Calendrier du 28 septembre 2020
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 28/09/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
online
VOHRA Rakesh (University of Pennsylvania)
Instability of Centralized Markets
écrit avec Ahmad Peivandi
Centralized markets reduce search for buyers and sellers. Their ‘thickness’ increases
the chance of order execution at nearly competitive prices. In spite of the incentives to
consolidate, some markets, securities markets and on-line advertising being the most
notable, are fragmented into multiple trading venues. We argue that fragmentation is
an inevitable feature of any centralized market except in special circumstances.
Texte intégral
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 28/09/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
either amphi Hermite (ground floor) or room 314 (third floor) at Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
SALAMANCA Andrés (PSE)
Biased Mediators in Conflict Resolution
What is the role of biased mediators for reaching negotiated settlements in social conflicts? Previous empirical research in Political Sciences has suggested that mediators are often more effective if they are unbiased (or impartial).This research contributes to the previous debate following a game theoretic analysis. We study a model of cheap-talk in which an agent possesses private information about a binary state of the world. This information is required by an uninformed principal in order to take an action in the real line. Individuals have quadratic preferences, with a difference in their bliss point parameterized by a state-dependent bias parameter. Therefore, a conflict of interests between both parties arises because of a discrepancy in their bliss point. Provided that mediation is beneficial for at least one party, we show that whenever the variation of the bias across states is large enough, the agent will refuse to participate in a mediation process that is biased towards the principal. Otherwise, the mediator’s bias is inconsequential for reaching an agreement, hence a biased mediator is as effective as an unbiased one.