Calendrier du 29 mai 2017
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 29/05/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DUTTA Bhaskar (U of Warwick)
Coalition formation with history dependence
écrit avec joint with Hannu Vartiainen
Abstract. Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra(2015), have typically been based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional ‘moves’ in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra(2016) point out that these solu- tion concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these solution concepts can yield unreasonable predictions. Dutta and Vohra (2016) restricted coalitions to hold common, history independent expectations that in- corporate optimality regarding the continuation path. This paper extends the Dutta-Vohra analysis by allowing for history dependent expectations. The pa- per provides characterization results for two solution concepts corresponding to two versions of optimality. It demonstrates the power of history dependence by establishing non-emptyness results for all finite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The paper also provides partial comparisons of the solution concepts to other solutions.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 29/05/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GAVAZZA Alessandro (London School of Economics)
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