Calendrier du 22 mai 2017
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 22/05/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GUO Yingni (Northwestern)
The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
écrit avec Eran Shmaya
Abstract
A sender persuades a receiver to accept a project by disclosing information regarding
a payoff-relevant state. The receiver has private information about the state, referred
to as his type. We show that the sender-optimal mechanism takes the form of nested
intervals: each type accepts on an interval of states and a more optimistic type’s in-
terval contains a less optimistic type’s interval. This nested-interval structure offers
a simple algorithm to solve for the optimal disclosure and connects our problem to
monopoly screening problems. The mechanism is optimal even if the sender conditions
the disclosure mechanism on the receiver’s reported type.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 22/05/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle S/19, MSE, 106 boulevard de l'hôpital, 75013 Paris
WIBAUX Pauline (Paris 1 - PSE)
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Régulation et Environnement
Du 22/05/2017 de 09:00 à 13:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 paris