Calendrier du 15 mai 2017
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 15/05/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SAMUELSON Larry (Yale)
Agreeing to Disagree in Large Worlds
écrit avec Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler
Du 15/05/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BERTHOD Mathias (PSE, Paris I)
Smart tariff for smart customers? Evidences from the lab and A bargaining agreement between non-renewable resource producers: stability versus asymmetry
A bargaining agreement between non-renewable resource producers: stability versus asymmetry
Régulation et Environnement
Du 15/05/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BERTHOD Mathias(PSE, Paris I)
MAYOL Alexandre(PSE, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne )
A bargaining agreement between non-renewable resource producers: stability versus asymmetry
Within a linear quadratic differential game framework with economic depletion inspired by Salo and Tahvonen (2001), we use recent results of Reddy and Engwerda (2013) to characterize a Pareto optimal bargaining agreement between two non-renewable resource producers. The main result is that incentive to cartelize will depend on the symmetry of the producers. In contrast to Salo and Tahvonen, we find that the concentration in supply could then increase over time while countries have more and more interest to bargain.