distribution of Polluting Activities Across Space: An Application to France





Should the largest cities be the most polluting? On the one hand, spatial concentration of economic activities brings welfare gains through agglomeration economies and increased local real wages. On the other hand, aggregating too much polluting activities in the same place leads to lower air quality and detrimental effects on health and productivity of local workers. Building on a spatial general equilibrium model, featuring endogenous pollution, trade and between-cities migration, I investigate welfare effects of the spatial heterogeneity of local stringencies resulting from current air pollutants regulations. I calibrate the model using French data and show that current emission policies target the most populated cities. As a result, these cities are less polluting and relatively larger than what they would be under a spatially uniform policy stringency. However I also find that taking into account productivity and amenity intrinsic local endowments could lead to higher welfare gains.



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