Calendrier du 17 décembre 2019
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 17/12/2019 de 17:00 à 18:00
13
KNEBELMANN Justine ()
Property Tax under Weak Enforcement
I combine administrative and survey data to characterize the current functioning of the property tax in the urban region of Dakar (Senegal). This paper aims to assess the Property Tax Gap; to identify determinants of being in the tax net; and finally to discuss whether a weakly functioning property tax ends up being more or less progressive than the (theoretically not progressive) tax defined by the legal framework. This is work in progress using baseline data for an RCT that is in the field.
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 17/12/2019 de 14:45 à 16:15
Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris (M° Saint Germain des Prés), SALLE H 402
BEKKERS Eddy (WTO)
The welfare effects of trade policy experiments in quantitative trade models: the role of solution methods and baseline calibration
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 17/12/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GLEYZE Simon (PSE)
Segregation and Expectation Formation on the Returns to Schooling
écrit avec Philippe Jehiel (PSE/UCL)
We show that low credit constraints together with high returns to schooling are consistent with low investment in human capital if students form their expectation on the returns to schooling by word-of-mouth learning. Under rational expectations, computing these expected returns requires to know the joint distribution of schooling, ability and wages. Instead, in our model students estimate this joint distribution by sampling their social network with a selection bias toward students with similar ability. The perceived returns to schooling exhibit regression to the mean compared to the opportunity cost, leading to self-selection and equilibrium mismatch. We discuss policy implications and show that quotas might be ineffective. We then derive a new form of bias in the estimated returns to schooling from Mincer equations. It is caused by the equilibrium misallocation of students to schools leading to a downward "mismatch bias" on the estimated returns. Finally, we discuss econometric issues in demand estimation from matching data and show that most identifying assumptions (Nash equilibrium, stability, undominated strategies, etc.) induce biased estimates of structural parameters.