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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 27 juin 2024

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 27/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-15

PAUL-VENTURINE Julia ()

Mayors strike back: Evidence from the removal of floor area ratios in France



écrit avec Guillaume Chapelle (CYU, LIEPP) and Camille Urvoy (Mannheim)




Land use regulations have been pointed out as a major factor of housing scarcity, contributing to high prices and reducing agglomeration economies. Yet most studies use aggregated measures at the municipalities level and little is known about the impact of specific regulatory tools at a fine scale. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the removal of all floor to area ratios (FAR) by decision of the central state in 2014 in France. FAR limits housing surface on a plot according to the plot surface. Its removal aimed at increasing density by allowing more construction. To identify its impact on the Paris metropolitan area, we use a difference-in-difference framework comparing housing blocks where a maximum FAR existed before the reform with close blocks where no FAR existed. Yet, we find that most treated areas did not see a significative change in housing density compared to non-treated ones. Using a panel of disaggregated land use regulations, we explain that it triggered an endogenous regulatory backlash from the mayors. They quickly compensated for the disappearance of FAR using alternate tools that still were available such as maximum heights and area coverage. Treated residential areas saw a small but insignificant decrease in their density compared to untreated ones, while treated semi-residential areas — that gather single-family housing and low-rise multi-family units — saw a significant decrease in density compared to non-treated areas of the same type. Indeed, they were the most at risk of densification. We interpret this impact as suggesting that mayors revised their local plans to reassure their constituents against the threat of devaluation of their house if more density were to be allowed. Ours results confirm that the home voter hypothesis and NIMBYsm are still important drivers of land use restrictions today. They also contribute to the debate optimal governance level for housing policies.

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 27/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

R2-20

WEBER Giacomo (PSE)

Coarse Agents and Intergroup Phenomena





This paper proposes a framework for analyzing intergroup phenomena. We consider heterogeneous agents divided into two groups. Agents are paired to play normal-form two-player games under complete information. When opponents belong to the same group (in-group), players form correct expectations about their behavior. Conversely, players form coarse expectations when their opponent is from the out-group. In equilibrium, these coarse expectations must coincide with the average behavior observed in the out-group. We apply this framework to an organizational setting where the groups represent subdivisions, and each game corresponds to a team task. These tasks are assumed to exhibit strategic complementarities. An omniscient designer assigns agents to teams in a way that maximizes the overall probability of task success. Our study focuses on the optimal assignment strategy, emphasizing the role of coarse expectations. We also discuss further economic applications