Calendrier du 30 janvier 2018
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 30/01/2018 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus Jourdan - Room R2-20
VISKANIC Max (Sciences Po)
Women Working on Women: Evidence from French Politics.
NGOs, Development and Globalization
Du 30/01/2018 de 14:30 à 17:30
Campus Jourdan - Room : R1-14
14:30-15:20 - Philippe Garnier (NGO CRAterre, Architect and researcher)
”On the transition between emergency aid, reconstruction and long term development”
15:20-16:10 Ruben Durante (Sciences Po)
”The life of others: explaining differences in news coverage of human losses around the world”
(with M. Djourelova and E. Papaioannou”)
16:10-16:40 Coffee Break
16:40-17:30 Nancy Carfrae (UIA - Union of International Associations, coordinator)
“UIA: 100 years of documenting international civil society”
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 30/01/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CARBONNIER Clément(U. Paris 8 Vincennes-St Denis, LED & Sciences Po, LIEPP)
MALGOUYRES Clement(CREST)
PY Loriane(Banque de France & IPP)
URVOY Camille()
Wage Incidence of Corporate Income Taxes: market equilibrium versus rent sharing
We take advantage of the introduction of a large tax credit (Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit - CETC) in France in 2013 to assess the wage incidence of corporate income tax. The eligibility rules of the scheme - proportional to the wagebill for individual compensations lower than 2.5 minimum wage - generate a strong discontinuity, upon which we build our identification strategies. Thanks to the match of employer and employee exhaustive admistrative databases, we are able to contrast the corporate income tax incidence on wages at individual and firm levels. The individual-data based analysis studies the deformation of the distribution of wages and hires around the notch, following bunching literature. The firm-level analysis consists in difference-in-difference between firms matched within cells defined according to their wage cumulative density function. The source of variation in treatment intensity stems from pre-reform wage differences in a tight window around the threshold. We show that there exists a discrepancy between the absence of bunching at the individual level and the substantial incidence on wages at the firm level, espcially for high-skill workers. This suggests that rent-sharing or other firm-level wage setting mechanisms are key to fully understand the incidence of such tax credit policy.