Calendrier du 29 septembre 2016
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 29/09/2016 de 13:00 à 14:00
WOLFF François-Charles (Université de Nantes)
The effect of innovation on quality and prices: Evidence from the French fish market
écrit avec Laurent Gobillon
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 29/09/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
REDLICKI Bartosz (U of Cambridge)
Spreading Disinformation.
It is a common tactic, e.g., for political parties, to manipulate information without any official verification and then spread it by word of mouth. I develop a theoretical model which combines elements of Bayesian persuasion and cheap talk. An individual, called “manipulator”, manipulates information by designing an information policy, which is modelled by Bayesian persuasion. The information then diffuses via a chain of cheap talk communication in a population of agents with heterogeneous preferences. The manipulator’s objective is to spread disinformation so that as many agents as possible take high actions. He needs to take into account that his information policy can affect the agents’ own incentives to manipulate information during its diffusion. The manipulator’s optimal information policy has a high degree of manipulation if the majority of agents have a large upward bias. On the other hand, he may set a lower degree of manipulation in order to make the information more credible to agents with no upward bias or to improve information diffusion between agents with different preferences.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 29/09/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
YUCHTMAN Noam (LSE)
Are Protests Games of Strategic Complements or Substitutes? Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Democracy Movement
écrit avec Davide Cantoni, David Yang, and Jane Zhang
The decision to protest is strategic: an individual's participation is a function of beliefs about others' behavior. Models of protest often assume strategic complementarity; however, the incentive to free ride suggests the possibility of strategic substitutes. We conduct the first field experiment directly manipulating individuals' beliefs about others' decisions to protest, in the context of Hong Kong's anti-authoritarian movement. We ask university students about planned protest participation and elicit prior beliefs about others' planned participation in an incentivized manner. We randomly provide information about others' actual protest plans, and elicit posterior beliefs in an incentivized manner, allowing us to identify the causal effects of upward and downward belief adjustment on individuals' participation. We consistently find evidence of strategic substitutes. Heterogeneous treatment effects suggest that protests function like a public goods game. Results from direct survey questions reinforce our experimental findings.
Behavior seminar
Du 29/09/2016 de 12:00 à 13:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
ARRONDEL Luc (PSE)
Pourquoi la demande d'actions baisse-t-elle pendant la crise : Préférences ou anticipations ?