Calendrier du 15 mars 2023
Development Economics Seminar
Du 15/03/2023 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan
BOBONIS Gustavo (University of Toronto)
Norms of Corruption in Politicians’ Malfeasance
écrit avec Anke Kessler and Xin Zhao
We develop a political agency model in which office holders are motivated by re-election as well as reputation motives, and are incentivized to curb corrupt behavior through elections, formal audits, as well as norms regarding the appropriateness of corruption that prevail in their peer group. The model formalizes the notion that anti-social behavior is governed by both formal and informal rules of conduct. We show that, while the formal institutions of audits and elections have the desired direct effect of reducing corruption, the presence of norms and their interaction with the direct incentives can have unintended effects. We examine the model's predictions in the context of Puerto Rico's anti-corruption municipal audits program over the period 1987-2014. Specifically, using a quasi-experimental design based on the exogenous timing of audits relative to elections, we show that the model helps explain peculiar patters in the data: mayors respond positively to audits in their own community, but negatively to audits - and the corresponding reduction in corruption - in neighboring municipalities. Our estimates suggest a large negative spillover effect: communities where two-thirds of adjacent jurisdictions undergo a (timely) audit experience a 30 percent increase in reported corruption levels.
Economic History Seminar
Du 15/03/2023 de 12:00 à 13:30
Annulé
SCHNEIDER Sabine (Oxford University)
International Finance, Bilateral Cooperation and the World Silver Crisis, 1871-1879
Imperial Germany’s monetary union in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71)
necessitated the liquidation of vast quantities of German silver stocks on world markets. Between
1871 and 1879, the German Chancellery engaged an international network of banks and refiners
to acquire gold-backed assets in return for selling its silver in Europe and in South and East Asia.
This paper reconstructs the Chancellery’s network of financial agents and presents the most
comprehensive picture yet of the transcontinental bullion flows that underpinned Germany’s
monetary reforms. Based on a wealth of banking and government records, the paper yields a more
nuanced understanding of the geographic outlets and strategy of Germany’s bullion trade and its
impact on the global silver glut that set in from 1872. The ensuing macroeconomic disruption that
accompanied Germany’s demonetization gave rise to both prolonged uncertainty in bullion
markets and growing diplomatic tensions across Europe.