Calendrier du 16 octobre 2023
Econometrics Seminar
Du 16/10/2023 de 18:00 à 19:15
ZOOM
CHETVERIKOV Denis (UCLA)
Spectral and post-spectral estimators for grouped panel data models
écrit avec Co-author: Elena Manresa
In this paper, we develop spectral and post-spectral estimators for grouped panel data models. Both estimators are consistent in the asymptotics where the number of observations N and the number of time periods T simultaneously grow large. In addition, the post-spectral estimator is sqrt(NT)-consistent and asymptotically normal with mean zero under the assumption of well-separated groups even if T is growing much slower than N. The post-spectral estimator has, therefore, theoretical properties that are comparable to those of the grouped fixed-effect estimator developed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). In contrast to the grouped fixed-effect estimator, however, our post-spectral estimator is computationally straightforward.
Texte intégral
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 16/10/2023 de 17:00 à 18:30
R1-09
NETZER Nick (U Zurich)
Endogenous Risk Attitudes (with Arthur Robson, Jakub Steiner and Pavel Kocourek)
In a model inspired by neuroscience, we show that constrained optimal perception
encodes lottery rewards using an S-shaped encoding function and over-samples low-
probability events. The implications of this perception strategy for behavior depend
on the decision-maker’s understanding of the risk. The strategy does not distort choice
in the limit as perception frictions vanish when the decision-maker fully understands
the decision problem. If, however, the decision-maker underrates the complexity of
the decision problem, then risk attitudes re?ect properties of the perception strategy
even for vanishing perception frictions. The model explains adaptive risk attitudes
and probability weighting as in prospect theory and, additionally, predicts that risk
attitudes are strengthened by time pressure and attenuated by anticipation of large
risks.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 16/10/2023 de 12:00 à 13:30
R1-09
GOEDDE Julius (PSE)
Satiation, unraveling and capping prices. Designing peer-to-peer platforms with internal currencies
I examine how peer-to-peer sharing platforms that use internal currencies instead of real money should set prices. Individuals must earn currency by supplying on the platform and can only spend it by consuming on the same platform. Beyond this difference, such systems often mimic real markets where prices equalize demand and supply. I argue that non-market-clearing prices can be superior. As individuals typically only have a limited demand for the specific goods on the platform, some may become satiated and reduce their supply. This might induce others to reduce their supply in turn and thus lead to unraveling. I illustrate with a stylized model of a dynamic exchange economy that reducing the price of attractive goods may increase their supply and aggregate welfare. In the empirical part, I focus on a widely-used platform for exchanging holiday homes. Using proprietary data on the universe of transactions I confirm key predictions of the model. My results suggest that satiation is quantitatively important. Thus, compressed prices might indeed improve upon market-clearing prices - despite possible side-effects like misallocation. A broader insight is that lessons from traditional markets may not easily extend to markets without real money.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 16/10/2023
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, Amphitheater