Calendrier du 23 mars 2015
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 23/03/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
DEKEL Eddie (ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, AND SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC)
Disclosure and Choice
écrit avec Co-author(s) : Elchanan Ben-Porath and Barton L. Lipman
An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer's expectation of the outcome. With some probability, the agent can disclose the true outcome to the observer. We show that choice is inefficient : the agent favors riskier projects even with lower expected returns. If information can be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer, the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information, excessively risk-averse when the challenger has better access, and efficient otherwise. We also characterize the agent's worst-case equilibrium payoff.