Calendrier du 16 décembre 2019
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 16/12/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
STRACK Philipp (Yale University)
The Cost of Information
écrit avec Luciano Pomatto, Omer Tamuz
We develop an axiomatic theory of information acquisition that captures the ideaof constant marginal costs in information production: the cost of generating twoindependent signals is the sum of their costs, and generating a signal with probabilityhalf costs half its original cost. Together with a monotonicity and a continuityconditions, these axioms determine the cost of a signal up to a vector of parameters.These parameters have a clear economic interpretation and determine the difficultyof distinguishing states. We argue that this cost function is a versatile modeling toolthat leads to more realistic predictions than mutual information.
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Régulation et Environnement
Du 16/12/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-14, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LUENGO Andres (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)
Environmental Misallocation in the Copper Industry
We use mine-level data from the international copper industry to quantify environmental
misallocation. We define this concept as the ratio between the observed carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions in the industry and the level reached by a social planner that
allocate the observed output across mines so as to minimize emissions, conditional on
the current state of the technology and some well-defined extraction rules. We find that
CO2 emissions derived from the world copper industry could be reduced by 47% under
the planner's allocation. We also find that the latter allocation of output would bring
down production costs by 24% at the aggregate level. Our results suggest that a cleaner
environment is not necessarily tied to lower levels of productive efficiency.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 16/12/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
PAWLOWITSCH Christina (Université Panthéon-Assas, LEMMA)
Evolutionary dynamics of costly signaling
écrit avec Josef Hofbauer
Costly-signaling games have a remarkably wide range of applications (education as a costly signal in the job market, handicaps as a signal for fitness in mate selection, politeness in language). The formal analysis of evolutionary dynamics in costly-signaling games has only recently gained more attention. In this paper, we study evolutionary dynamics in two basic classes of games with two states of nature, two signals, and two possible reactions in response to signals: a discrete version of Spence’s (1973) model and a discrete version of Grafen’s (1990) formalization of the handicap principle. We first use index theory to give a rough account of the dynamic stability properties of the equilibria in these games. Then, we study in more detail the replicator dynamics and to some extent the best-response dynamics.