Calendrier du 15 octobre 2015
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 15/10/2015 de 16:30 à 17:45
Maison des Sciences Economiques, 6th floor conference room
TELES Pedro (BANCO DE PORTUGAL AND UCP)
Macro Workshop
Du 15/10/2015 de 15:00 à 16:00
MSE Campus (106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris), room B. 3.1
KEISTER Todd (Rutgers University)
Liquidity regulation and the implementation of monetary policy », co-written with Morten L. Bech
In addition to revamping existing rules for bank capital, Basel III introduces a new global framework for liquidity regulation. One part of this framework is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which requires banks to hold ssufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive a 30-day period of market stress. As monetary policy typically involves targeting the interest rate on loans of one of these assets central bank reserves it is important to understand how this regulation may impact the e-fficacy of central banks’ current operational frameworks. We introduce term funding and an LCR requirement into an otherwise standard model of monetary policy implementation. We show that when banks face the possibility of an LCR shortfall, it becomes more challenging for a central bank to control the overnight interest rate and the short end of the yield curve becomes steeper. Our results suggest that central banks may want to adjust their operational frameworks as the new regulation is implemented.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 15/10/2015 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment B, 1er étage, Salle CMH
TAKAHASHI Hidenori (MANNHEIM)
Strategic Design Under Uncertain Evaluations: Structural Analysis of Design-Build Auctions
I investigate firms’ competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of Design-Build (DB) auctions. Reviewers’ design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder’s perspective, leading luck to dampen differences in firms’ chances of winning. I model bidders’ behavior and show semiparametric identification of the model primitives. Uncertain evaluations reduce the expected price of design quality, and exacerbate an auctioneer’s uncertainty in auction outcomes. A simple adjustment in the auction mechanism may completely shut down the impact of uncertain evaluations on bidding incentives, restoring efficient allocations of projects.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 15/10/2015 de 12:30 à 14:00
BURSZTYN Leonardo (*)
Identifying Ideology: Experimental Evidence on Anti-Americanism in Pakistan
Identifying the role of intrinsic, ideological motivation in political behavior is confounded by agents’ consequential aims and social concerns. We present an experimental methodology isolating Pakistani men’s intrinsic motives for expressing anti-American ideology in a context with clearly-specified financial costs, but negligible other consequential or social considerations. Fol- lowing a survey, we offer subjects a bonus payment. One-quarter of subjects forgo around one-fifth of a day’s wage to avoid anonymously checking a box indicating gratitude toward the U.S. government, revealing anti-Americanism. We find that even extremists moderate their political expression when the financial cost is high and when anticipating public expression.
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