Calendrier du 19 novembre 2020
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 19/11/2020 de 16:00 à 17:15
USING ZOOM
RAVN Morten (UCL)
Financial Frictions: Macro vs Micro Volatility
écrit avec Seungcheol Lee and Ralph Luetticke
Texte intégral
Behavior seminar
Du 19/11/2020 de 14:30 à 15:30
online
ORTOLOVA Pietro (Princeton)
Caution and Reference Effects
écrit avec Simone Cerreia-Vioglio and David Dillenberger
We establish a theoretical link between three phenomena at the core of behavioral economics: the Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and violations of Expected Utility as in the Certainty Effect. In our model, all jointly stem from one single force: uncertainty about the utility function to use and caution. Behaviorally, we show that our model is derived from positing a form of the certainty effect, that we show implies both Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect. We analyze further implications of our model and demonstrate how it can organize existing empirical evidence of the Endowment Effect, and how it is conceptually and behaviorally distinct from other popular approaches, e.g., Cumulative Prospect Theory.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 19/11/2020 de 12:30 à 13:45
USING ZOOM
AZMAT Ghazala (Sciences Po)
Gender Promotion Gaps: Career Aspirations and Workplace Discrimination
écrit avec Vicente Cunat and Emeric Henry
Using a representative survey of U.S. lawyers, we document a sizeable gender gap in early partnership aspirations. This explains half of the later gender promotion gap. We propose a model to understand aspirations and empirically test it. We show that aspirations induce higher effort, are correlated with expectations of success, and preference to make partner. Furthermore, aspirations are linked to mentoring, fertility choices and early experiences of discrimination. Facing harassment or demeaning comments affects later promotion, mediated via aspirations. We highlight the importance of accounting for, and managing, aspirations as an early intervention to close gender career gaps.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 19/11/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
online
AUGIAS Victor (SciencesPo)
Wishful Thinking: Persuasion and Polarization
How can wishful thinking impact strategic information disclosure? To investigate this question we model a game of persuasion in which Receiver has a tendency to distort beliefs optimistically in the direction of more pleasant states. In the spirit of Caplin and Leahy (2019), we model wishful thinking as a choice of beliefs: following the reception of information, Receiver optimally chooses its posterior belief by trading off the anticipatory utility she derives from being optimistic as well as the cost of distorting beliefs. We characterize the optimal correspondence between Bayesian and motivated belief and analyze how a rational persuader would choose to disclose information to such an agent, characterizing conditions on the preferences of Receiver that define whether the persuader is better or worse off when facing a wishful thinker vis-à-vis the Bayesian canonical model of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Finally, we extend the model to a setting in which wishful voters with heterogeneous partisan preferences choose through majority voting whether or not to adopt a proposal and show that, if voters preferences are symmetrically distributed around the median voter, optimal public persuasion induces maximum belief polarization. This formalizes a new mechanism for the emergence of polarization which comes as a byproduct of strategic information disclosure to wishful agents.