Calendrier du 18 septembre 2019
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 18/09/2019 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
Development Economics Seminar
Du 18/09/2019 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
VALENTE Christine(University of Bristol)
SHAH Manisha(UC Berkeley)
Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions
écrit avec Damien de Walque (World Bank)
If parents do not perfectly observe whether their children attend school, (i) cash transfers conditional on an attendance target may increase school attendance in part through an information effect and (ii) incentivizing children directly could be more cost effective than incentivizing parents. We isolate experimentally and for the first time the information effect of a CCT and find that it is large. Incentivizing children is at least as effective as incentivizing parents––and importantly, not because parents were able to appropriate conditional transfers made to children. These results imply the possibility of large savings relative to traditional CCTs.