Calendrier du 17 novembre 2020
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 17/11/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
Zoom: https://zoom.us/j/97117933045?pwd=VG5oY0RDaWJMbmtSY2o3Y2F5RkZxZz09
HEIM Arthur (PSE)
Preliminary results of a RCT assessing the impact of a Welfare-to-work program in France
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 17/11/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Via Zoom
URVOY Camille ()
Political Profit from Nonprofits? Evidence from Governmental Transfers
Do politicians give money to nonprofit organizations to improve their electoral prospects? In this paper, I study how politicians allocate governmental transfers to nonprofit organizations in France, where they cannot make campaign contributions by law, and campaign spending is limited. To identify electorally motivated transfers, I test whether government officials channel more resources to organizations in municipalities headed by a political ally. Using close elections providing quasi-random variation in mayors’ political affiliation, I show that the government grants significantly more transfers to nonprofit organizations where a well-connected political ally is electorally at risk. Politicians favor ideologically close and influential organizations. The extra amount nonprofit organizations receive dwarfs that spent on campaigning by the average mayoral candidate. Finally, I show that money granted to nonprofit organizations contributes to increasing the lead of ruling party candidates in local elections. My results document a new way politicians use money to sway voters, and provide a more complete picture of how money impacts politics.