Calendrier du 20 septembre 2021
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 20/09/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
Salle R1-09 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
ONUCHIC Paula (OXFORD UNIVERSITY)
Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects
écrit avec RAY Debraj
We propose a model of collaborative work in pairs. Each potential partner draws an idea from a distribution that depends on their unobserved ability. The partners then choose to combine their ideas, or work separately. These decisions are based on the intrinsic value of their projects, but also on signaling payoffs, which depend on the public’s assessment of individual contributions to joint work. In equilibrium, collaboration strategies both justify and are justified by public assessments. When partners are symmetric, equilibria with symmetric collaborative strategies are often fragile, in a sense made precise in the paper. In such cases, asymmetric equilibria exist: upon observing a collaborative outcome, the public ascribes higher credit to one of the partners based on payoff-irrelevant “identities.” Such favored identities do receive a higher payoff relative to their disfavored counterparts conditional on collaborating, but may receive lower overall expected payoff. Finally, we study a policy that sometimes (but not always) clarifies the ordinal ranking of partners’ contributions, and find that such disclosures can be Pareto-improving and reduce the scope for discrimination across payoff-irrelevant identities.
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Régulation et Environnement
Du 20/09/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
Salle R1-13 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
PEITZ Martin (University of Mannheim)
Ad clutter, time use, and media diversity
écrit avec ANDERSON Simon P.
We introduce advertising congestion along with a time-use model of consumer choice among media. Both consumers and advertisers multi-home. Higher equilibrium advertising levels ensue on less popular media platforms because platforms treat consumer attention as a common property resource: smaller platforms internalize less the congestion from advertising and so advertise more. Platform entry raises the ad nuisance price to consumers and diminishes the quality of the consumption experience on all platforms. With symmetric
platforms, entry still leads to higher consumer benefits. However, entry of less attractive platforms can increase ad nuisance levels so much that consumers are worse off.