Calendrier du 17 novembre 2022
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 17/11/2022 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-01
PORZIO Tommaso (Columbia Business School)
Transforming Institutions: Labor Reallocation and Wage growth in a Reunified Germany
How do institutions affect economic performance? We exploit a unique historical episode,the German Reunification, to investigate how this radical change transformed East Ger-many’s labor market allocation, igniting wage growth in the early years after reunification.Using matched employer-employee data constructed from the universe of German socialsecurity records, we show that the sharp growth in East German wages strongly correlateswith a rapid reallocation of workers across plantswithinEast Germany. Moreover, reallo-cation was disproportionately larger among older cohorts, suggesting that longer exposureto communist institutions led to more severe misallocation: In a competitive market, theseolder workers would have switched jobs or been fired at a younger age. By the same token,only East German plants that already existed at the time of reunification display different re-allocation patterns compared to their Western counterparts: Large plants downsize, indicat-ing that they had previously been inefficiently large, while all plants experience significantlevels of worker turnover. We find that plants with larger levels of reallocation experiencelarger wage growth. This provides rare, direct empirical evidence that the reallocation ofworkers — both within and across plants— spurred by new labor market institutions, wasconsequential for wage growth.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 17/11/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PETERS Dominik (Dauphine)
*Voting Rules in Participatory Budgeting
Using participatory budgeting (PB), cities give their residents an opportunity to influence how the city's budget is spent. This is often done by collecting project proposals, and then voting on those proposals. This talk discusses work in computational social choice on this voting problem. First, we discuss the voting systems in use in major cities, which mostly involve a naive greedy algorithm based on approval scores. Then we formalize a model of voting under a knapsack constraint with additive valuations, and discuss how standard approval votes fit in that model. We then discuss a new voting rule, the Method of Equal Shares, that we have recently proposed and that is planned to be first used by a small city in Poland next year. This rule provides proportional representation, formalized by an axiomatic guarantee, which I'll argue is a desirable goal in PB. Finally, I will mention PB work on the core, strategyproofness, computational complexity, and several extensions which could form directions for future research: allowing negative votes, allowing for constraints, as well as analyzing input formats and the process of agenda setting, among others.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 17/11/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-01
SAGGIO Raffaele (UBC)
Hours Mismatch
We characterize work hour constraints in the labor market and quantify welfare gains to workers from moving from their current hours to their optimal hours. There is a firm component to work hours that explains approximately 27% of the overall variability in hours. Contrary to predictions from established models of work hours determination, there is virtually no correlation between worker preference for hours and employer hour requirements. Instead, high-wage workers are more likely to sort to firms offering more hours even though they have a preference for fewer hours. Using a revealed preference approach, we find that workers are off their labor supply curve, on average. The typical worker has an inelastic labor supply and prefers firms that offer more hours. Workers are willing to trade off 25% of earnings on average to move from their current employer to an employer that offers the ideal hours, at a given wage level.