Calendrier du 17 décembre 2018
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 17/12/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PESKI Marcin (University of Toronto)
Bargaining with Incomplete Information about Preferences
We study a war-of-attrition bargaining over a pie with heterogeneous parts, where players have incomplete information over their opponent preferences as well as behavioral types. Before the war of attrition, players choose their bargaining demands. If the preference uncertainty has a full support and players demands are simple offers, then, in equilibrium, players divide each part of the pie equally. Next, we consider the case when each player may demand that the opponent chooses from a menu of allocations. In the on-sided incomplete information case, the player with known preferences proposes a menu of all allocations that give her at least a half of the value of the whole pie; such a menu is accepted. Finally, we show that the war of attrition game with two sided incomplete information may have multiple equilibria.