Calendrier du 29 octobre 2015
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 29/10/2015 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment B, 1er étage, Salle CMH
HARRINGTON JOE (WARTON BUSINESS SCHOOL)
A Theory of Collusion with Partial Mutual Understanding
Unlawful collusion is when Örms have a mutual understanding to coordinate their
behavior for the purpose of achieving a supracompetitive outcome. Given the legal focus on mutual beliefs, this paper initiates a research program to explore how much and what type of mutual beliefs among Örms allows them to e§ectively collude. Focusing on price leadership as the collusive mechanism, it is assumed that Örms commonly believe that price increases will be at least matched but lack any shared understanding about who will lead, when they will, and at what prices. Su¢ cient conditions are derived which ensure that supracompetitive prices emerge. However, price is bounded below the maximal equilibrium price.