Calendrier du 20 juin 2024
Du 20/06/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 20/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-15
EBLE Alex (Columbia University)
How Gender Shapes the Career Impacts of Network Shocks: Evidence from Academic Science
Professional advancement often comes through personal connections. This study analyzes how gender persistently shapes the career benefits workers enjoy from positive shocks to their network of connections. We follow mid-career academic scientists in China who compete to serve temporarily on a major scientific funding body. This role brings substantial opportunities to expand their personal networks, partly through increased interactions with senior scientists who are gatekeepers of research funding. Specifically, we estimate how service affects career advancement differentially by gender over time. For males, service is linked to a 56 percent increase in high-stakes, high-value grants awarded, a doubling of the likelihood of promotion, and a significant increase in the likelihood of becoming a gatekeeper with whom subsequent scholars choose to network. In contrast, females experience no gains. This disparity appears to flow primarily through an expansion to the professional networks of male but not female scientists. Notably, the benefits of service are more comparable when female scientists have more opportunities to network with senior female scientists. These findings help explain the persistence of gender inequality in senior roles in science and other historically male-dominated fields.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 20/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R2-20
SERRANO Roberto(Brown University)
SERRANO ROBERTO (Brown University)
Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication
écrit avec Zeky Murra-Anton
Can private information or mediation change a sender’s behavior and im-
prove the receiver’s expected utility in persuasive communication games? In a
mediated Bayesian persuasion model, private information cannot improve the
receiver’s expected utility when the sender communicates it. When the inter-
mediary communicates the private information, the receiver’s expected utility
improves only with a positive autarky value of the intermediary’s private infor-
mation (AVIPI), a novel information accuracy measure we propose. Finally, the
sender’s strategic behavior is generally affected by the intermediary’s presence
as he tries to persuade the intermediary to, in turn, persuade the receiver
Behavior seminar
Du 20/06/2024 de 11:00 à 12:00
ZOOM
ZIMMERMANN Florian (Briq and the University of Bonn) *;
La séance est annulée
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 20/06/2024
FUCHS-SCHüNDELN Nicola (Frankfurt)
International Macroeconomics Chair Lecture