Calendrier du 19 septembre 2022
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 19/09/2022 de 17:00 à 18:15
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SPIEGLER Rani (LSE)
*False Narratives and Political Mobilization" (joint with Kfir Eliaz and Simone Galperti)
We present an equilibrium model of politics in which political platforms compete over public opinion. A platform consists of a policy, a coalition of social groups with diverse intrinsic attitudes to policies, and a narrative. We conceptualize narratives as subjective models that attribute a commonly valued outcome to (potentially spurious) postulated causes. When quantified against empirical observations, these models generate a shared belief among coalition members over the outcome as a function of its postulated causes. The intensity of this belief and the members' intrinsic attitudes to the policy determine the strength of the coalition's mobilization. Only platforms that generate maximal mobilization prevail in equilibrium. Our equilibrium characterization demonstrates how false narratives can be detrimental for the common good, and how political fragmentation leads to their proliferation. The false narratives that emerge in equilibrium attribute good outcomes to the exclusion of social groups from ruling coalitions.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 19/09/2022 de 12:00 à 13:15
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY Ariane (PSE)
*Pro-business arbitration with ISDS
In this paper we investigate the Investor-State Dispute Resolution Settlement (ISDS) framework, which governs dispute resolution between foreign investors and host states in many bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. We show that ISDS delivers fair justice in a one-shot setting. In a repeated-interaction setting however, it is prone to collusion to the benefit of all parties except the host states. Three factors are determinant: First, the investors are the sole parties able to file cases; Second, arbitrators' earning prospects depend on the investors' filing cases; And finally, treaties leave substantial discretion to arbitration courts in their interpretation of treaties' provisions. We give conditions for pro-business collusion between investors and arbitrators to develop and we show how it makes it profitable for foreign investors to file high-stake claims against states in response to new environmental, social or health regulations. Further, we address regulatory chill and show how the fear of ISDS attacks can hold back welfare improving regulation in the host country. Finally, we extend the model to show how regulatory chill affect policy-making in other countries in which the investor operates with similar activities.