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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 27 septembre 2024

Occasional Empirical Environmental Group

Du 27/09/2024 de 16:30 à 17:30

R1-09

JEGARD Martin (INRAE)

An Optimal Distribution of Polluting Activities Across Space





Should air quality policies target industries within the largest cities? On the one hand, we should seek to reduce atmospheric pollutants’ emissions in places where most of the population is concentrated. On the other hand, more stringent policies can hurt local industries and targeting the cities that contribute the most economically may decrease welfare. Extending recent quantitative spatial economics models, I analyze these counteracting forces. I find that when the local damages from pollution are not internalized by the industry and workers react to low air quality through migration, the largest cities can be too small. As a result, an optimal set of policies imposes higher emission taxes in these locations relative to the rest of the country. I estimate the model using French data and find that current policies impose higher costs of emissions in larger cities but raising them even higher could achieve welfare gains.

PSE Internal Seminar

Du 27/09/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

R1-15

CHALLE Edouard(Pse & Cnrs)
PONCET Sandra(Pse & University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)

Inequality and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Open Economy





We study the transmission and optimality of monetary policy in a tractable small open economy model in which households face uninsured idiosyncratic earnings risk and unequal access to financial markets. As is typical in open economies, the stabilisation of the output gap and inflation (the "internal" objectives) may conflict with the stabilisation of the exchange rate and the current account (the "external" objectives), and our economy is no exception. Uninsured shocks and unequal financial market access further complicate matters for the central bank, as the domestic and foreign demands for home goods now both affect the distribution of earning shocks domestically and, ultimately, domestic inequality. Under plausible calibrations for the trade elasticities, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and the cyclicality of income risk, the central bank finds it optimal to stabilise the exchange rate more than in the benchmark economy without idiosyncratic earnings shocks.

EU Tax Observatory Seminar

Du 27/09/2024 de 12:00 à 13:00

R1-14

KYSAR Rebecca (Fordham University)

The Global Tax Deal and the New International Economic Governance





The ethos of economic integration and trade liberation no longer reigns supreme. Instead of multilateral trade agreements, nations are turning towards protectionism and unilateralism. Yet in late 2021, nearly 140 countries agreed to a new global tax deal that is aimed at coordinating their tax systems to curtail tax competition and corporation profit shifting to tax havens, as well as constructing a new allocation of taxing rights among nations. Although multilateral trade agreements now seem out of reach, tax multilateralism is ascendant. This is surprising given the deep tradition of national control over tax policy. It also perplexing since international tax does not exhibit the same theoretical harmony between national and worldwide welfare that international trade enjoys. The traditional account offered by economists is that trade liberalization is a rising tide that will lift all boats because countries will produce according to their competitive advantages and trade the rest, making trade suitable for international coordination. In contrast, tax is largely described as a zero-sum contest for a fixed pot of tax revenues, deeming it ill-suited for collective action. If multilateralism in the economic sphere is dead, then how did this agreement come to be? And perhaps more puzzlingly, why did a global deal emerge in international tax, of all places? This Article attempts to explain the forces by which the global tax deal came to pass. It contends that we must look beyond traditional rationales for the explanation, instead examining the global tax deal within a broader foreign and domestic economic policy context. The Article concludes that the fall of multilateralism in the trade context and its rise in international tax can be explained by the same phenomenon—widespread dissatisfaction with the distribution of gains from globalization. This account not only illuminates the stakes at issue in the debate over the implementation of the new global tax system, but also extends the rationales for each of its two parts, or “Pillars,” beyond those proffered (and indeed beyond those typically discussed in international tax policy). Further, this explanation provides evidence that an alternative international economic order is emerging rather than the old Washington Consensus simply dying —one where marshaling resources to reverse fiscal austerity and address distributional concerns is on the agenda. Finally, the story of the global tax deal helps to identify troubling aspects of the new industrial and trade strategies that nations are embracing and offers alternatives to them.

Behavior Working Group

Du 27/09/2024 de 11:00 à 12:00

MSE (salle S1)

RIMBAUD Claire (Université Paris-Dauphine.)

Consumers’ (mis)perception of second-hand clothing





Our research project aims to understand consumers' attitudes towards second-hand goods, specifically related to image concerns in the clothing industry, through two connected survey experiments. The first survey investigates if there is a negative perception of buyers of second-hand clothes. The second survey aims to improve people's negative perception of second-hand clothes by presenting them with unbiased opinions from the first survey and asking them to choose between vouchers for first or second-hand clothes.

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Du 27/09/2024 de 11:00 à 12:30

MSE salle du 6e étage

SALESSE Camille (U. Montpellier, Center for Environmental Economics Montpellier)

Air Pollution and Educational Inequalities



écrit avec Simon BRIOLE (U. Montpellier, CEE-M)




This paper assesses the impact of air pollution on human capital using comprehensive data on the results in the two main national exams in France, the Brevet (9th grade) and the Baccalauréat (12th grade), for the cohorts 2010 to 2017. By leveraging daily random variations in air pollution between exam days, we show that fine particulate matter (PM2.5) concentration above the WHO threshold significantly decreases the test score only for the poorest and foreign students. This result is robust using the instrumental variables method, exploiting day-to-day variations in wind direction. Taking a Brevet exam on a day when PM2.5 levels exceed WHO recommendations results in a 5% standard deviation decrease in test score for the poorest students. These students also have the greatest academic difficulties, further exacerbating educational inequalities.